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ABSTRACT
This study applies a 'problem solving' approach to employee dishonesty
in a particular retail organisation, analysing records of detected offenders,
surveying the attitudes to honesty of its employees, and investigating the
impact of targeted prevention initiatives.
The literature review establishes employee dishonesty as a complex
phenomenon in which writers have identified many influences that could
act on an individual to encourage or discourage dishonest acts. The
analysis of records of detected offenders investigates the prevalence of
offending and provides a typology of offences. It also confirms the
complexity described in the literature, finding evidence that 'rational
choice' factors of risk and reward, 'neutralisation', and job satisfaction all
contribute to the decision to offend. The type and cost of offences are
shown to vary with the age and length of service of the employees
perpetrating them and the analysis identifies the integrity of managers as
an important issue. Several potential preventative strategies suggested by
the analysis are considered. The survey of employees establishes that
attitudes to dishonesty and offending vary with age and length of service.
In confirmation of the offender analysis, it establishes the integrity of
managers as an important factor influencing the honesty of employees.
An evaluation of the effectiveness of a number of targeted interventions is
provided. Whilst practical problems prevented accurate measurement of
the financial impact of these initiatives, detection rates demonstrate that
the interventions had a considerable effect, showing that despite the wide
range of influences on an employee's honesty, their decision to offend can
be influenced rationally.
In conclusion, a model for managing employee dishonesty derived from
the analysis is put forward. This proposes grouping employees into four
bands according to their age and length of service and targeting a different
dishonesty prevention strategy at each group.
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(1) INTRODUCTION
This section is intended to explain why the issue of employee dishonesty
is important and worth focusing research on. It sets out the aim and
scope of the research.
The problem of retail employee dishonesty
Retailing is one of the UK's principal employers. It accounts for over ten
per cent of national employment (Cross 1995).
Many factors could put this work force at particular risk of being tempted
into dishonesty. Employees are somewhat younger than in other
businesses and are thus closer to the peak age for offending. Many retail
employees are employed on a casual or part-time basis and therefore have
less commitment to their employer. Wages in retailing are relatively low,
providing a possible cause of grievance and therefore a potential
justification for dishonesty. In addition, the nature of the work - with
responsibility for merchandise and large sums of money - means that
opportunities for dishonesty are difficult to eradicate.
In surveys researchers found that around 75 per cent of retail employees
thought that some of their colleagues stole from their employers (Beck and
Willis 1991).
Cost of retail employee dishonesty
The loss that retailers attributed to employee dishonesty in the British
Retail Consortium (BRC)Survey of retail crime losses in the 1993/4
financial year was estimated to be £679 million (Speed et al. 1995). Of this
only £20 million was the result of clearly identified and recorded incidents
of staff dishonesty. The remaining £659 million was missing stock that
retailers attributed to staff crime.
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Research by the Home Office (Mirlees-Black and Ross 1995) established a
similar figure, of £22 million, for losses from clearly identified incidents of
staff dishonesty - though they did not attempt to estimate losses from
undetected incidents.
In the BRC survey, retailers attributed more of their unexplained stock
losses to staff dishonesty (32 per cent) than they attributed to customer
crime (26 per cent).
Current strategies for managing employee crime
As Shapland (1995) points out, 'Many of the techniques to motivate staff to
prevent theft and to deal with any suspected incidents are not specific to
the retail environment.'
As with any other type of crime, the response to staff dishonesty can be
split into two elements: detection and prevention.
In terms of detection, there has been an increased focus in recent years on
more sophisticated systems involving analysis of Electronic Point of Sale
(EPoS) system data and closed circuit television (CCTV) monitoring.
However most staff crime is detected by measures that are more
traditional: staff searches and reports from other staff. Some companies
also use anonymous telephone 'hotlines' on which employees can report
colleagues.
Prevention tends to be relatively unsophisticated and focused on the early
stages of an individual's employment. It commonly involves screening of
job applicants through references from previous employers and training
new staff on the company policy and the consequences of dishonesty.
However, increasing reluctance among retailers to give negative
references has reduced the effectiveness of the screening process.
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The prevention 'message' is generally the same for all levels of staff.
Sometimes, because it is primarily promulgated as part of the induction
training for new starters, it is expressed in terms only appropriate to them.
Even when it is designed for a wider audience, senior employees are still
unlikely to regard it as appropriate to anyone other than new starters.
There are essentially two types of 'message' given out to the staff, and
they are sometimes used in combination. The first type stresses the
company's power over the staff and the second type emphasises the
company's concern for its employees.
The 'control' message stresses that offenders will be caught. It emphasises
that staff must conform to standards and instructions put in place to
ensure that they do not have an opportunity to steal. It tends to
emphasise the company's surveillance measures. It stresses the
particularly unpleasant consequences for employees who steal or
transgress the rules.
The 'support' message plays on more personal values - focusing on how
by stealing the staff member will be 'letting themselves down' and 'letting
down' the rest of 'the team'. The dire consequences of being caught
stealing are also stressed - but not as something the company will gleefully
impose on you - rather something the offender will bring on themselves
by stealing and which the company wants to protect them from. The
supportive message also stresses the benevolence of the company - both as
a way of showing that the employee doesn't really need to steal, and also
to emphasise the status, reputation and benefits the employee will be
throwing away.
Theoretical framework
These two approaches to staff dishonesty have resonance with the two
principal currents in theoretical criminology.
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The control approach implies a 'deterministic' viewpoint that portrays
certain people as pre-disposed to criminality and requiring the company
to control them. The' support' messages imply a more' classical'
viewpoint in which the company seeks to influence the rational choice
made by employees whether to steal or not. The emphasis that some
retailers place on recruitment - on seeking to prevent' the wrong types'
entering the business - implies the deterministic view of staff crime.
However, the staff training undertaken by retailers - showing the risks and
consequences of staff crime - seems to be based on the' classical' notion
that offenders make a rational choice.
There are three other key aspects that a theoretical framework for staff
dishonesty needs to take into account: the employee's attitude to the
company, the practices that the employee is introduced to as 'normal'
within their workplace, and the way the employees actions are interpreted
by the company. Staff offenders often justify their actions by interpreting
them as a form of 'natural justice'. They see their theft as balancing some
extra effort or outlay made by them which the company has not
compensated them for through normal channels or as compensating them
for some injustice done to them. To put this notion in its most basic form
it proposes that it seems probable that employees are more likely to steal
from employers who do not treat them well.
A connection between high rates of pay and low shrinkage (as an indicator
of staff theft) and the provision of employee profit sharing schemes and
low rates of shrinkage is suggested, for example, by Barnfield 1994. This
idea also has links to other management studies of deviance and negative
influence by employees. The interpretation of staff crime as a way of
challenging the power of the company has resonance with conflict theories
of criminology.
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For some employees the actions which are considered by the company to
be dishonest are behaviours that they have learnt as normal in the
workplace. From a criminological viewpoint, the way dishonesty can
become part of the normal culture within the workplace has been
described by Mars (1982). Furthermore, it has also been argued that
dishonesty is not only entrenched within many organisations, but also that
it is healthy for worker morale (Henry 1978b). This aspect of staff
dishonesty also has a relationship with management studies of how the
culture of employers influences the behaviour of its staff.
Some of the activities undertaken by employees in the course of their
work, which are regarded as dishonest by employers, are difficult to
classify as crimes in the conventional sense. In other cases, actions of the
employees that do fit into conventional crime categories are viewed more
leniently by the employer. These concepts about the nature of crime have
shared issues with the notion of white-collar crime outlined by Sutherland
(1949) though the perpetrators can only seldom be described as 'high
status' people as in Sutherland's definition.
The complexity of possible motivating and restraining factors involved in
retail employee dishonesty (which I have touched on above) is not
reflected in the sophistication of the actual policies in place in most
organisations which are designed to counter the problem.
Most employers seem to find a stance somewhere on a continuum
between control and support, and include any other theoretical
perspectives as seem pragmatically to be appropriate. I am convinced that
this 'one size fits all' approach is not sufficient. Far more impact could be
derived from being more targeted and focusing particular preventative
strategies on particular groups of employees.
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Though few companies would consider the same management techniques
appropriate for all their staff in all other aspects of their work, they seem
to make an exception for staff dishonesty.
The 'problem solving' approach to employee dishonesty
This simplicity in the response of employers to the issue of employee
dishonesty runs counter to the tide of progress in crime prevention over
the last two decades. In crime prevention, the trend has been towards a
problem-solving approach. In this approach, crime is broken down into
very specific problems - for example by type of offence, or by geographical
area. Each carefully defined problem is then countered with targeted
prevention measures. In many instances, the approach relies upon
databases of incidents from which the patterns of offences are drawn.
This approach, which I will loosely refer to as 'crime analysis', has been
applied to the problem of crime against retailers, but primarily where the
crimes have been perpetrated by outsiders. Ekblom (1986) proposed the
relevance of the approach to theft from shops in a study of losses in a busy
record shop. (See page two for an overview of the preventative process.)
Burrows has described how the concept was put into practice by one
retailer (1988) and included it among the components of successful crime
prevention in business in his review of initiatives from business crime
prevention (1991).
However, there is little evidence of employers using crime analysis as the
basis for the management of staff crime. Hope (1991) reviews how
retailers have taken up the use of databases and crime analysis. He finds
that databases have been used for tackling staff crime, but they are
databases of Electronic Point of Sale information, and they are analysed in
order to identify potentially risky transactions. He did not find any
significant analysis of the detected incidents of dishonesty by employees.
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This study attempts in part to redress that balance. The basis of the
research is applying the 'problem solving' analytical approach to a
collection of records of offenders detected by one employer. The employer
operates a large number of retail outlets trading in relatively high value
merchandise in the UK.
The records are incident reports submitted to the employer's central
security department either by local store management or by internal
company investigators. The personnel details contained in them have
been checked against the central personnel files for the accuracy of the
data on age, length of service, grade and so on, and have been updated
wherever possible with details of whether the case was referred to the
police, and what action was taken.
These records do not represent a statistical sample against which
inferential statistical techniques can be applied with any confidence. On
the other hand the records provide a wealth of detailed information on the
circumstances, costs, and offenders that with sensitive interpretation can
highlight opportunities for crime prevention. In contrast, self-report
studies of employee dishonesty do provide a basis for statistical analysis
but the details of the offending is only sufficient for deriving a general
description of the offenders. This is not so useful for deriving counter-
measures for preventing a particular type of crime. Much more data is
required for situational crime prevention.
Aim of the research
The ultimate aim of this research is to inform the development of
employee dishonesty prevention within the retail profession. Despite a
burgeoning literature on preventing various forms of crime, there is very
little written about the prevention of staff dishonesty. For example,
Joanna Shapland (1995) in her comprehensive review of crime prevention
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strategies in the retail sector has little more than a page for the prevention
of staff crime.
I do not intend this desire to inform management practice to place the
research wholly into a category of 'practitioner reflection'. I believe study
of the phenomenon will be of wider interest than that. However, where
there is a range of different avenues that the research could follow, I will
progress first down those that seem to offer the best chance of informing
changes in policy for the management of staff dishonesty.
My belief that such work can contribute to an improvement in the
management of dishonesty is based on my perception that there is a flaw
in the fundamental approach the industry has to the problem. The
attitude of employers and researchers to employee theft seems to imply
that it is one cohesive phenomenon, which can be explained by one theory
and countered by a single approach. However, the plethora of theoretical
perspectives available from the literature, and the evidence of disparate
circumstances that can be gathered from company employment and
detection records, both suggest that this is not the case. If employee
dishonesty is not one cohesive phenomenon, then preventative strategies
based on treating potentially dishonest staff as if they are all the same
seem to me to be unlikely to be effective.
The starting point for this work was the suspicion that offenders are
neither a single group of similar people, nor an amorphous mass. In
contrast to both, it seemed probable that offenders would fall into several
groupings with similar motivations and behaviours. Analysis of these
groups of offences and offenders seemed likely to suggest targeted
prevention strategies which may be more successful that the 'blanket
approach'. Crime analysis holds out the promise of facilitating more
effective initiatives for the reduction of employee dishonesty, in the same
way that 'situational' crime prevention programmes have been directed
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against other crimes. This could be described as a problem-solving
approach - and the essential element of such an approach is the notion
that the better a problem is understood, the easier it is to solve.
My thesis is that a better approach to prevention is through better
targeting of the management response. Different groups of staff may
indulge in particular types of dishonesty, and be influenced by particular
factors. In essence, then, my research goal is to discover what are the most
useful factors for targeting employee dishonesty crime prevention.
There are three areas of investigation that I believe will contribute to that
goal.
The first requirement is to identify groups of offenders or offences that
could be potential factors in targeting prevention measures. I need to
investigate the characteristics of offenders and offences, looking for
associations between the characteristics of detected offenders and the
offences they commit.
The second area of investigation concerns the relationships between
groups of employees in general and their attitudes to issues of integrity
and deterrence.
Thirdly there is the investigation of the effect that targeted intervention
has on the profile of offenders, and financial measures within the
company.
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(2) PREVIOUS VIEWPOINTS ON EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY
This section reviews the literature on employee dishonesty. It deals with
the issue of what is classed as dishonesty. It then focuses particularly on
whether previous research has established explanations for dishonest
behaviour that could assist with the targeting of preventative strategies.
What constitutes employee dishonesty?
The phenomenon of employee dishonesty has been approached in a
variety of ways by different researchers. The variety is not just the result
of differing methodologies and theoretical viewpoints; it is also the result
of a considerable variation in what is chosen for study. Rather like
'delinquency', employee dishonesty covers a number of possible
categories of crime and choices can be made about which of these crimes
to focus on. Furthermore, the concept of employee dishonesty can be
broadened to include a number of behaviours that are difficult to
technically classify as crime.
At the narrow end of the spectrum of viewpoints, violations by staff can be
seen as those incidents that would be defined in law as 'theft'. Although
concepts such as ' trust violation' and' dishonesty' may be mentioned by
writers, they are only seen as other ways of referring to acts of theft. The
study of employee' offenders' undertaken by Robin (1969) is a good
example of this. His subjects are referred to as 'trust violators' or/thieves'
as synonyms. A similar linking of concepts, this time between' staff
dishonesty' and 'theft' is made in the title of Beck and Willis's (1993)
article 'Employee Theft: A Profile of Staff Dishonesty.' This focus around
the legally defined term theft is prevalent among security specialists
writing to give advice. (For example in Bernstein 1974) A narrower focus
is also favoured among those who focus on the relationship between
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psychological test scores and employee behaviour (such as Jones 1980 or
Jones and Terris 1983).
It is difficult to include all the criminal activity that people think of as
employee theft within the legal definition of theft. It is perhaps for this
reason that other legalistic definitions that cover a slightly wider scope
have been put forward. Dwight Merriam (1977) put forward the following
definition for employee theft:
The unlawful taking, control, or transfer of an employer's property with
the purpose of benefiting the employee or another not entitled to the
property.
However, this definition is still quite narrowly focused, and there are
issues that arise from a narrowly focused approach.
One issue arises from the fact that it is very difficult to measure theft by
employees. What a business can measure are financial shortfalls, of which
the most common is the stock deficiency discovered when stocktaking
(sometimes called making a 'stock-audit'). This deficiency is commonly
referred to as 'shrinkage'. This shrinkage can be caused by other activities
than just straightforward theft. Some of them are Idishonest' and others
not. Examples include negligent accounting procedures, deliberate or
accidental damage, theft by suppliers and various forms of false
accounting. These will all lead to 'shrinkage'. Although many of them are
not criminal, they may reasonably be termed' dishonest'. An example
would be giving away unauthorised' free gifts' to make a sale and gain
commission, but without accounting for them through the till system (and
therefore showing a discount). Given that shrinkage, which is all the
business can measure, is affected by a wider variety of practices than
straightforward theft, it seems to make good business sense to not exclude
them by restricting the study of dishonesty too narrowly.
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This disparate collection of failings that cause shrinkage may be more
closely linked than they at first might appear to be. Murphy (1993)
summarises an unpublished report (Murphy and Lee 1991) in which he
relates dishonest acts such as stealing to poor standards that would lead to
accounting failures. He makes the connection between the two through a
psychological factor he refers to as 'conscientiousness'.
Murphy's own approach to defining staff dishonesty gives another
perspective again. His approach is to start by identifying the key elements
of 'honesty' in the workplace and its relationship to integrity (1993,3-9).
This leads him to establish 'truthfulness' as the most important concept.
He says, 'The central focus of this book is on understanding the
circumstances under which members of organisations either abide by or
violate widely held ethical standards regarding truthfulness in their
behaviour and communications.' (I find there is an attractive semantic
link between the concept of 'truthfulness' and 'shrinkage'. If a lack of
truthfulness is re-phrased as 'misrepresentation' then a direct link is made
to the concept of 'shrinkage' because, shrinkage could be re-phrased as the
degree of 'misrepresentation' of the company stockholding.) Employees
who appreciate the opportunities for different representations possible
within the system of accounting may feel that relativistic rather than
absolute injunctions should apply.
The other issue that arises from a narrow focus on legalistic definitions of
'employee theft' is that the perpetrators themselves do not consider what
they are doing to be 'theft' and approaching it through legalistic terms can
be restrictive and limit understanding of the phenomenon. Henry (1978)
paints a colourful picture of the world of the 'hidden' economy where the
inhabitants participate in a structure of shared obligations and values 'that
he shows to be fundamentally irreconcilable with the values and concepts
of criminal law and mainstream economic exchange. The view that there
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is a phenomenon for study here that is different from other types of crime
is manifested in the way researchers coin or make use of alternative names
for the activities they study. For example, there is 'chiselling' (Altheide
1978), 'scamming', (Grey and Anderson 1994), 'cheating' (Mars 1982) and
'perks' or 'the fiddle' (Ditton 1977).
One way to deal with these issues is to focus on very specific behaviours.
This is the approach taken by Hollinger and Clark (1983) in their large-
scale 'self-report' study of employee dishonesty. Although they take their
starting point as Merriam's definition (1973), as quoted above, their
questionnaire asked specific questions that included a wider spectrum of
behaviours. This took their research beyond straightforward theft
(represented by asking respondents to give frequency for items like 'take
store merchandise') to behaviours that are more difficult to treat as
criminal (represented by items like: 'use the discount privileges to buy
merchandise for non-employees'). They also took the opportunity to
broaden their investigation to issues that can be grouped under the terms
'production deviance' or 'theft of time' (including items such as: 'take
unauthorised long lunch or coffee breaks', or 'use sick leave when not
sick').
However, looking at definitions based around the actions employees took
is not the only way to define the area for research. In an influential study,
Cressey (1953) focused his work by reference not to what employees did,
but on the way that they viewed what they had done, and in the context of
their intentions on taking up a particular employment. His subjects had
committed a wide variety of crimes from theft to breaches of company
legislation. What he investigated were the explanations and motivations
given by them after they had betrayed their employers' trust - but he was
only interested in those cases where they did this despite taking up a job
with every intention of being honest. In this study, it was therefore the
attitude of the subjects to their employment, rather than the actual nature
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of their dishonest behaviour that was used to identify them as being
appropriate to include in the study.
At the farthest end of the spectrum of practices that could be included
within the concept of employee dishonesty is what could be termed 'rule-
breaking'. What the employees do in these cases may not be criminal, but
it contravenes the regulations set by the employer, and may render the
perpetrator liable to sanctions from the employer as substantial as many
other more obvious' crimes'. An example of this is the study by Bensman
and Gerver (1963)of the way that a forbidden 'tap' tool is used in an
aircraft factory. Regulations prohibit it, the regulations are policed, and
anyone reported having such a tool could expect to be dismissed.
Bensman and Gerver's study also shows the complexity of the issues
involved in the 'rule-breaking' end of the spectrum of employee
dishonesty because, although the practice they describe is strictly against
the rules, they show how it is essential to the smooth running of the
factory. They summarise:
... a large part of behaviour, visible to an insider or to a sophisticated
obseroer. is 'criminal,' i.e. it violates publicly stated norms. But since
such behaviour is accepted - in fact often stimulated, aided and abetted by
the effective on-the-spot authorities - the criminality of such behaviour has
limited consequences.
Within the study of management science and organisational behaviour,
this sort of violation of the rules of the workplace sometimes attracts the
title of 'workplace deviance'. This phenomenon is defined by Robinson
and Bennett (1995,556) as:
... voluntary behaoiour that violates significant organisational norms and
in so doing threatens the well-being of an organisation, its members, or
both.
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Robinson and Bennett used a technique called multidimensional scaling to
produce a typology that they consider' a more accurate and
comprehensive typology of workplace deviance.' Broadly speaking, their
typology confirms the traditional split between production deviance (such
as taking extra time off or working slowly) and property deviance (such as
taking or using the company's property). What it adds is an interpersonal
dimension which they term' political deviance' and' personal aggression'.
They classify as 'political deviance' items such as 'showing favouritism',
'gossiping about co-workers', and 'competing non-beneficially'. Among
the items they classify as 'personal aggression' are: 'sexual harassment',
'verbal abuse', and 'stealing from co-workers'.
I am uncomfortable, however with involving the concept of 'deviance
against norms' in this context. My unease comes from the notion of using
the word 'norms' only to refer to standards set by the institution. In the
social framework of many organisations, what I would understand to be
best described as 'norms' are the social expectations set by the workforce-
and that may have very different norms to the edicts of the employers.
For example, in the circumstances of the 'production deviance' researched
by Collins, Dalton and Roy (1946) the deviants are the 'rate busters' who
do not conform to the social convention of restricting output. They chose
instead to maximise their own earnings, which, as the majority of the
workforce see it, was to the detriment of the other workers. Another cause
of discomfort is giving a central place to the question of whether the
actions in question caused 'harm' to the organisation. Dalton (1959),
Ditton (1977a), and Zeitlin (1971) all show that undeniable dishonesty can
be perceived as beneficial to the goals of the organisation.
However, there is a further aspect to consider within this phenomenon
and that is an aspect of the concept identified as 'occupational crime' by
Clinnard and Quincy (1967). Their typology includes most crimes
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committed in the course of an occupation as 'occupational crime'. They
include lawbreaking on behalf of the organisation as well as crimes against
it. This area leads the concept of employee dishonesty into a wider area of
business ethics. They also highlight the circumstance where an occupation
gives the opportunity for dishonesty - perhaps engenders it. For example,
in one of the articles within their typology, Quincy (1967) shows how the
business role of retail pharmacists leads to violations of their professional
standards in a way that is completely alien to non-retail pharmacists.
Considering this spectrum of possible interpretations the straightforward
definition that Dwight Merriam (1977), as quoted above, put forward for
employee theft seems too restrictive. However, it would be equally easy
for employee theft to be only a peripheral issue if employee dishonesty is
broadened to include all moral questions facing employees.
Greenberg and Scott (1996, 117) provide an alternative classification
process. They take a 'top-down' approach that seeks to distinguish what
they term' employee theft' from other types of crime stage by stage.
They identified employee theft at the top level as a non-violent, as
opposed to violent crime, and then identified it as business crime (which
they labelled 'white-collar' crime) as opposed to non-business crime. They
then distinguish it as occupational crime where the employee alone
benefits, as opposed to organisational crime where the company benefits,
and distinguish it as crime against the company as opposed to crime
against co-workers. Finally, they identify it as property deviance rather
than production deviance. They therefore conclude that it is 'a non-
violent form of property deviance focused on one's company committed
by an employee of that company for personal gain.'
This approach I find provides an effective route through the dilemma of
establishing a meaningful, but not too restrictive, definition of the
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phenomenon I have been referring to as 'employee dishonesty'. They
avoid the restriction of legal definitions and yet identify clear distinctions.
Although they label what they have defined as 'theft', it includes many
offences that would be defined differently (as fraud, or false accounting),
or be too trivial for the criminal justice system to concern itself with.
Greenberg and Scott represent their definition as a diagram, the essential
elements of which I replicate below as figure 2.01.
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Figure 2.01
Characterising employee dishonesty
Adapted from Greenberg and Scott (1996)
Violent or non violent:=J
*Non business or business
Company benefits or employee benef!![]
Against co-workers or~against company
..... ~
Production or: property /
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Why do they do it?
Whatever focus research has been aimed at, previous writing about
employee dishonesty always seems to revolve around issues of aetiology.
The issue of 'why they do it' is so persistently asked about employee theft,
I feel, because the stereotypical benevolent or charitable interpretation of
theft is that the theft was a response to need. Yet, clearly, the defence of an
overwhelming lack of the necessities of life does not apply to those in
employment. As Altheide et al. (1978) observe 'why so much theft occurs
while income and purchasing power continue to rise is unclear.'
The literature seems to fall into three groups based on three different
answers to the question of why employees behave dishonesty.
One group of answers seems to be tied up with deterministic viewpoints.
Underlying these views is a notion of a pre-disposition to crime that traces
its roots back to measuring the bumps on people's heads and seeing how
closely set their eyes were in order to pick out the criminals. (For example,
Ceasare Lombroso in 'L'uomo delinquente', as summarised by Vold and
Bernard (1986,51), asserted that anomalies of the body or skull were
related to a criminal predisposition.) It also reaches forward into
sophisticated measurement of attitudes and cognition which there is
evidence to show can predict theft, as I will describe later.
A second group of answers portrays crime as a 'rational choice' made by
the offender. This is linked to the 'classical' tradition of criminology. Its
roots are in the neo-classical notions of a rational ordered universe
working to comprehensible principles in which people developed an
ordered society to which individuals conformed or not on the basis of
personal will. This theory underpins the situational crime prevention
initiatives, which have been the success stories of modern crime
prevention.
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The third group of answers involves the offenders not viewing what they
did as 'wrong'. Employee dishonesty, more perhaps than any other facet
of criminality, has brought out explanations of offending connected with
the offenders viewing their actions and themselves as 'non-criminal'. The
writers who focus on this show how employee dishonesty can become a
normal or even institutionalised part of the working environment.
I will discuss each of these groups one by one.
Deterministic interpretations
People only spend part of their lives at work. A significant part if not the
great majority of the influences that affect their behaviour at work comes
from outside the workplace. It would be foolish therefore to imagine that
factors influencing criminality in society in general could be entirely
negated by any factors within the work place.
There are many deterministic or positivist theories of criminality that
would predict that a number of employees arrive at work with a pre-
disposition towards dishonesty. Some of these theories relate to the
intelligence, physical characteristics, or biology of the offender (Cortes
1972). Others identify social circumstances, such as the way they have
been labelled, or conflict arising from unattainable economic goals, that
could drive an individual towards dishonesty (for example, Merton 1968
or Becker 1963).
Whatever may best explain their dishonesty, however, from the point of
view of the employer, these social forces are going to be largely invisible.
They will be factors the individual brings with them into the work
'society'. The Home Office's self-report study of youth crime (Graham
and Bowling 1995) shows that offending at work often forms a progression
from other offences. The authors conclude that
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... the notion that young people Igrow out of crime' is an
oversimplification, at least for young males ... These findings contrast with
information on recorded convictions ... [something which] ... may in part
be explained by men switching from relatively visible and risky forms of
property crime, such as burglary and shoplifting, to less visible, less risky
and less detectable forms of property offending, such as fraud and theft
from the workplace.
Farrington and West's longitudinal study of delinquency (of which a
comprehensive overview is given in Farrington 1994) also portrays
offending as a progression identifying a number of interacting
psychological factors that result in anti-social behaviour.
Retailers seldom proclaim a belief in such determinist theories of
criminology. However, their reliance on employee screening as the most
important aspect of their employee dishonesty management strategy does
seem to do this. Emphasis on effective interview screening relies on a
belief that some individuals have a particular propensity to crime, and
therefore the way to control staff crime is not to take Icriminals' into the
business in the first place.
This belief underlies a 'mythology' of security management. Its typical
form of expression is displayed in the advice currently posted on the
World Wide Web by Gardner (1988). He advises (without references) that
Studies show that roughly 25 per cent of a typical workforce are prone to
dishonesty and will actively seek out ways to steal. Another 25 per cent
are extremely honest and would seldom steal. The remaining 50 per cent
are basically honest, but given opportunity and an apparent lack of
concern by management, they may steal.
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The same breakdown, this time attributed to 'surety bond losses' is put
forward by Charles Carson (1977, 13) in his practical handbook for
employers and security staff Managing Employee Honesty.
Whilst the explanations of employees having a disposition towards
offending may have a sociological basis, the more sophisticated methods
of screening employees are based on psychometric tests that are based on
a psychological explanation of criminology. These 'honesty' tests measure
attitudes that job applicants reveal in relation to issues of honesty and
integrity. They are conducted with a view to screening out from
employment those who 'score low' on honesty.
Jones (1980) found 'statistically significant relationships between attitudes
towards socially unacceptable deviant behaviour' as measured by one
such test battery, and 'employee on-the-job behaviour in the areas of theft,
alcohol use, and illicit drug use' Oanes 1980, 75) as measured by self-
reported behaviour. Three separate scores were compiled: for dishonesty,
alcohol abuse and drug abuse. The three were found to be significantly
interrelated.
Jones and Terris (1983) investigated the predictive validity of the 'London
House Press Personnel Selection Inventory - Form One' by testing 86
employees from a national home improvement centre chain in various
areas of Chicago. They found' significant correlations between the
subjects' attitudes toward theft and (a) their managers' ratings of their
counter productivity, (b) the security director's ratings of internal theft,
and (c) lumber inventory shortages.'
The test was based on the finding that 'employee-thieves generally
reported more (a) rumination over theft behaviour, (b) toleration of theft
acts, (c) projection of theft in others, (d) rationalisation of theft, and (e)
inter-thief loyalty than honest employees.' The following are examples of
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questions designed to evaluate these attitudes. To establish rumination
over theft, they asked: 'How often in recent years have you simply
thought about taking money without actually doing it?' For projection of
theft in others they asked: 'How many executives steal from their
companies?' Concerning rationalisation of theft acts, they asked: 'Will
everyone steal if the conditions are right?' For punitive attitudes towards
thieves, they asked: 'A young person was caught stealing $50,000 in cash
from an employer. If you were the employer what would you do?' And
an example of a question targeting inter-thief loyalty is: 'If you were
caught stealing, would you tell on the people who helped you?'
However, there are problems that may deter employers from putting their
faith in such tests. In the first place, they are not based on any measures of
actual theft. The tests may well identify people that are bad employees,
but not necessarily seriously dishonest employees. Bad staff (so
measured) would certainly attract negative ratings from management and
may be associated with higher inventory loss. Sloppy stock management
often contributes more to inventory shortage than theft. The inter-
relatedness of the scores in Jones's 1980 study would tend to support this
view. Murphy (1993) draws together a number of studies into integrity
testing to show a similar perspective - with the concept of
'conscientiousness' as the linking factor. He argues that 'people who
exhibit low levels of conscientiousness (which results in poor scores on
most integrity tests) ... are undependable, avoid extra work. .. are sloppy,
and require constant supervision' (Murphy 1993, 130).
There is also a danger, especially when recruiting higher calibre
employees, that the test will screen out the better candidates. An
unpublished in-house evaluation of one test (The ATH test by Permetric)
by this author found that many existing senior managers scored
predominantly towards the' sinner' end of the scale. So did many of the
new starters who received the highest evaluations from their managers six
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months after joining and taking the test. In contrast the one proven thief
in the sample scored far enough along towards the I saint' end of the scale
that he would never have been screened out. The evaluation consisted of
all members of staff joining the company at a given time taking the tests,
but their scores not being worked out for six months. After six months,
the scores were calculated and compared to various measures of
performance. The evaluation was not rigorous enough to stand up to
serious academic scrutiny. The sample was not large enough and itwas
difficult to establish any reliable measure of undetected dishonesty.
However, the number of 'high flyers' who would have been screened out
if the test were used was enough to put the company off any use of the
tests.
In recent years, the validity of the tests has been questioned from both
technical and ethical standpoints. Camara and Schneider (1994) have
reviewed these issues. They identify three areas for concern. The first is
the Iethical' issue of whether it is proper to deny some candidates
employment, and labelling them as 'dishonest' based on a psychometric
test. The second question is one of professional standards. Psychologists
usually demand high levels of technical understanding from people who
administer psychometric tests, and Camera and Schneider report that this
is not as strictly adhered to in the case of honesty tests. This means that
although the scores may need sophisticated interpretation they are only
used to create two categories: 'hire' and 'don't hire.' Thirdly, they find
that the technical validity of the tests themselves is being questioned. In
part, the problem arises because the tests are proprietary and not open to
outside validation, but there is also little agreement on what exactly they
are measuring. Validation against actual thefts is of course difficult
because so little employee theft is actually discovered. However, Camara
and Schneider finally conclude that:
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Although technical and scientific questions about integrity tests (e.g. how
well they work, what they measure and why they work) may not be
answered to the complete satisfaction of behavioural scientists, a general
consensus on their validity and utility has emerged. (Camara and
Schneider 1994, 117.)
In the final analysis, whether the psychometric approach is the best
indicator of it or not, there is a strong influence on employees from their
life outside the workplace, and it has to be true that businesses ignore it at
their peril. However, businesses are perhaps being blinded to other
opportunities by their enthusiasm for screening. At the time an individual
joins the organisation they go through a socialisation process that can
modify the values they bring into the workplace. In the third section of
this chapter, which deals with dishonesty as 'normal' behaviour in the
workplace, I relate some of the research that has demonstrated the
powerful nature of this process - though the examples show how the
process can be used to achieve a negative impact on honesty. Businesses
could more consciously and conscientiously use the induction process to
pass on values, as well as knowledge, to the new starters. Rites of passage,
the breaking down and rebuilding of identity and forced separation from
previous influences, are methods used in organisations such as the armed
forces to establish a new set of norms for recruits. 'Boot camps' for new
shop staff would be impractical and extreme - but there may be some
principles that could transfer.
Dishonesty as a rational choice
The other popular view of employee dishonesty within retailing is that it
is a rational choice, a relatively conscious decision that weighs up the
balance between opportunity and reward versus difficulty and risk.
This is, for example, the central message of Carson's handbook on the
management of employee honesty. He entitles his first section 'Honesty as
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a controllable variable,' and he goes on to say it is 'conditioned by positive
security.' The greater the temptation, he says, the greater percentage of
the workforce that will be tempted. The temptation he describes as a
balance between rewards and the security system. He does warn his
readers that rewards may have a subjective value by warning his readers
that in most cases an employee's 'need' is a desire for improved status,
recognition or bolstered ego, and he gives examples of cases that illustrate
this. Nonetheless, he maintains a very conventional view of the rewards
the thieves are targeting. The 'positive security' he then advocates is a
regime of physical measures and systems of accountability that increase
the difficulty and risk of gaining those rewards. He says:
A good security system removes temptations, or makes the temptations
appear dangerous or unprofitable. (Carson 1977,7)
Stuart Traub's (1996)review of corporate strategies for tackling employee
crime in the USA includes 'screening and education projects' but the
majority of the measures he describes are aimed at either increasing the
difficulty or visibility of the crime. Among the potential approaches he
highlights are the options that 'Alarms can be installed on exterior doors,
dumpsters can be replaced with compactors, mirrors can be positioned to
view corners, the number of observation booths can be increased, and
employees can be required to park some distance from building
entrances.' In addition to this sort of physical or 'situational' attempt by
employers to increase the risks, he says many businesses attempt to
increase the perceived risk to the potential offenders from their co-workers
by operating 'whistle blowing' programs which encourage staff to use a
confidential hotline to inform on dishonest colleagues - often in
conjunction with a rewards scheme.
Many of the academic viewpoints on this perspective of crime as a rational
choice are drawn together by Cornish and Clarke (1986)in their collection
33
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
of papers from a conference organised by the Home Office in 1985. They
argue in their introduction that many approaches, at the time they were
writing, seemed to 'assume that much offending was broadly rational in
nature'. They give the starting point for their work as:
... an assumption that offenders seek to benefit themselves by their criminal
behaviour; that this involves the making of decisions and of choices,
however rudimentary on occasion these processes might be; and that these
processes exhibit a measure of rationality, albeit constrained by limits of
time and ability and the availability of relevant information.
The focus from this perspective is on crimes rather than criminals, making
a distinction between the involvement of the criminal in criminal acts (the
decision to commit, or desist from committing, crimes), and the
involvement of the criminal in particular criminal events (the decision to
commit a particular crime). This viewpoint then gives greater importance
to situational factors and the role of incentives.
It is argued by Hirschi (1986, 109) that this approach has common ground
with his 'control theory' interpretation of criminality. He says:
In pure control theory, it is assumed that all people are capable of crime if
the price is right, where price is defined as the product of crime benefits
and the likelihood of detection.
Hirschi portrays informal social controls as the mechanisms that restrict
delinquency. These he categorises as commitments, attachments,
involvements, and beliefs. However, situational crime prevention as
described by Clarke (1997, 2) focuses less on the individuals and offers as
controlling factors' discrete managerial and environmental changes to
reduce the opportunity for ... crimes to occur.' Clarke organises the
possibilities into a sixteen-compartment grid of techniques for reducing
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the opportunity for crime. The techniques are grouped under four
headings: increasing perceived effort (for example by target hardening),
increasing the perceived risks (for example by increasing natural
surveillance), reducing anticipated rewards (for example by property
marking), and finally removing excuses, (for example by facilitating
compliance).
Rewards to the offenders
If this model of a balancing of rewards against risks is to work, then the
value of reward needs to be considered in terms of its value to the
offender rather than in purely mor.etary terms. There is no 'absolute'
value to the reward. At the simplest level, what may seem a small reward
to the wealthy may be a significant gain to those nearer the breadline. At a
more sophisticated level the aspirations and expectations can serve to
magnify or minimise a reward. Evidence for this notion of 'relative
deprivation' is gathered together by J. Stacy Adams (1965, 268).
Addiction to drugs may be another factor increasing the urgency and
importance of the rewards of dishonesty. Horvath found, in his self-report
study of job applicants, that' as drug usage ... became more frequent and
"more serious ... involvement in work-place theft increased' (1990, 233).
However, he does note that another plausible explanation for the
relationship is 'that the factors that contribute to deviant work-place
activities also are acting to some extent on involvement in non
employment-related deviance.
Economic theories of crime, as set out by Becker (1996,1968), take account
of the issue of relative importance of the reward to the individual. The
choice to commit crime is seen as influenced by the same issues as those
involved in a purchase decision. As summarised by Vold and Bernard
(1986, 30) the theory holds that:
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The costs and benefits include not merely monetary factors, but factors
such as taste, comfort, prestige, and convenience.
These theories are supported in a work setting by the research of
Hollinger and Clark (1986). Their survey of over nine thousand
employees found little evidence for lower wages (as such) being associated
with higher offending. They found that the adequacy of the respondent's
income (as reported in the categories of 'always', 'usually', 'seldom' and
'never') was not related to involvement in property deviance. However,
when they asked about how concerned individuals were about their
finances (as opposed to how adequate their income was) they found that
there was a relationship. They write:
... the results are significant, with higher-theft individuals more likely to
be concerned about their finances, particularly those who ranked finances
as the first or second most important issue. (1986,57)
Risks
On the other side of the notional scales from the rewards are the risks, or
to put it another way the ease of opportunity. Hollinger and Clark
observe that:
One of the most commonly expressed theories of employee theft and
counter-productive activity is predicated on the supposition that the
opportunity to indulge in such acts is the key factor to understanding
deviant employee behaviour. (Page 69)
Franklin in her study of employee dishonesty in an American retail
organisation identifies opportunity as the main factor influencing the
crimes that took place (1975, 137).
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However, a good opportunity can be no more measured in 'absolute'
terms than the rewards can. The risk is related to the' stake' in society that
the offender has made. A young person with no marriage or family and
only a limited tenure in his job has invested a much smaller stake in his
status as a trusted employee. As Hollinger and Clark (1986, 65) posit,
'higher levels of theft among younger employees may simply be a
function of lesser commitment to the organisation, combined with lesser
:r.
social risk to those employees actually involved in the theft behaviour.'
It is in the area of increasing the perceived risk of crime that the security
department of a retail firm probably considers it can have the most impact.
However, Hollinger and Clark found only a weak inverse correlation
between the size and sophistication of a retail security department and the
level of staff crime. A more effective correlation was with the emphasis
placed on the company's adoption and dissemination of a clear policy on
staff crime. The effectiveness of unequivocal setting of standards is
demonstrated by the work of Baum and Youngblood (1975). They
investigated the effect of 'legal' compliance with groups of undergraduate
students attending an accountancy course. They changed the way
attendance was enforced in each of their groups of subjects and compared
this to actual attendance records, grades and self-reported satisfaction.
They found, in summary, that:
The results indicated that a control policy based on legal compliance
significantly improved attendance and performance and did not alter
satisfaction levels. (Page 688)
Hollinger and Clark found a significant, but low negative correlation
between the rate of staff crime and the percentage of the work force caught
stealing. This seems to suggest that a company's efforts are as well
directed towards deterring staff from crime rather than catching them.
This is not to say that the perceived risk of being caught is not a very
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important deterrent factor. They found that 'the stronger the perception
that theft would be detected, the less the likelihood that the employee
would engage in deviant behaviour' (page 120).
In further analysis of their self-report survey data, Hollinger and Clark
(1983b) investigated the relationship between employee theft as self-
reported by employees in their survey and the certainty and severity of
punishment. They found that the certainty of punishment was the most
significant factor, but that the severity of punishment was also a deterrent
factor. However, their most interesting finding was in the relationship
between these factors and age. They found that: 'In short, older
employees are substantially more deterrable than younger employees.'
They observe that for younger staff the effect of detection is far less - they
have a 'lesser social and economic vulnerability to the effects of detection
or punishment' (page 415). Trevino and Ball (1992) found from an 'in-
basket' exercise involving MBA students evaluating the disciplinary action
taken in hypothetical situations where ethical violations had taken place
that the' application of harsh discipline to one individual may influence
future ethical behaviour of other individuals.' They conclude that
managers cannot afford to avoid disciplinary actions, and ought to
encourage the punishment to have social meaning by making it known in
some way.
Dishonesty as normal behaviour
Employee fraud, or even all crime by employees, is sometimes loosely
referred to as 'white-collar' crime. This is far from true to the original
meaning. Sutherland (1949) coined the term to describe the activities of
business executives and managers who went outside the law on behalf of
their companies. The employees we are dealing with here are not
Sutherland's employees of high rank and status, and the incidents we are
dealing with are not intended to benefit the companies involved. (A
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thorough investigation of the relationship between the concept of white-
collar crime and employee theft is provided by Robin 1974.)
However, there is something in Sutherland's concept that is particularly
appropriate to the study of dishonest employees. Sutherland picked on
his 'white-collar' crimes as a way of shaking the foundations of simplistic
definitions of, and explanations for, crime. He showed that employees can
commit acts which the law defines as criminal, and acts which may cause
terrible harm to the community, but these individuals can still uphold a
high sense of their own worth, and moral superiority. He pushed to centre
stage the unsettling notion that people who in most respects still share the
moral values of the rest of society commit a considerable amount of
criminal activity. They however can re-classify their criminal actions in a
way that prevents what they are doing conflicting with their moral values
and investigation of this phenomenon is a rich vein of insight that runs
throughout writing about employee theft.
This is an essential reason for Clinard and Quinney (1967) identifying
'occupational crime' as a separate type within their typology of crime.
They observe that:
A major characteristic of occupational crime is the way in which the
offender conceives of himself Since the offences take place in connection
with a legitimate occupation and the offender generally regards himself as
a respectable citizen, he does not regard himself as a criminal. At most he
regards himself as a 'lawbreaker'.
This viewpoint is illustrated by this author's personal experience of
inmates in a remand centre discussion group. The young offenders there
would happily answer the question: 'When did you become a criminal?'
They would give a date, and age, or a specific crime, which marked their
self-classification as 'criminal'. For example, one individual said that
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although he had been involved in shoplifting from an early age,
involvement in his first domestic burglary, at the age of 12, marked his
transition to the status of I criminal'. There is evidence from some
disciplinary interviews that staff offenders are keen to argue that,
whatever they may have done, they are not criminals.
Donald Horning (1970) showed that the way objects were classified
influenced whether they became targets for theft. He noted that some
parts in an electronics factory he studied became classified of 'uncertain
ownership' because of the way they were managed. Taking home such
stock was sanctioned by work-group mores.
Altheide and his colleagues (1978) collected the ways in which employees
justify their actions into four groups:
Our research suggests that the various reasons people have for taking
things not officially theirs are grounded in general contexts: (1) the
history of employer-employee work relations and the way these are
translated into each individual's early on-the-job experience; (2) a
ubiquitous belief throughout our society in the equality of people and the
implications this has for situationally breaching the subordinate-
superordinate relationships in the complex division of labour of most work
settings; (3) trans-situational constant loyalty to work-groups, standards
of legitimacy, and fair play; and (4) culturally acceptable vocabularies of
motives to legitimise and neutralise what one takes and widespread beliefs
about the 'objective' meanings of theft and deviance.'
These groupings form convenient banners around which to assemble the
work of a number of authors, as well as Altheide and his colleagues, so I
will dwell on them in turn.
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Employee-employer relations
In support of context one, the history of employee-employer relations,
Altheide and his colleagues give examples of the way J good work' takes
on a moral meaning for workers quite different from the view envisaged
by managers. They show how the wages-in-kind notion is promoted by
socialisation into the work experience.
They give a bread delivery driver-salesman as an example of an employee
pressured into theft from customers as a way of making up for mistakes
that would be charged against him by the company. This is similar to the
experience of Ditton (1977) who documented a similar process through
participant observation involving bread driver-salesmen in Britain. The
supervisors who trained new drivers told their trainees that any shortages
in the accounts from their rounds would be made up from their wages.
They also slowly made it clear to them that they were never going to be
accurate enough to ensure perfect accounts and no shortfalls. Once this
was established, and without ever overtly telling them to steal, they make
it clear that it was possible to make up any shortfalls by passing them on
to other customers in overcharges and short deliveries.
This process whereby the social meanings within a workplace are subtly
revealed to new workers is a phenomenon demonstrated by Collins,
Dalton and Roy (1946) in their study of the restriction of output in three
factories.
Altheide and his fellow authors noted another way in which supervisors
are sometimes involved in the establishment of a culture of dishonesty.
They tolerate a certain level of staff' deviance' as an informal reward
system, keeping staff on their side for when they need a little extra effort.
The authors quote post office supervisors in the USA as an example. They
are said to support the staff in the maintenance of excessive allotted times
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for routes knowing that some times when the mail is heavier workers will
have to work especially hard.
Bensman and Gerver (1963) describe similar circumstances in the way that
supervisors and inspectors in an aeroplane factory collude with workers in
the use of an illegal 'tap' tool to re-cut threads in a nut when parts of the
assembly cannot be correctly aligned. To the company possession of a tap
is a dismissable offence, but the authors describe how the inter-related
ends and means of these groups have led to its establishment as 'fairly
acceptable behaviour'. They point out that much of what the workers do
is:
'criminal', i.e. it 'Violates publicly stated norms. But since such behaviour
is accepted ... the criminality of such behaviour has limited consequences.
This finding is supported by Dalton (1959) in specific relation to theft. He
studied the official and unofficial roles of managers and employees,
primarily in the chemical industry. He found that despite 'well defined
official tasks ... ' for these managers ' ... the inescapably fluid daily situation
distorts expected working conditions' (page 215). Managers used the
toleration of various misuses of company property as a form of informal
reward scheme. Dalton found, as Ditton had done, that managers could
never overtly sanction these actions. They had to be unofficial. He
illustrates this with an example from retailing. The manageress of a soda
fountain in a drugstore resigned after resenting not getting the recognition
she deserved for achieving far higher profits than any other fountain head
in the company. She achieved this profit through rigorously preventing
free meals or pilferage. He says:
The store manager regarded her as a failure because she did not
understand what he could not tell her - that her margin of profits was too
high and that some social use of materials, not theft, was expected.
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Zeitlin (1971) put forward the idea that there was a good economic case
for such toleration of theft. He asserts that theft is a negligible cost to the
company compared with the benefits that it gives in terms of morale and
job satisfaction. An employee on the fiddle, he argues, gets great
satisfaction from the success in challenging authority, from the challenge
of perpetrating the fiddle, as well as from the extra cash the fiddle
provides, but usually has to put more diligence into the requirements of
the job in order to keep the fiddle going. He says:
The dishonest worker is enriching his own job in a manner that is very
satisfactory (for him). This enrichment is costing management on the
average, $1.50 per worker per day. At this rate management gets a
bargain. By permitting a controlled amount of theft, management can
avoid reorganising jobs and raising wages. (Page 26)
To control the amount of theft he advocates giving warning signs to
employees who exceed an agreed threshold. By way of example, he tells
of a workforce who collected the tolls for a bridge in which the labour
turnover problem was solved by relaxing controls so that the staff could
steal. The management estimated what the takings ought to be from a
vehicle count, and from that they estimated the level of theft for each
employee. If an employee exceeded the threshold they had agreed on,
they parked a police car outside his toll booth - not to catch him, but to
signal that he had to steal less.
This line of argument raises the issue of the general ethical standards of
the businesses. How do ethical standards of a business in general
influence the ethical standards of the individuals employed within it
concerning the company's property? Those who write about business
ethics, for example Sorrell and Hendry (1994), have not overlooked the
issues surrounding the responsibilities of the employee to show loyalty to
the company, and the possible conflicts between this loyalty and other
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moral issues. Senior management has its own social norms, the ethical
standards of which could be interpreted negatively by other employees.
An insight into the moral dilemmas of this world is provided by Jackall
(1988). It has been argued by Gross (1980, 64) that the features, structure
and operation of some businesses, such as emphasis on performance, the
creation of competing business units, and the need to reduce uncertainty,
are particularly likely to result in unethical behaviour.
What, it seems, has not been studied is whether staff dishonesty and low
ethical standards in the business go hand in hand. Do employees
pressurised into 'bending the rules' to achieve the goals of the business
become more likely to 'bend the rules' on their own account? If they do
then perhaps an active policy of honesty, such as that reported by Sorrell
and Hendry, can be a crime prevention measure in terms of employee
dishonesty. These authors report that video producers Fenman Training
post on their walls a statement that reads:
We believe in honest and fair methods of doing business. Our policy is
Active Honesty. For example, if a colleague became aware that a supplier
had mistakenly undercharged us for goods or services and clearly had not
noticed the error, we would expect that colleague to point this out to the
supplier, likewise if we had overcharged a customer.
We believe in the importance of trust and mutual respect in business and
we believe that a policy of Active Honesty pays for itself in the long run
quite apart form the self respect that it makes possible for colleagues. This
company will never penalise anyone for being honest regardless of the cost
to the company.
44
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
A belief in equality
As evidence of their second context, a belief in the equality of workers and
employers, Altheide and his collaborators quote from interviews with a
worker in an electrical retailing chain that demonstrate a view of theft as a
way of balancing the unreasonable power managers have over employees.
They argue:
It is commonplace for employees, like street criminals, to steal for greed
and fun; those cases do not require a lot of explaining. However, it is also
true that many employees steal for revenge and dignihj. They see their
wages in kind as not only something they are entitled to, but also as a way
of 'getting back' at a boss or superoisor ...
In some of their examples, they show that the employee's actions have a
specific audience, of family, friends, or work-mates for whom the acts are
described or displayed. This audience further emphasises the
meaningfulness of the activity beyond any financial gain as a way of
restoring the balance of power and sense of self worth for an individual
who sees him or herself as unreasonably put down by his superiors. The
use of theft to regain self-respect in the face of unfair and degrading
treatment by managers is also described by Grey and Anderson-Ryan
(1994, 209). They conclude from their study of employee theft in chain
restaurants, 'the essential motivation to scam is dissatisfaction with their
work environment.' However, it is not just an overtly exploitative work
environment that could trigger retaliatory action by employees. Rousseau
and Parks (1993) investigate the contracts between individuals and
organisations at length. They conclude:
... contract violation subjects the employment relationship to a trauma
undermining the factors such as good faith which created the relationship.
(Page 36)
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In addition, they demonstrate that the substantial differences between the
way individuals and organisations regard contracts makes violations
difficult to prevent.
Altheide et al. also show that thefts are not just symbolic balancing for
emotional comfort but also a colder balancing of notional accounts of
effort expended against reward received. For example, they quote
workers who take tools or parts with the justification 'I've given [this
company] ten years of my life; I think I deserve a little bonus.' Their
interviews also make the connection between 'work deviance' in the form
of taking extra break time or working less hard, and theft. Their subjects
talk of this sort of reduction in work as a similar component in their
balancing of notional accounts as pilferage, and also tell them that a 'go
slow' is a response to any reduction in pilfering rights.
Hollinger and Clark (1983, 46) in their self-report study also found a
relationship between property deviance and production. However, their
study found that job satisfaction was better related to production deviance
than property deviance. An initial stronger relationship was diminished
after they took into account the strength of the relationship between job
satisfaction and age. They had to conclude that' given the minimal
strength of the relationships reported here ... job satisfaction is apparently
only one variable set related to the occurrence of deviance within the work
setting.'
J. Stacy Adams (1996) gathered a wide range of authorities and integrated
them into' a theory of inequity from which it [is] possible to specify the
antecedents and consequences of injustice in human exchanges' (Page
268). The straightforward premise at the heart of his meticulous
construction is that when people exchange their services for pay they
make an evaluation of what they perceive as their inputs (effort, diligence,
time, and investments such as education). They then balance this against
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their outputs (pay, conditions, and other investments in the exchange
made by the employer). J. Stacy Adams lists a number of strategies
employees can turn to in order to resolve any perceived inequality. They
could attempt to vary outcomes (for example asking for a pay rise),
'distort .. .inputs and outputs cognitively' (i.e. re-think the value they place
on outcomes and inputs), give up the exchange (by getting a new job or a
transfer). Alternatively, they could change the way others work (acting
against a 'rate buster' so that their inputs have greater value). But the
employee's most simple strategy is to vary their inputs through some form
of production deviance - varying the amount of effort or time they put in
to the job - or vary their outputs in the form of property deviance-
stealing the employer's property. Kemper (1966) referred to this use of
theft to redress exploitation as reciprocal deviance.
Greenberg and Scott develop the notion further, describing employee theft
as a process of social exchange (1996). They find employee theft is
legitimised by a 'cycle of acceptance' in which the perception of a
victimless crime is perpetuated by failures by management to respond
aggressively, and it is encouraged by dual ethical standards adopted by
managers, and supported by workplace norms. Nevertheless, their
principal argument is that 'Theft is ... conceptualised as an attempt to
redress distributive injustice' (Page 118). This finding is derived in the
main from research undertaken by Greenberg.
Greenberg (1990) provides experimental evidence that the way that
workers are treated has a strong bearing on how workers measure the
injustice and respond by stealing. He manipulated the way in which two
factories in a group were told about a pay cut that had to be made. In the
factory where the employees were given an adequate and sympathetic
explanation of the issue there was a lower increase in shrinkage than in the
factory where an inadequate explanation was given. Similarly, in another
experiment (1993) he established a greater willingness to steal among
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students employed on a clerical task and paid less than they were
expecting if the explanation for the lower pay was adequate and
sympathetically expressed. In two similar experiments (1994a, 1994b) he
took this a stage further. In one experiment, he gave one group of subjects
an opportunity to steal items (batteries) of value to the employers but of
no value to themselves and another group of subjects an opportunity to
steal cash. This gave an insight into motivation: stealing the cash could be
an attempt to redress the injustice, but stealing the batteries was only
retaliation. Whilst both the adequacy of the explanation and way the
subjects were treated affected the theft of cash, only the way the subjects
were treated affected the theft of the batteries. This showed that
retaliation theft is affected most by the way people are treated. In the
second experiment, he related cheating on clocking out to a self-report
questionnaire of employee attitudes. He found that the degree of respect
shown to the workers was a better predictor of cheating than measures of
pay fairness.
Tucker (1989) goes further and interprets employee theft as social control.
He identifies it as 'a form of "self help" involving the pursuit of justice.'
As evidence, he identifies from previous research that theft is associated
with the' degree of marginality' of the workers. He says: 'The low status,
temporary, socially isolated employee should be most likely to engage in
this activity' (page 326). This, he suggests explains the often observed
relationship between the age of employees and theft from their employers.
The younger staff he identifies as more marginal steal more.
However, this finding is in part challenged by work done by Hollinger,
Slora and Terris (1992) involving deviance in fast food restaurants. Firstly,
in the analysis of their self-report study of deviance they found that the
factors affecting three types of deviance differed. They identified different
factors affecting property deviance for personal benefit, from that affecting
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property deviance for altruistic ends (such as giving free meals to their
friends) and different factors again for production deviance.
Their analysis shows that for personal property deviance young staff with
a short length of service contrasted with older staff with a similar short
length of service. The youngsters were far more likely to steal. However,
for both of these groups the fairness of their employer did not affect their
probability of stealing. In contrast, both older and younger employees
with a longer length of service were more likely to steal if they regarded
their employer as unfair. Altruistic property deviance, however, they
found to be almost entirely explained by age. The younger the staff, the
more likely they were to give away company property. In contrast,
production deviance they found to be explained by the worker's
evaluation of the fairness of their employer alone - unaffected by the age
of the worker.
Work-group loyalty
Tucker (1989) argued that much staff dishonesty was undertaken as a
'solitary event'. In contrast, Altheide and his colleagues demonstrated
that work-group loyalty is a prerequisite for some forms of dishonesty.
The actions they describe, such as battering a box in the receiving area
until it opens and then taking a few items from the contents requires the
complicity of a number of staff working in the area. Nevertheless, their
examples also show the way the shared 'culture' of the social group
legitimises the activity. This is particularly demonstrated by the use of
shared vocabulary, for example the illustration they give of a cashier
asking co-workers in the supermarket to ' see if there is anything spoiled'
when meaning Igo and split open a pack for me.'
They go on to show how the work-group not only legitimises employee
theft, it also controls it. At the most basic level this is just the recognition
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within the group that if anyone gets greedy it will bring them all under
suspicion.
This finding follows Mars (1974), who described a very well established
culture of worker control of pilferage in his study of dockyard workers.
The gangs took a strict percentage of the value of the cargo, and
responded harshly to anyone who went beyond this. In Mars's
description, the enforcement of an appropriate amount of pilferage seems
to have added legitimacy to it being taken among those involved. Insisting
that it was wrong to take more than the agreed amount seems to have
conferred additional legitimacy on the practice of taking what they did.
An issue within these groups is how you become a member. Altheide et
al. touch on the way in which members of the group may do a new-comer
'a favour', which will have to be reciprocated. They also note that not all
the theft is for direct financial reward. They quote an informant who says
that a sales person in the jewellery department of a store 'although she
refused to steal for herself, she would steal for a friend or ask you to steal
something for her.'
Henry (1977) discusses the culture of informal trading networks at length,
and gives descriptions of the joining process. He identifies several
characteristics of groups who obtain and distribute pilfered goods. For
example, although these groups often purport to be 'getting a good deal',
monetary values are not maintained as they are in the mainstream
economy. Networks of interpersonal obligations are kept rather than
financial accounts, and favours or items are exchanged rather than money
changing hands. Henry (1978a) argues that the criminal justice system,
conventional crime control techniques, or private security expenditure can
have little impact on such networks. He argues that
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Formal legal control, as well as stigmatising the offender, completely
misrepresents his activity by imposing a material value on the
transactions and by failing to understand or reconstruct the events. (Page
148)
Instead, Henry suggests that self-regulation is the best form of control,
providing evidence that self-regulation seems to operate naturally within
most work-groups involved in theft anyway. A community court, he
suggests, might be a way to formalise this. Hollinger and Clark (1983a,
123) found quantitative data to support this. They found formal sanctions
(the response of the management) to be less well negatively correlated
with employee theft (i.e. less effective a deterrent) than informal sanctions
(the response of co-workers).
Justifications
From their interviews, Altheide and his colleagues were able to ague that
their informants did not believe themselves to be 'real thieves'. A number
of commentators have focused on this need to 'neutralise' the self-
censoring judgements that the offender's general commitment to
conventional values would ordinarily raise.
Cressey (1959) argues that one of the prerequisites for offenders who
betrayed a position of trust, which they had taken in good faith, was that
they had established an appropriate vocabulary of adjustment, by which
their actions could be accommodated within their personal moral
framework. From his interviews, he formed the opinion that this mental
're-classification' was a prerequisite to the offending. He found
individuals who had previously been in similar circumstances as those in
which they offended, but without offending. The key difference he
discerned in these previous situations was that they had not at that time
established a suitable' adjustment'. This has much in common with
Matza's study (1964) of delinquency. In this, he proposed a neutralising
51
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
process operating in delinquents who he asserts have generally
conventional commitments. Tatham (1974) provides survey data showing
that retail employees who steal have a ready stock of 'neutralising'
viewpoints and report little guilt.
It is however, difficult to be sure of the degree of conventional
commitment in the face of unconventional acts, and the effect of
unconventional beliefs. Roy Austin (1977) disputes Matza's findings and
finds deviant or unconventional beliefs to be more important than
'neutralising' beliefs.
Hollinger (1991, 196) offers one explanation for the difficulty in finding
good supporting evidence for the neutralisation theory. His analysis of
the data from his self-report study of deviance among workers shows
neutralising beliefs are associated with property deviance. However, his
evidence shows that the effect is much less pronounced among younger
staff. He concludes that this' ... may mean that neutralization techniques
work best among older adults, not among the younger individuals with
which it was tested exclusively in the past.'
However, there is another problem with the concept of neutralisation. It is
difficult to be sure that a 'vocabulary of adjustment' or a neutralising belief
is in fact a prerequisite to the offence. It could be interpreted as an excuse
invented after the event. Hamlin (1988, 431) argues persuasively that
motives are generated only in response to a 'question situation' after the
action has taken place. However, he links the 'motives' available to the
social setting in which the action takes place. Hawkins's (1984) survey of
'ripping off' by waiters showed little agreement by those who stole with
typical'neutralising' attitudes. He argued that in the environment he
studied, in which seventy-seven per cent of the waiters reported
discussing 'rip-off' methods with co-workers, there was no need to find
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justifications. However, he does not rule out justifications having played a
part in creating this current state of affairs. He says: 'it could be argued
that neutralising attitudes were important in the past, setting up a pattern
of theft which has now become accepted' (page 62).
Minor (1984) provides evidence for the notion that neutralisation is a
'hardening process'. From two questionnaires completed three months
apart investigating attitudes and behaviour among a sample of college
students he discovered evidence of this process operating in two ways:
One sort of hardening process is the erosion of morals: the more excuses
one accepts for morally problematic behaviour at one point in time, the
more likely one is to approve of that behaviour in the future ... The second
major version of the thesis is that moral judgements influence subsequent
behaviour, which in turn influences subsequent moral judgements.'
(Page 1015)
From his work with embezzlers, Cressey also satisfied himself that a 'non-
shareable problem' preceded the criminal violation of financial trust. He
sees the embezzler as defining' a financial problem as a non-shareable one
which, by definition, must be solved by an independent, secret and
relatively safe means if it is going to be solved at all' (Cressey 1975, 48).
Another reason put forward by Altheide's informants for believing
themselves not to be doing anything wrong, is that stealing from
corporations, from legal entities, is not the same as stealing from
individuals. This is similar to the findings of Smigel (1970) who asked his
survey subjects to rank different organisations according to how guilty the
subjects would feel if they stole from them. The big faceless corporations
came out on top, as the least guilt-inspiring target. Altheide asserts:
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We tentatively conclude that work-groups are the singularly most
inhibiting forces in an employer's arsenal against theft.
The difficulty is how any employer can effectively direct that force. Even
when aware of the importance of work-group norms, it seems difficult to
escape from the situational nature of possible remedies. For example,
Traub (1996) in his review of employer strategies seems to fail to notice the
incongruity between the informal controls that dominate the academic
literature that he quotes and the formal controls he catalogues from the
professional security press.
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Summary of the potential influences on employee honesty
The possible interpretations of dishonesty could be summarised by
mapping them out as opposing forces. (See Figure 2.02 below). Some are
attracting staff towards dishonesty and others are preventing it. (In
practice most factors appear on both sides in a negative or positive form -
for example' opportunities' on one side balanced by 'lack of opportunities'
on the other side.) The direction of the force then represents one
dimension in the diagram.
Another dimension that can be added to the map is the distinction
between factors making a person willing to perform dishonest acts in
general, and the willingness to commit a particular dishonest act.
A third dimension that can be added is a distinction between' internal'
factors and 'external' factors. The influences can be grouped on the map
as follows.
Inherent propensity or natural honesty and family and peer group
norms
I will start 'internally' on the general willingness to undertake criminal
acts.
Many explanations for criminality have portrayed social forces as driving
individuals into criminality. In the work environment, such views of
criminal behaviour I consider as 'internal' factors because the employee
brings them into the work place. I've labelled such factors as 'family and
peer group norms' here - perhaps 'outside work conditioning' would be a
better label.
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Figure 2.02
Summary of potential influences on employee honesty
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Retailers tend to argue that their problems all start with some bad apples -
with some notion of natural honesty (as illustrated by Carson's handbook
for security staff 1977). Their recruitment policies tend to support a very
basic positive belief in there being some naturally' criminal people'. The
general balance of evidence in favour of psychometric 'honesty tests'
suggests that there may be some validity in this view. (See Jones 1980, or
Jones and Terris 1983 for specific evaluations, and Murphy 1992, or
Camara and Schneider 1994, for an overview.)
Un-shareable problems, and neutralising concepts
As with the study of delinquency, employee dishonesty has the special
feature that in many ways these criminals seem to share the core values of
society and often behave 'normally'. (A point made, for example, by
Clinard and Quincy 1967). One view of this is that they have to develop
attitudes that will neutralise their natural guilty feelings. (See Matza 1964,
for views on neutralising among delinquents). In addition it was
proposed that employees who betrayed the trust of their employer had
'uri-shareable problems' - things like alcoholism, drug dependency, or a
lifestyle they know they cannot afford. The theory is that they are so eager
to hide these things that they would risk becoming a criminal (see Cressey
1959).
Workplace norms and supervisory collusion
In the workplace, there are many influences outside the individual that
can affect their willingness to act dishonesty. Much work suggests that
dishonesty is normal behaviour in the workplace, that the culture supports
it, and employees do not believe they are doing anything wrong.
(Altheide et al. 1978, Mars 1984, Henry 1977). Furthermore, some studies
have shown that in certain work cultures the supervisors collude in this
acceptance - usually as a way to achieve a work related-goal such as
providing informal rewards. (Dalton 1959, Bensman and Gerver 1963, and
Ditton 1977) provide evidence of this.
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Fairness of rewards, treatment by management and the quality of the
work environment
Workers who do not believe they are fairly rewarded or are not treated
with respect by management are more likely to steal to redress the balance
of the transaction or fight back against their poor treatment. (See Tucker
1989, Adams 1996, Greenberg and Scott 1996, and Greenberg 1990, 1995).
However, it has also been noted that many work environments are a lot
more stimulating if you are on the fiddle - and the rewards to employees
of Igetting their own back' may be emotional rather than physical (See
Zeitlin 1971).
Rewards and opportunity
The separation of the willingness to commit particular acts from the
general willingness to turn to criminality is a distinction made by the
situational school of crime prevention - and the principal factors in this
section are those that they focus on: the opportunities, risks and rewards.
(See Cornish and Clarke 1986, Clarke 1997). Efforts made by employers to
reduce dishonesty tend to fall into this dimension. (See Carson 1977,
Bernstein 1974, and Traub 1996). They increase the risks of detection
through surveillance or systems of accountability. It has also been shown
that the certainty and severity of the sanctions system they put in place
also affect employee dishonesty (Hollinger and Clarke 1983).
Workplace norms
Although the work-group may tolerate or encourage dishonesty, it has
also been found to regulate the level of thefts. This can be a restraining
factor in regard to a particular theft (Altheide et al. 1978, and Mars 1974)
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Subjective view of risks and rewards
As some commentators have noted, the value of rewards and the impact
of the risks are subjective. For example, the risk of losing a job may be
very different for a teenager than it is for someone in their fifties (see
Adams 1965, or Hollinger and Clark 1984). Finally, any previous
experiences of dishonesty will inform the choice to offend again.
59
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
(3) RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section describes the methodology adopted for each part of the
research in general terms, explains some of the factors that have shaped
the way the research was conducted and gives the reasons for choosing
to conduct the research in this way.
Options for researching employee dishonesty
My research aim was to investigate the belief that better targeting of
prevention action to particular groupings of employees and offences by
employers would be more effective in reducing employee dishonesty.
Therefore, it was clear my research needed to gather data on employees
and offences so that I can look for groupings. Itwas also clear that I
would need data related to 'effectiveness'. There is a range of approaches
that could have been taken.
The notion of looking at a criminological phenomenon as a 'problem' to be
solved, which is implicit in my objective, owes much to a style of research
conducted by the Home Office from the late 1980s onwards. Victor [upp
(1993,22) notes that
The criminological enterprise within the Home Office has had two key
strands. First, there has been a strong investment in empirical research,
usually quantitative research based on social surveys, official statistics or
reforms-as-experiments. Second, such research has been firmly tied to the
formulation or evaluation of policy. What is seen as problematic for
official policy.
Itwould be possible for my research to follow along similar lines.
Empirical research irrespective of its benefits as criminology is more
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conventionally accepted as research within business, and is easier to 'sell'
to those in power. The company's own' official statistics' already receive
focus from senior managers, so basing research on them is again more
likely to receive the official support I needed to undertake the research. In
the same way that official statistics only represent those crimes that are
detected, leaving a huge' dark figure' for crimes that have escaped official
notice, so too company records of those detected only identify a minority
of employees. In both environments, survey studies are a natural way of
bridging this gap.
However, I am aware that this approach to the research has many possible
failings. A real understanding of any phenomenon can be difficult to
achieve by looking through high-level statistics. Reinharz (1984) describes
the way that the design, implementation and interpretation of social
surveys can be completely alienated from the society being studied. It is
possible that the only questions that are asked are those that the
researchers thought were important to support their interpretation of the
situation. Reinharz observed that such research might be more likely to
say something about the social scientists that conducted the study than
about the population they are studying.
An alternative approach is to base research on the meanings people assign
to particular actions in particular social settings. Methodologies based on
observation, and particularly participant observation, are best suited to
achieve this. It is persuasive to note that participant observation has
probably contributed more than any other methodology to the
understanding of the phenomenon of employee dishonesty. The work by
participant observers, such as Mars (1974), Ditton (1977a), and Henry
(1978a) has shown that employee dishonesty cannot be fully understood in
terms of simplistic economic or legal interpretations, but through the
interpretations and meanings that develop in particular social settings,
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where actions are influenced by much more personal social affiliations and
obligations.
Clearly, policy-making that doesn't take any account of these issues will
not be effective. As I will show later, it is difficult to interpret the facts of
offending without considering them. If employees were simply out to
steal the greatest possible value of goods, then the characteristics of
offences would be far more similar, and there would be fewer groupings
of offenders and offences to investigate.
However, participant observation would be less useful in understanding
the diversity of different effects happening amongst different groups of
employees. If,as I suspect, dishonesty occurs in a number of different
ways among different groups of employees, participant observation
would only give an insight into one group, and would have to be
replicated for other groups. Another way of understanding the small-
scale effects would be to conduct extensive interviews. If conducted in a
sensitive and open way, interviews could give real insight into meanings
employees gave to the behaviour and circumstances associated with what
the company would term Idishonesty'. A particular advantage of long
interviews would be that they could also give the longer-term perspective
in a way that could not be achieved by observation. The study could
include the way in which employees became involved in particular
behaviours over the course of their careers - or indeed over the course of
their working lives. Such a study could investigate the changes they
understood to have taken place in their interpretation of events and their
actions - and what they saw as involved in these changes.
Another research opportunity is the way that the system operates by
which employees are identified as I dishonest' and dealt with by the
company. Variations in the predominance of certain groups of workers
among those detected as dishonest may just be the result of the way the
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system operates. As in the wider criminal justice system a number of
filters operate between particular actions taking place and an individual
being disciplined, or prosecuted. The way the system operates will
determine which actions are noticed, which of these are brought to official
notice, which of these are processed as dishonesty, and the action those in
authority take. In an arena where very few of the losses that are
experienced result in prosecutions in the formal criminal justice system,
there is an interesting opportunity to study the system itself. This could
be done through studying the working practices of key actors in the
system, such as security managers, and looking into the meanings they
attach to actions and situations. Alternatively, the way the system
operates could be investigated by studying the meanings implicit in the
documentation.
In essence, the grand methodological decision is between the macro and
micro level. The tension between the contrasting attractions of the micro
and macro level analysis (and to some extent the desire to reconcile them)
represents a recurrent theme of discussion within sociology in recent years
(as discussed by Fielding 1988). By investigating employee honesty at a
micro level I could be sure that what I found was meaningful in terms of
the way particular employees interpreted and understood their behaviour,
but it would not be possible to assume that these findings were significant
among the workforce as a whole. On this basis such research would be
less reliable as the basis for policy. However, if my research were
conducted at the macro level, it would be possible to completely fail to
understand the real factors that were at work. So, however confidant I
might be that the effect I had observed was significant to the workforce as
a whole, because I failed to understand it, any changes in policy may be
ineffective.
In the end, practical and pragmatic issues influenced the method of
working more than theoretical issues. My method of working was
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considerably influenced by my personal circumstances. I am employed by
the security department of a major UK multiple retailer. A major part of
my role is the collection and interpretation of company information in
order to improve policy and the use of resources. This research was
undertaken as a collaborative programme, representing a partnership
between the university and my employer. Itwas not possible, within this
framework, to venture too far from the macro-level research my
employers were used to receiving, and it would have been difficult to
integrate a more micro-level programme involving a considerable
commitment to observational fieldwork in with my Iday job'.
Such a situation rules out a Igrounded' theory approach (as described by
Glaser and Strauss 1967). I could not pretend to approach any social
environment within the company with an open mind. If I am researching
with a view to informing policy making within the company, I cannot get
away from the pre-conceptions of current policy and my previous work.
There is also a 'moral' dimension. My employer was clearly interested in
research based on the company for which I work. With this requirement,
participant observation was a difficult option. Even if I had been
sanctioned to give up my regular role for the time needed, it seemed
difficult and dishonest to try to pass myself off as a regular member of
staff, whilst really being employed by the security department. On top of
which, there was the issue that I did not fit, in terms of age and experience,
the profile of the employees I would want to study. It would similarly
have been impossible to become an outside observer, or to conduct
extensive interviews. I would never have received open and honest
information from employees who knew that I worked for the security
department. On the other hand, to avoid telling them would have
involved a deception that I would have been uncomfortable with from an
ethical point of view.
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Therefore, my broad methodological approach has been to work with the
data obtainable from company records or by surveys. My hope is that my
study of the literature from those who have undertaken micro-level
research such as participant observation, will give me a better chance of
interpreting statistical data meaningfully.
At least I am aware of the dangers of not taking account of the micro-
effects previous writers had observed.
In my favour is the fact that I have a good understanding of the situation
that company employees are in. I have worked as both a salesman and a
manager in the business I'm studying. My viewpoint is not divorced from
what I am studying in the way that someone who, for example, has only a
background in criminal investigation might be. I have at least experienced
the social setting I am writing about.
The research
Having established the overall methodological basis for the research, the
issue was to decide which company records to focus on, and what, if
anything needed to be added by survey data.
Offender record analysis
My original intention was to focus almost exclusively on the company
records of employees detected for dishonesty. From these records I
wanted to identify groupings of offenders and offences.
My intention was to compare the prevalence of certain groups among
those detected for dishonesty and the prevalence of those groups among
the workforce in order to identify patterns of offenders. I was then
intending to analyse the prevalence of particular offences, as a finding in
its own right, and in relation to the offender groupings. This data could
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then be combined with financial loss figures to provide a wider
interpretation and investigate patterns such as geographical distribution.
This I believed would identify particular potential targets for intervention.
However, a number of writers have commented on the limited value of
such investigation records as the basis for research. Dwight Merriam
(1977,376) asserts that 'the study of apprehended thieves - is untenable
and naive.' Hollinger and Clark (1986) included arrest records in their
research, but relied most heavily on self-report questionnaires to satisfy
their research needs. This was because they found that arrest records held
by the companies they approached were not centralised or
comprehensive, and the concern that:
These records may be more a function of the departments' reaction than
the employees' offending. In other words, employee-theft apprehension
rates, like arrest rates generally, often are more a reflection of policing
practices than the actual criminal behaviour.
However, offender records do have some significant advantages over self-
report studies and other similar methods of investigation.
Firstly, we know that they deal with serious dishonesty. This is not
something that can be said with such confidence about self-report surveys.
In the desire to make it easier for offenders to feel comfortable with
confessing their crimes the survey subjects are often coaxed along with
'weasel' words which widen definitions of the behaviour reported beyond
the criminal, or even the seriously aberrant. The wording is often chosen
to be non-judgemental about the offending. The result is that self-report
surveys probably discover a lot more about those who perpetrate very
low-value or less serious offending than they tell us about those who are
committing serious or high value crimes. For example, Hollinger and
Clark (1983, 42) use a measure of property deviance which is heavily
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weighted to misuse of the discount privilege. They reported a total
involvement in property deviance of 35.1 per cent. But contributing to
that is a measure for 'misuse of the discount privilege' of 28.9 per cent, a
contribution which dwarfs the next highest component - 'involvement in
taking store merchandise' - which was reported by only 6.6 per cent.
This makes it difficult to be sure that the serious offenders - the ones
which are costing businesses the most money - share the same
characteristics. The finding of an association between minor anti-company
behaviours such as taking extra days off and 'property offences' such as
that established by Hollinger and Clark (1983) may be the result of the
way such surveys are written.
The second issue regards the detail of the offences. When working from
investigation reports there is a great deal of detail about how offences
were committed. This is a considerable contrast to a self-report survey
such as Hollinger and Clark's that has to content itself with general
categories such as 'take an item of store merchandise with a retail value of
more than $5' (Hollinger and Clark 1983, 34).
The third issue regards the background data held about the offenders. A
self-report study is limited to the data that can reasonably be requested on
the form. The study of detected offenders can link to more detailed
company records of their employment.
So, to summarise, because it can be more confident about the value and
circumstances of offences and more detailed in its records of perpetrators
the analysis of offender records is well suited to crime analysis. It is this
level of detail that is needed to identify potential opportunities for
intervention. A corollary is the analysis of shop thieves undertaken by
Ekblom (1986). The arrest records he worked with were not believed to be
strictly statistically representative of all the thieves that stole from the
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store, but the detail contained in them could, nonetheless, inform crime
prevention practice.
The records of dishonest staff are held in the company's security incident
database. About 190 individual people are recorded here as dealt with by
the company for dishonesty per year. (Owing to the definition of
'dishonesty', which I will discuss later, including a condition that the
offenders were dismissed or resigned from the company there are no
'repeat offenders' within this group.) This is not a great number on which
to base analysis that looked for overall groupings, so instead of looking in
detail at a short time period, I chose instead to take a wider time frame,
and include more records.
Although the records contained most of the information needed for the
research there was a lot of 'cleaning' of the data required. The majority of
this checking was in ensuring that the personal details of the staff were
correct by checking records against the company's central personnel
database. Itwas also necessary to check that coded information in the
reports was correct and had been consistently applied. Finally, more
comprehensive records of the value and type of loss were added and
associated with each offender (as opposed to the incident as a whole) and
coded fields were added to describe how they were detected.
There were other data that I contemplated including. I considered adding
into the analysis details of the previous career history of offenders -
information that could be gathered from their application forms. This I
believed could assist with refinement of the recruitment process. I also
investigated the possibility of gathering detailed discipline records for
each offender to investigate the predictive power of previous disciplinary
conduct. I also had access to the full investigation reports submitted by
the investigators (which were more detailed in some respects than the
security database records) and the summaries of the hearings conducted
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as part of the disciplinary process. In the cases of management staff I also
gathered records of the psychometric tests they undertook as part of the
recruitment process. However, with the exception of a more detailed
investigation of the circumstances of dishonesty by management
employees, I did not use any of these sources of data except to fill in gaps
in the security database records.
There were a number of reasons for this. In part it was a pragmatic
sacrifice to practicality. Personnel files are routinely archived, and
retrieving them turned out to be an unreasonably time-consuming
process. Itwas clear that gathering fuller data would severely reduce the
number of cases that I could include in the research.
These sources of data also turned out to be inconsistent. For example
different personnel officers maintained different regimes for dealing with
the time expiry of previous disciplinary action. One employee may have
disciplinary records stretching back four years included in their file, while
another may have none - not because there had been none, but because a
standard of discarding disciplinary records after one year had been set
and rigorously enforced by their personnel team. Another factor was the
number of employees who were found to be dishonest relatively shortly
after starting with the business. Their files had rarely been completed, and
in the most extreme cases, where employees had not been in the business
for more than a couple of months, it seemed that records had not made
their way from local sites to central personnel departments for filing.
Therefore, the research data was limited to the relatively consistent data
on the offence recorded on the security incident database, with personal
details checked for accuracy against central personnel database. The data
for two and a half years (from the 8th of February 1996 to the 17thof
August 1998)was cleaned. This yielded cases relating to 478 individuals
for analysis.
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Employee Attitude Suroey
The analysis of the offender records identified that there was a need for
survey data to be collected. It did so in two ways.
Firstly the analysis highlighted that a very small proportion of the
employee dishonesty within the company was represented by the detected
offenders. Itwould have been imprudent to make policy
recommendations that relied on these records alone. Survey data could
act as a balance to the selectiveness of this data.
Secondly, analysis of the offender records suggested different attitudes to
risk among different age or status groups of employees. These would only
ever be hints or potential explanations without the back up of a more
rigorous survey of employee attitudes. The two key topics for study were
the attitude of employees to wider issues of integrity and the attitude of
employees to deterrent factors.
Consequently, the second component of the research was a postal survey
of employees. This was included to act as a counter-weight to the offender
analysis and to gather this additional information about the attitudes
employees have to dishonesty.
Securing the funds for a major postal survey of the workforce was not an
easy task. The demands of the business were not entirely aligned with the
requirements of the research. However, one of the actions that arose from
the analysis work was the creation of a training (or propaganda) video to
be shown to all employees at a weekly training session. Itwas possible to
include within the business case for the video session justification for the
funds to evaluate the training via a national survey. The questions about
attitudes that had been raised by the analysis of the offender records were
able to form part of this survey. However, one survey was forced to tackle
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three major questions: the prevalence and characteristics of dishonesty,
attitudes to wider issues of integrity, and provide an indication of the
impact of the training session. (And to this was added a fourth objective
of investigating compliance with company search procedures.) It is
probable that a survey instrument that had to achieve less would have
been a sharper tool, and using separate instruments for different tasks
may have been a better solution had this option been available.
Case history as experimentation
Clearly, the identification of groupings of employees and offences that
may assist in crime prevention would be more persuasive if accompanied
by empirical research in the form of a controlled trial. Plans to conduct
such a trial ran into two problems that proved intractable within the scope
of this research.
The first problem was support from the company. The senior
management in the company was supportive of an analytical approach to
its staff crime problem, and eager to take up suggestions from the
research. It was not, however, well disposed to wait before fully
implementing any proposals whilst a controlled experiment was set up. If
suggestions seemed good then they were implemented immediately.
The second problem was to do with measurement. Most staff crime goes
undetected. As I will demonstrate later, the analysis showed that the
proportion of staff crime represented by those detected was an
insignificant proportion of the amount of crime which other measures of
losses suggested was taking place. It could not therefore serve as a
reliable measure of the effectiveness of any intervention. On the other
hand, the measures of loss within the business, whilst clear enough to
establish that the general level of dishonesty dwarfed the amount
associated with those detained, were not clear enough measures to
establish the effect of any intervention with any certainty. Undetected
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staff crime is only one contributor to a range of financial indicators within
a retail organisation. It was found that the contribution of administrative
changes, marketing initiatives, and the level of crime by other groups had
a considerable but largely unquantifiable effect on any financial measures
of the problem.
In place of a controlled experiment, the third and final part of the research
comprises something better described as a I case study'.
As a result of the first analysis, a range of targeted interventions was
proposed - and many of these were implemented. I describe these actions,
and comment on the process of putting them in place. Following the
implementation of these measures, I describe the changes in the profile of
the offenders detected, and the variations in the other business measures
associated with employee dishonesty. This will then inform a discussion
of the effect the interventions had, and an evaluation of the targeting
process.
This 'before and after' methodology will not be robust enough to Iprove'
the efficacy of the approach in a clinical 'laboratory' sense. However, the
'real life' setting - the fluctuations and whims of the actual measures
available in a dynamic company and the changing patterns of actual
criminal behaviour - may be able to give a better insight for security
practitioners than a more clinical setting could do.
The details of each part of the research design will now be included in the
chapters that deal with that part of the research.
Relationship with the company studied in the research
As I have already said, I was employed by the company that was the
subject of the research and they were paying my university fees. The
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research represented an extension of work I regularly undertook as part of
my employment. I have described the way in which these circumstances
cut down the options available to me for the type of research I should
undertake, ruling out participant observation or direct interviews with
offenders. However, this situation had other effects, which I will address
here.
Many of the effects were positive. As an employee with many year's
experience in branch sales, management and training roles previous to my
involvement in loss prevention I brought to the research considerable
understanding. As an insider there was no research time taken up
learning the culture of the business or making contacts. Any jargon in the
investigation reports was clear to me and the mechanics of offences
involving company systems needed no further explanation.
As an insider I also had unrivalled access to existing company records.
The database of investigation records was already in my keeping. I was
fully responsible for their categorisation and for maintaining the structure
of the database. I had clerical assistance available to me for tasks such as
the checking of database records against the mainframe personnel
database. I also had access to information from other departments such as
those that could provide financial data.
However, other effects were less positive. Despite my best efforts, I may
have been less able to be objective than another researcher would have
been. In some cases this may have resulted in me taking a rose tinted view
of the data. For example, I may have been too willing to accept the
veracity of investigation reports. However, I may have been unobjective
in the opposite direction as well, perhaps unconsciously seeking to
confirm prejudices I held about the company which I had built up during
the course of my employment.
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Working for the organisation I am researching is also likely to have had an
impact on the way I have expressed my findings. My circumstances are
no doubt similar to that of many researchers, especially in management
consultancy, who need to tread carefully when expressing their negative
findings to their sponsors or those providing access. As an employee the
consequences of upsetting my sponsor would be more serious - and I have
far less chance of winning any argument over what should be made
public. It is gratifying therefore that my managers have expressed no
concerns of this type over the contents of the thesis.
My greatest problem in the role of employee researcher was in terms of
control. The arrangement for the research was essentially that, in return
for paying my fees, I worked on the research primarily in my own time,
and my employers gained more comprehensive analysis of the issue than I
could normally achieve. There was interest in the findings and I was
required to make regular reports at a high level. However, at my
relatively lowly rank I had very little influence in achieving elements of
the project that would have an impact on operational issues. The research
was approved rather than championed by my superiors. As a result,
seizing opportunities rather than sticking to a well-designed route often
determined the final course of the research.
The first casualty of this was the sequence of the research. Initial analysis
was required long before the literature review was complete. Getting
authorisation for the attitude survey proved difficult, and it was
eventually approved only as an evaluation of one of the initiatives when
ideally it should have contributed to the identification and design of the
initiatives.
The second problem with my 'lack of clout' within the organisation was
that interventions were not undertaken under scientific conditions. If an
idea was seen as a good one then the benefit to my research in not
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implementing it in one area to establish a control, was outweighed by the
operational difficulties and increase in losses resulting from leaving some
areas out.
Thirdly, interventions were not always the ones I would have preferred to
study. Though the business found straightforward situational measures
derived from the characteristics of offences more attractive, I should have
liked to study interventions based on the characteristics of offenders. The
training video that I wanted to produce would have been targeted
specifically at younger new starters, but senior managers insisted it should
do for all employees.
On balance I think the positive effects of my situation outweigh the
negatives. Insider access and understanding have, I think, resulted in
better product than an outsider's greater objectivity and more clinical
research design could have done. There is one further benefit. As an
insider, continuing in the same role I was in while undertaking the
research, I am in a position to ensure it is not just gathering dust on a shelf.
It is being used and has acted as the basis for further research to direct
policy.
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(4) PERSPECTIVES FROM OFFENDER RECORDS
This section presents the results of the research into the company records
of dishonesty. It particularly focuses on whether groups of offenders or
offences present themselves as potential targets for preventative
measures. However, before launching into the analysis it describes in
more detail the methodology and particularly the distinctions made in
identifying the records to study.
The offender records
The offender records were created on the company's security incident
database. This database contains records of all crime-related incidents
from burglary to stock missing in transit. As with all the incident records,
the records of staff dishonesty serve a number of purposes.
By acting as a centrally updated record of all serious incidents, the
database ensures a consistent central source of information, and therefore
aids communication. Senior security management use the database to
review threats and losses on a daily basis, and all security staff use it to
review the history of incidents at a particular site. The records are used to
provide summary statistics that provide a view of the scale of current
threats to the business, and of the performance of security staff. In
addition, the personnel department often uses the records as the basis of
disciplinary hearings (though sometimes the security staff member who
conducts the investigation submits a more detailed report of an
investigation). Routine and ad hoc analysis of the records (of all types of
incident) is used to identify opportunities for crime prevention measures,
or to target or evaluate spending.
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What do the records in the database contain? Firstly, they hold details of
the person that first reported the incident, at which site it took place, and
(if it is known) at what time it took place. For each incident there are also
details of the police involvement (officers' names and any crime report
numbers), details of the loss (actual model numbers of stock, where this is
known), and a coded description of the type of incident. For each
individual suspect or offender there is a separate record of their personal
details (age, gender, job title, length of service and so on) along with the
action taken against them by the company and the police. Each suspect
record is linked to an incident record, and one incident may have a
number of suspect records, one for each of the employees involved. There
is also a 'free text' description of the incident, usually detailing how it
came to light, how it was investigated, what the disciplinary outcome was
and (in some cases) preventative measures taken up or recommended to
prevent similar future occurrences.
The records can develop over time as they are updated. The first report
may be a 'threat' to the security of the site represented by money,
recorded as taken from the tills in order to be deposited at the bank, that
has not yet been recorded as received at the bank by the central accounting
function. This report of a 'threat' may then be updated to become a report
of missing cash when it has been established that there are no mistakes in
the accounting systems, and the money has definitely gone astray. This
report of missing cash may then be updated as a report of 'staff theft of
cash' after an investigation has identified a member of staff responsible for
taking the cash.
Although records may start with a report from site managers or central
accounting departments, in most cases the bulk of the information about
staff offenders comes from the security department staff (who have the
title security managers) who conduct the investigations. In the light of
this the question of how reliable these records are needs to be addressed.
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The security manager is the representative of the company and can
therefore be expected to take the company line. They are reporting that
they have established the guilt of the person recorded and they will
therefore tend to include only things that seem to contribute to that view,
and interpret everything in that light.
The 'facts of the cases' (as presented in the records of the investigation) are
tested through the disciplinary process. This is at least to the same level as
is necessary to that process, which is 'on a balance of probabilities'. So, in
terms of facts pertinent to the disciplinary process the records can be
considered relatively accurate.
Often a case rests on a combination of circumstantial evidence and a
confession. It is necessary to consider how valid these cases are. There is
no special bonus or incentive for security managers that would encourage
them to put unreasonable pressure on staff, and the disciplinary process
allows reasonable time for reflection, so I feel it is unlikely that the records
include any false confessions. However, bar-room stories of what
happened in the 'bad old days' shared by security managers tell of 'old
timers' who would have an interview technique based on little more than
intimidation. I am confident that this is no longer the case. I have to be
aware though, that, as I work with the security managers on a day-to-day
basis, my viewpoint is biased.
It is the supporting information and commentary on motives or
circumstances within the reports that are likely to be much more
subjective. They represent the views of the security manager, and while
they are not likely to include deliberate or malicious fabrications, they are
likely to be selective and biased. Any comments quoted as having been
made by site staff are likely to benefit from the advantage of hindsight,
and any excuses given by employees for their actions are likely to be
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treated with some contempt by investigators. In contrast, I find myself
contemplating alternative interpretations informed by the work of
researchers and particularly the participant observers. When the
investigator writes that the suspect' could offer no reasonable explanation
for his actions' they are usually attributing the actions to a moment of
'madness'. In contrast, I see the potential for Henry's (1978a) informal
trading networks operating, with their alternative interpretation of actions
in terms of personal obligations that are very difficult for individuals to
reconcile with formal legal terms. Investigators will sometimes mention
that the offender claimed they were 'only borrowing' the money. They
report this in a tone of derision. In contrast to their disbelief, it is possible
to interpret this in terms of Cressey's (1970) concept of the offenders
'vocabulary of adjustment'.
So, to sum up, the records represent a reliable account of the facts of the
case, and in some cases they contain a subjective account of motives and
contributory factors which are open to very different interpretation from
those implied in the records.
Which records represent dishonesty?
The question of what constitutes Idishonest' behaviour among retail staff
has been discussed as part of my review of previous literature. I found
that there was quite a wide range of perspectives available. In general,
these perspectives represented a continuum between a narrow legalistic
definition centred on theft (typified by Merriam 1977), through to a broad
grouping of 'deviance' from company rules including production
deviance, and political or aggressive anti-social behaviour towards other
staff (typified by Robinson 1995).
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I decided that the 'top down' categorisation developed by Greenberg and
Scott (1996) of what they referred to as 'employee theft' was the best
definition for the phenomenon I wanted to focus on. This was:
a non-violent form of property deviance focused on one's company
committed by an employee of that company for personal gain.
However, the issue becomes more complex when it is related to particular
individual records and the task of deciding which ones should serve as the
basis for this study. Even if I had been working against the narrower
definitions of employee theft, the complexity of possibilities in 'the real
world' serve to challenge categorisation.
Take the case of record 35. (These offender records are quoted directly
from the company incident database. To retain confidentiality the names
involved have been replaced, and the record numbers refer only to their
sequential position in the research material.) This particular record
involves an incident where the individual misused company resources,
was investigated by a company security investigator, dealt with by the
police, and was dismissed from the company - and yet the incident is
difficult to consider one of Iemployee dishonesty'.
Record 35
I [company investigator] was contacted by [A], branch manager, of [a
particular company shop] who informed me that a lady by the name of [8]
had called him and explained that a member of staff called [S] had
phoned from [another] shop, to try and obtain her address. She went on
to explain that he had phoned her father using the name of [particular
name] who worked for [company name] Promotions. He told her father
she had won a prize and that he required an address to send it to. Her
father refused to give it to him and dialed 1471 that proved to be the
[particular] shop when he phoned the number back. She also said she
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In the company of [A] I suspended [8].
had reported it to the police. The police had visited [8] and when he
eventually admitted it, he was given a verbal caution.
I [company investigator] visited the branch on 29/3/00 and interviewed [8]
who admitted making the call from the shop without permission, using
false descriptions and also attempted to coerce another member of staff
named [Cl to make a similar call .... 1made the decision to suspend [8] for
actions liable to bring the company into disrepute and attempting to
coerce another member of staff to do the same.
Update from [company investigator] by [clerk] 14/4/00:
[8] was dismissed at a disciplinary.
The offence is non-violent in itself (irrespective of what purpose learning
the address in question was to serve.) The misuse of the company phone
represents property deviance focused on the company, and was for
personal gain - however unclear exactly what that was.
However, although the case seems superficially to fit the definition, I feel
uncomfortable at including it. I decided there were two rational
explanations for this' gut feeling'. The first was that there were two
'crimes' against the company. One was the unauthorised use of the
phone, and the other was an offence against standards of customer service
and integrity in dealing with customer information. The latter was the
cause of the employee's dismissal, and this did not really fit with the
definition.
The other explanation was that Greenberg and Scott's categorisation gives
no idea of the' degree' required of the elements within it. The employee
did 'steal' the value of the call, but it is such a small cost that the police
and crown prosecution service would be unlikely to proceed with any
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prosecution, and indeed the company would be unlikely to dismiss
someone for making one call. The incident was harmful to the company in
a very minor way, though it did involve a greater risk should an incident
like that have been made an issue of, say, by a sensationalised newspaper
story.
I suppose there may be three potential systems by which to judge how
serious an incident was (or indeed if denied, whether it took place as
represented by the investigator): criminal law, employment law, and the
way actions are judged within the workplace. Whilst there are some clear-
cut cases in which a member of staff is prosecuted under criminal law,
dismissed by the employer without risk of any industrial dispute, and
viewed as dishonest by management, there are many other cases that are
less clearly defined.
Taking legal classifications is often counterproductive when undertaking
crime analysis. When looking for a targeted response to a particular type
of crime it is often better to group offences by the way they were
undertaken rather than by what the offenders were (or may have been)
prosecuted for. Losses that could have been prevented in very similar
ways are prosecuted as very different offences. For example, many fraud
cases such as employee collusion in credit card fraud are prosecuted as
'conspiracy'. In some cases, a decision is made that prosecuting the main
offence is too onerous, but it has been found that the employee falsified his
application form to hide a previous criminal conviction. This is then
prosecuted as gaining pecuniary advantage by deception.
In addition, whether an employee is actually prosecuted is not necessarily
good evidence that they were dishonest or not. It is relatively difficult to
get a criminal prosecution in the case of employee dishonesty. This is
usually because employees have such large legitimate scope for having
possession of company stock, or even cash, that it is difficult to prove that
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their possession of it was unlawful. A good example is an employee
'caught' taking stock out of a site hidden in the rubbish. To the store staff,
it may be obvious that the stock could not have been put there by accident,
and the employee may even confess to the manager that they had
intended to take the item. However, when the facts of the case are
converted to written statements, and the confession has been retracted
following legal advice, a court conviction is not easy to achieve. If they
claim that the stock was in the rubbish by accident, it is difficult to prove
that they had an intention to 'permanently deprive' the company of the
goods, and prove that 'beyond reasonable doubt'. In addition, it is
sometimes very difficult to prove the 'loss'. Cases of employees cheating
the bonus system, or giving unwarranted discounts to their friends are
particularly problematical. Therefore, despite a company policy of
referring everyone to the police, in practice the company only passes on
cases likely to hold water, and a substantial number of cases are not
reported.
Using criminal prosecutions as the basis for selection of cases has the
additional problem of the time-scale. It takes a long time for cases to come
to court, and even then, it is often difficult for the employer to find out the
outcome.
Employment law seems to offer a more comprehensive approach because
decisions are based on a 'balance of probabilities' rather than on proof
'beyond reasonable doubt'. It seems better therefore to pick up cases of
staff who have been dismissed for' gross misconduct' than waiting to see
who was prosecuted. Obviously, employees are dismissed for other types
of gross misconduct than just dishonesty, so some elements of legal
definition are still required.
There is however, an issue with the comparability of adjudications. Line
managers hear disciplinary hearings. When the employees being judged
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are more senior, and the facts are in any way open to interpretation then
there can be a problem with bias. Area managers are rewarded on the
basis of sales, and individuals who are good salespeople or good sales
managers are likely to be given the benefit of any doubt.
There was another aspect of the company influence. When I went through
the process of proposing, explaining, and presenting the results of this
research to senior managers, I had to develop a pragmatic approach to
selecting cases to present as dishonesty. If senior managers were
uncomfortable with my findings they tended to challenge the
classification, and suggest that the findings were wrong on the grounds
that they were based on cases that were 'not real dishonesty'. However, I
think it is entirely appropriate that the selection was influenced by these
views.
From a symbolic interactionist perspective, (as described in relation to
society as a whole, for example, by Hester and Eglin 1992, 11) the way in
which actions within the workplace are defined as 'criminal' by those in
authority is probably the central issue of staff 'dishonesty'. The processes
and contexts form an interesting parallel with the processes within the
criminal justice system. Among these processes are the way in which
certain forms of behaviour within the company are defined as dishonest,
the way staff at all levels identify certain acts and persons for judgement,
and the way that these acts are labelled by those who adjudicate the cases
on behalf of the company.
In identifying the types of offence for study, there is another pragmatic
need to consider the views of the employer. My aim is to influence
management practice, and in order to inform management practice, it is
necessary to solve something the employer thinks of as a problem. Not all
crimes committed by employees are viewed as a problem by the employer.
It occurred to me to wonder if Robinson and Bennett (1995) would have
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got the same results in building their typology if they had built it only
using the views of business managers, instead of postgraduate students
and academics. Obviously, I didn't have the resources to investigate this-
but I did form the impression that the seriousness with which incidents
were viewed within the company differed from the scale of seriousness
established by the typology.
Clearly any employer is less likely to view crimes from which it benefits to
be dishonest. Therefore, crimes such as violations of trading standards
would have been excluded. Violations of health and safety, or
environmental legislation, would be similarly excluded on the basis that
they are not considered Idishonesty' - irrespective of damage to the
company.
More difficult to classify are incidents where members of staff have
overcharged or otherwise misrepresented transactions to manipulate sales
figures. Sales employees are measured on sales of extended guarantees,
and in the case below a salesman overcharged customers to push up his
sales of guarantees.
Report 37
I [investigator] was contacted by [credit supplier] about a number of
agreements put through from [given store] by assistant number [given
number], [8].
On checking the agreements indicated I found eight which were
suspected false details and pulled off sales receipts for all. On checking
the receipts I noticed that [8] had overridden the [extended guarantee
product] amount on all of the agreements. In one case selling a £400 hi fi
with a £400 [extended guarantee product] when the amount for [extended
guarantee product] should have been £215.
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Update from [investigator] by [clerk] 14/4/00
When questioned he explained that on this one and others he did not tell
the customer the cost of [extended guarantee product] just that it would
cost a couple of pound more per month. He then inflated the [extended
guarantee product] to put more through the till ...
I reported this matter to [company official] and it was decided to suspend
for actions liable to bring the company into disrepute and falsification of
company documents.
Further investigations will be made with the manager and the deputy
manager on their return from holiday and sickness.
[SI has been given a first and final written warning.
The additional sales revenue would have nominally given the sales person
additional commission, but the real/personal gain' is the benefit in
prestige the extra value of extended guarantee sale will give him. His
extended guarantee sales performance will influence his standing among
his colleagues and how he is regarded by managers. In monetary terms
only the company benefited from the dishonesty. Setting the outcome of
this disciplinary hearing (a warning) alongside the cases of employees
dismissed for stealing property with a trivial value from the company,
suggests that the degree of harm or benefit to the company is given
greater weight in determining the outcome of cases than the degree of
criminality or integrity involved.
A similar group of investigations involved employees manipulating
company systems to meet business measures. These cases often represent
a crime of false accounting, and they are seen as a problem, but they are
not seen by most people in the company as Idishonesty'.
A typical example is record 106 below:
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Record 106
During a [security] check I [security manager] identified a transaction
which had been processed on 5/2/00, where an item was refunded then
re-sold with a discount resulting in a £15 cash refund.
The original sale recorded that the item purchased was paid by the
means of a credit card telephone order, and no delivery charge had been
accounted for. The store manager, [M], stated that a refund resale was
processed to obtain the £15 in cash to pay for the delivery. [M] stated that
he took full responsibility for the transaction and was processed due to
there being a reduced budget on this area of petty cash ...
Area managers generally treated these cases very leniently. They are seen
as representing many of the ideals of the business: 'solving problems',
being' entrepreneurial', being' smart'. One senior manager issued a
briefing to all managers that said in essence that all that mattered was
meeting sales targets, and to achieve this there were 'no rules'. This
culture represents a problem for the business. Whilst it may be seen as
smart in terms of the business culture to have got around the restriction on
petty cash and still paid for the delivery, condoning fraudulent
transactions is bound to have a negative impact on the integrity of all the
staff. The problem is of course that it becomes very difficult to distinguish
between this fraudulent refund to generate cash for a delivery and a
fraudulent refund to generate cash for the employee. However, as with
Bensman and Gerver's (1963) aircraft factory and Dalton's (1959)
industrial plants, the necessity of solving day to day problems can lead to
some lowering of standards of integrity being condoned by management,
and not seen as serious.
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In part, selecting incidents the company does consider serious can be
achieved solely by using incidents from the company's security database.
The security department is involved only when something the company
considers serious is involved. However, even then, some of those serious
incidents had to be excluded.
One category that was excluded was that of the incidents fitting into the
IAggressive' quadrant of Robinson and Bennett's (1995) typology. These
include cases of harassment, or violence to other staff.
The database also included incidents of taking or possessing illegal drugs.
These, though criminal offences, were excluded. They do not cause a
direct loss to the company and are viewed leniently by management.
Some incidents were easy to decide on. Thefts of stock or cash were
clearly right to include. Handing out goods to accomplices without
payment were also included. Employee collusion in credit card and credit
application fraud was also included despite the direct loss being to the
credit provider, not the employer.
The illegal copying of software, videos or music presented more of a
problem to classification. It is a criminal offence, does cause an indirect
loss to the company (in that the employee or someone they sell to is no
longer going to buy legitimately). However, some incidents are relatively
trivial, and are seen as a much less serious incident than, say, the theft of a
low-value item of stock. An example of a relatively trivial incident, where
a copy of a program was made, it seems, Ias a favour' for another member
of staff is incident 42, given below:
1
I Record 42
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The customer services manager [S1], and a full-time technician [S2],
were suspended after investigation and subsequent interviews revealed
that [S2] had given [S1] a copy of Norton Anti Virus PC software which
[S1] took home and loaded onto her own laptop.
At the beginning of the interview both [S1] and [S2] confirmed that they
were aware that the copying of software was illegal and contrary to
company policy.
During interview [S2], stated that [S1] had asked him for a copy of the
Norton Anti Virus software which he had subsequently supplied.
[S 1] had stated during interview that she was about to purchase a copy of
the software when [S2] offered to give her a copy of his copy. [S1]
confirmed that she had received a copy of the software at the store from
[S2].
The facts of the investigation were related to [personnel manager] [S 1]
and [S2] were suspended pending a disciplinary hearing at a date yet to
be set.
For full details see separate written report.
Update from [security manager] by [clerk] 3/3/00.
[S1] and [S2], have attended a disciplinary hearing, and have each
received a first and final written warning.
This incident was excluded from the dishonesty records.
In contrast, there were a small number of incidents of larger scale where
the copies were made for profit. These seemed to be different in nature,
and have been included. Record 33 below, because of the mercenary
nature of the incident was one of those cases that were included.
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Record 33
Following information received by the branch manager, [M], I visited the
store on Wednesday 24/6/98, at which time I interviewed [S] concerning
allegations that he was involved in the unauthorised copying, sale and
distribution of pre-recorded videos and games software.
[S] admitted that he had copied four pre-recorded videos at home and
had sold the copies within the branch for £5.00 each ...
Unauthorised discounts presented another problem. Should they be seen
as bad practice, buying business at a loss, or should they be seen as
dishonesty - the theft of part of the legitimate value of the sale? Report 94
clearly shows that discounting can be dishonest, but a confession of this
clarity among the records was unique.
Report 94
Report given by [company investigator]
I received notification of three excessive discounts carried out at [a given
branch]. The informant [A] explained that a member of staff who had
been transferred, name [8], had discounted £480 on £1300 worth of sales
at his branch. This was unauthorised excessive discount. I looked into
the systems and located a further two cases of excessive discount over
the same period by the same person. I interviewed [S] today at [a
company site], he admitted the discounting, gave the reason that he was
dissatisfied with working at [the company branch] and just wanted to
stitch them up the last few days he was working there. To do this he
invited friends and acquaintances to visit the store and get a good
discount. An example of this is a television sold to an acquaintance he
met at a pub, £800 sale, £300 discount. He denies any personal gain.
reported the matter to area manager, [B], as a result of that call I
suspended [S] for unauthorised excessive discounting. I have also
notified personnel [personnel officer's name].
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Update from [company investigator] by [clerk] 12/1/00.
[8] was dismissed.
Other cases were less clear cut. The employees involved usually had
reasons, often contested, for giving the discount. I decided that in these
cases I would base inclusion on the result of disciplinary hearings. If the
employee was dismissed, then the incident was classified as Idishonesty'
because of the seriousness of the action taken by the company. While this
process gave a practical solution, it was clearly subject to bias on the part
of the line manager conducting the disciplinary hearing. One manager
who seemed favoured by his superiors received two 'first and final'
warnings for selling stock to his friends and relations with very large and
unauthorised discounts.
There are some incidents that were considered as very serious by the
company but were essentially contractual violations rather than criminal
offences. These generally were instances of staff moonlighting, or cases of
employees using their regular job to tout for another business. (For
example, referring customers needing products repaired to their own, or a
friend's repair business.) An example is record 167 below:
Record 167
A member of staff, [8], sales, sold two modems to a customer then
privately went to the customer's house, installed the pes and charged the
customer £30 per hour for installation. The total came to £60.
[S] has attended a disciplinary, the results of which will be told to him on
13/3/99 ...
These cases generally did not represent any sort of criminal offence.
Whether they satisfied the Greenberg and Scott's definition was more
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difficult to be sure of. Company resources were sometimes used in a
minor way that could be considered 'property deviance', and, as in record
167, it could sometimes be argued that the company was deprived of
revenue. Redirection of that revenue could be represented more as
'property' than 'production' deviance. On the other hand the essential
nature of these cases was of a 'contract violation' and that contract is
essentially designed to regulate 'production'. Itwas really the redirection
of their labour which was the problem. These cases were therefore
excluded.
The final contentious area among the incident records was represented by
the cases where previous convictions came to light. These previous
convictions were not declared on the employees' application forms, so the
application represents a crime of' gaining a pecuniary advantage by
deception'. However, although the police were often involved, the cases
did not seem worth including in the study, even when, as in case 34 below,
the perpetrator was clearly actively engaged in activities outside the law.
Record 34
[8] was employed as part-time cashier at the new store from 7/2/00. Her
application form stated her previous employer [a hotel], in [a particular
town], where she had helped for one to two months in 1999. References
were requested and her honesty was questioned by her previous
employer and on this basis her employment was terminated by telephone.
[Less than three weeks after starting.]
Enquiries with the hotel suggest that she left under investigation for theft
and deception from her employer and police action is on going, in respect
of these matters.
Further enquiries together with a complaint from [a particular car hire
company], have revealed that on 10/2/00, [8] contacted [the car hire
company], purporting to be [pseudonym], new [assistant manager], and
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requested a business account be set up for [a company store] and a
vehicle supplied to [S]. [S] subsequently attended [the car hire company]
on 10/2/00, and provided a driving identification. At the same time a
phone call was received from a female purporting to be [pseudonym]
stating that as it was a new store they were unable to supply the
documentation and it was in the post from head office. It is stressed that
at no stage has [S] provided any [company] documentation or
identification supporting the application. [The car hire company] opened
the business account and allowed [S] a vehicle. She returned a few days
later to upgrade the vehicle complaining it was too small, and was given a
Nissan Almera. She was subsequently involved in a road traffic accident
with this vehicle resulting in the other vehicle being a write off. The
details given at the time of the accident appear to have indicated that [the
company store] had insurance liability.
I have spoken to [an employee at the car hire company], who has
confirmed the above information and they have indicated they will now
involve the police. He accepts that [my company] have no culpability in
this incident. It is also my intention to make a formal complaint to the
police of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception concerning her
original employment application.
There was one type of incident, which was seen as dishonesty by
management, but which it could be argued should be excluded from
analysis of the offender records. This was the theft by an employee of the
property of another employee. There were two reasons why it could be
appropriate to exclude these incidents. The first is because these thefts did
not seem to be a feature of the company Isociety'. Studies (such as Ditton
1977) have found strong social pressure against employees stealing from
co-workers. If they were not influenced by the local social pressure, then
this seemed a phenomenon that was less useful to study through
groupings of staff. Secondly, it seemed to be a different sort of dishonesty
to the types that targeted the company. This categorisation would be in
line with Robinson's typology that put theft from co-workers into a
separate quadrant from theft of property from the company - more closely
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associating it with other aggressive acts against other staff, such as
violence to a co-worker. Itwas therefore decided to exclude the two
incidents of this type that were detected during the period being studied.
In a similar way it was decided that the one case of theft of a customer's
property by an employee should be excluded as well.
There were a number of cases in which the employee was dismissed, after
having been interviewed in relation to an alleged action that was
undoubtedly 'property deviance' and dishonesty, but in which the
dismissal did not represent satisfactory proof of guilt. In these cases it
seemed the person was dismissed because of procedural failings without
the case of 'dishonesty' having been proved against them. A typical case
of this kind would involve the investigation of missing cash.
Circumstantial evidence may point to a particular individual, but was
denied by them. Yet it could clearly be proved that this individual had not
followed cash handling procedures in such a way as to facilitate the loss
and often in such a way as to make it impossible to establish whom the
thief was. An example would be a manager who failed to keep the safe
key secure, and was also the prime suspect for having taken the money.
They could be dismissed for the way they failed to look after the safe key,
putting the money at risk, even if they were never (on a balance of
probability) known to have taken the money. These cases were identified
by what was recorded on the incident report as the reason for dismissal or
by the details of the investigation, and were all excluded.
Cases included
Having considered these various exceptional cases, the basis of inclusion
remained that established by Greenberg and Scott's definition of employee
theft, given above, but with some pragmatic additional distinctions that
arose from considering individual cases.
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The definition mentions property, but much staff crime represents
collusion in credit fraud or cash losses resulting from staff not charging
their friends. As a result of this, the concept of 'property' that I worked to
was only that it was as a distinction from production deviance.
The concept of personal gain was interpreted fairly broadly so as to
include incidents in which the greatest beneficiaries of the incidents are
not necessarily the perpetrators (for example, when there is collusion with
outsiders).
To establish a standard for the degree of seriousness, and the degree of
proof required for inclusion, two tests were established.
Firstly, only incidents consistent with a criminal offence (even if not
actually prosecuted, or realistically even prosecutable because of the
degree of evidence required) were included. In other words, pure
breaches of company discipline or contracts were excluded however
serious they seemed to the business.
Secondly, only incidents serious enough for the employee to have to leave
the company (either because they were dismissed or in some cases because
they were allowed to resign) were included. This meant the company saw
them as very serious. It also established in most cases that they were
proven on balance of probability. In those cases where employees were
allowed to resign, I included those that I believed would have been
proved had the issue gone to a disciplinary hearing. To this was added
the requirement that they were dismissed for the' dishonesty' aspect of the
incident, and not some procedural failing, even if they were suspected of
dishonesty.
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Classification system
The records in the security database were grouped into two classification
systems, which interlocked.
The first system grouped the people. The employee 'offenders' in the
security database were fitted into a five-fold classification.
Firstly, there were those fitting the 'dishonesty' classification as defined
above.
Secondly, there were those who were classed as cases of 'discipline only'.
Some of these subjects represented rule breaking that was less serious in
type than the dishonest staff. For example, it included management staff
that had caused losses by failing to follow company procedures for stock
management. Others represented incidents of the same type as those
classified as dishonesty, but in which, through the discipline process, it
had been decided that they had not offended to the same degree. For
example, this category included those discounts found to have been
excessive and unauthorised, but not to the extent that they represented
dishonesty and the employee was dismissed. Also among these cases
were acts against other employees: harassment of co-workers, violence to
other employees, and thefts from co-workers.
The third category was labelled' outside work'. This category included
those who had previous criminal convictions not declared on their
application form, and the isolated cases where criminal behaviour outside
work had impinged on the work setting. (For example, the member of
staff who was selling drugs while at work, or the employee who went
shoplifting at the nearby supermarket in their lunch break.)
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The fourth category was labelled 'negligence' and included employees
whose actions - or more often, inaction - had caused the company a loss.
These employees had done things such as leaving stock unattended, left
cabinets unlocked, or failed to respond to product alarms.
The fifth part of the classification of people was a category for those cases
where employees were suspected of dishonesty, but it had not been
proved. If they were completely exonerated by the investigation, of
course, the record was removed. These cases included the employees
dismissed for the procedural failing in circumstances that showed the
potential for them having been involved to a greater degree. It also
included cases where the employees were still retained. For example, this
happened in most cases in which it was either one of two members of staff
who were responsible. This category was labelled 'potential complicity'.
The other part of the classification system was for the incidents that these
individuals were associated with. This formed part of a classification
system that included all incidents irrespective of whether there was a
suspect. On the other hand one incident may have a number of
individuals, each individual classified in a different way.
The classification system for the incidents was based on the prevention
opportunities available as opposed to legal definitions or any charges
made against the people involved. A particularly pertinent example of
that distinction comes from outside the area of staff dishonesty, that of
classifying burglary. Technically when a thief enters a private area of a
shop with the intention of stealing they are committing the offence of
burglary. However, keeping incidents of this kind in with break-ins
produces problems for crime management, because they are prevented in
very different ways. After a break-in the questions that need asking are:
'How were the physical protection devices (shutters, bars, doors, and so
on) overcome?' and 'In what way did the intruder alarm respond?' There
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is clearly no value in asking these questions of 'sneak thief' burglaries.
Otherwise it would lead to misleading statistics, for example a large
proportion of 'burglaries' in which the intruder alarm was not set, or the
shutters were not in place. It is much more informative to group this type
of incident with other thefts of stock, and include a question about where
the stock was stolen from. Then resources that apply to both, CCTV, staff
vigilance, local alarms, can be targeted appropriately to shop floor and
back store areas.
In terms of employee honesty specifically there are charge types such as
conspiracy, gaining a pecuniary advantage by deception, and deception
that give little assistance with identifying target areas for prevention.
For this reason the first major split was between' stock losses' and' frauds
and losses of cash'. Products and cash were split because the
opportunities for protecting them were different. Stock protection
involves physical measures, surveillance, and stock counting. Cash
protection is more to do with till systems and cash handling disciplines.
The stock is everywhere, but relatively easy to identify if discovered when
an employee is searched. Cash is only in very specific locations, but is
very difficult to identify as belonging to the company if found in a search.
The other groups of incidents in the database were 'burglary' (defined as
'break-ins' as just discussed), 'losses in transit', and general 'security
threats' (such as suspicions passed on by employees), 'property damage',
and 'health and safety' incidents. In practice employee dishonesty was
classified under the' stock loss' or 'cash loss' categories.
For cash and stock losses the next level of classification separated 'theft'
(including suspected thefts) from incidents which were 'unclear' and the
property was only missing. Clearly all the dishonesty records fell into the
'theft' category. Below this level the incidents are split by whether the
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incident relied on an accomplice outside the business. These cases were
classified as 'collusion', and those where employees worked individually
or in collaboration with other employees were labelled' staff'.
The breakdown of all people recorded in the security database according
to this classification is given in figure 4.01 below.
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Figure 4.01
Classification of all employee records in the security database
8th February 1996 to 17thAugust 1998
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As can be seen from this breakdown, dishonesty records represent only a
little over a fifth (21 per cent) of the employees recorded in the database.
The majority (over half of all the employees) represents instances of
'negligence'. Cases of 'discipline only' represent the same proportion of
the records as 'dishonesty', but the classifications 'potential complicity'
and' outside work' are much less common (four per cent and two per cent,
respectively).
Almost three-quarters of all records of negligence involve stock losses (74
per cent). This reflects an underlying predominance in the database of
reports of theft by members of the public. (There is a requirement for all
sites to report all stock losses they discover and many of the products are
protected by some form of device which it can often be alleged has been
negligently not used correctly.) Although a few cases refer to negligence
in protecting against criminal damage, burglary, Health and Safety
incidents and frauds or losses of cash, the majority of the remainder are
items classed as general 'security threats' for example losing door or
cabinet keys.
Of the dishonesty records, the most common incident, representing over
half the cases is theft of stock by an employee acting alone or with other
employees (54 per cent). Frauds and thefts of cash by employees acting
without' outsiders' represent the majority of the remaining cases.
Collusion with outsiders represent only 17 per cent of these detected cases.
This immediately raises the question of how representative of all cases
these records are. Barnfield (1998) advances the view that collusion
represents a very considerable contribution to losses. The fact this is not
so greatly represented in these figures may reflect the fact that it is more
difficult to detect instances of collusion rather than the fact that there are
fewer instances of it taking place. I will deal with this topic in more detail
later.
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Over two thirds of all the records of 'discipline' refer to some form of
'rule-breaking'. Most of these (58 per cent of all' discipline') are instances
of failures of procedures that have caused a threat to the business. There
could be seen to be a great deal of overlap here with the category of
'negligence'. The distinction is the' active' nature of the rule breaking in
this category. Whereas negligence usually involves failing to do things
like close a cabinet, these cases involve actively breaking the rules, such as
deliberately misrepresenting accounts to improve performance measures
for the branch. Also 'rule-breaking' are violence or harassment of other
staff (recorded as 'health and safety' incidents, seven per cent),
deliberately damaging company property (seven per cent) and breaking
rules for transferring stock (two per cent). The remaining 31 per cent of
incidents are those that appeared to be thefts or frauds, but which were
deemed non-serious as a result of the disciplinary process.
Two thirds of incidents of 'potential complicity' (66 per cent) involve cash
losses and fraud. The contrast of this proportion with the 42 per cent of
'dishonesty' involving cash losses and fraud reflects the problems of
establishing guilt when dealing with missing cash despite procedures
often quickly identifying the most likely suspect.
Types of dishonesty detected
The next level of classification was to do with grouping the offences
themselves into categories of 'similar types'. Here I will focus only on
breaking down the' dishonesty' cases to the next level of detail. These do
not necessarily constitute all types of dishonesty that took place in the
year, of course. They represent only those cases that have been detected
and proved.
In some cases there was a problem whereby a particular employee had
been found to have been guilty of a number of types of dishonesty. The
case below is an example of this:
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Extract from record 116729
A printer that was kept in the warehouse has gone missing. The item was
discovered missing by [W] on 06/05/98. The item was last seen intact on
02/05/98 by [W], warehouseman. The item was not protected.
No suspects or witnesses.
The branch have informed [G, security manager], and he intends to visit
the branch.
Update from [G] by [Clerk] 28/5198.
This [report] must be cross-referenced with [another report] which refers
to £620.00 counterfeit twenty pound notes, being found in the store
banking on 11/5/98. I attended this store on Wednesday 27/5/98,
regarding the above matters. Enquiries revealed that a full time member
of staff, [A], and the stores Deputy Manager, [5], had photocopied a five
pound bank note a few days before the Hewlett Packard printer was
found to be missing from the stores warehouse. Armed with this
information, I interviewed [A], who stated that he did copy a five pound
note under [5] guidance to establish print quality, but he also stated that
[5] had attempted to copy the other side of the five pound note, in an
attempt to make a complete note. I later interviewed [5], who denied any
knowledge of copying bank notes and could not explain why [A], a friend
of his, would say this. Due to the mounting evidence regarding both the
missing printer and counterfeit money in the banking I contacted [specific
police officer), who attended the store and following consultation [5] was
arrested on suspicion of theft of the printer and £620 from the banking.
He was further arrested on suspicion of making and using counterfeit
money. Whilst leaving the store [5], admitted to the police that the stolen
printer was hidden in his loft at this home address. He has also admitted
to changing £620.00 with counterfeit cash, whilst the banking was in the
store's safe. [5) has subsequently been charged with four criminal
offences and will be appearing before [a particular] Magistrates court ...
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There was an option of attributing multiple offences to each individual,
but this would have made the analysis very complex for the benefit of a
limited number of cases. Also, analysis by offender-incidents would be
difficult to achieve without giving a misleading view about the number of
offenders. Instead, I decided to sacrifice precision to simplicity and
classify the incident according to just one of the offences. In the case
above, most of the circumstances regarding the detection and the
investigation referred to the theft of the printer, so I used that as the basis
for classification of the incident. This was the most difficult case to
classify. There were factors in favour of classifying it on the basis of the
theft of the banking - for example, the greater value was represented by
the loss of the cash. Fortunately, this case was exceptional in how difficult
it was to classify. In most cases where there were two types of offence
involved, one formed the basis of the majority of the investigation, and the
other often represented little more than an allegation.
The sub-categories in each of the two major types of dishonesty - 'theft of
stock' I and' fraud or cash thefts' - were again constructed with an eye to
identifying similar prevention opportunities. They were grouped by
similarity in the way the dishonesty took place. Diagrams showing the
breakdown of the frequency of cases in each of these sub-types are given
in figures 4.02 and 4.03 below.
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Figure 4.02
Stock theft dishonesty
8th February 1996 to 17th August 1998
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In terms of 'theft of stock', the most common type or grouping of incidents
was the simplest - employees just taking (or attempting to take) the stock
out with them at the end of the day or when leaving the store for lunch.
This was labelled 'walk out'.
Many cases of this kind involved the stock being discovered hidden in the
employee's clothing or bags when they were leaving work. Managers
were instructed at this time to search employees in random fashion as they
left so that every employee was searched every week or so.
Some items were quite carefully hidden, for example inside clothing, or
inside the lining of coats, among papers, or in a couple of cases amongst
the remains of packed lunches in employee's lunch boxes. Case 112132
below is a typical example of a theft detected during a search and
involving concealed goods.
Extract from record 112132
During staff searches last night [M], manager, found a personal stereo
down [5], casual's, trousers. [M] saw the bulge and asked [5] what it
was. [5] said that it was a mistake and he had never done it before. He
also stated that he was sorry. The police were called and took [5] away
to the station for statements. [5] has been suspended ...
Another method of concealment was to hide the item to be stolen inside
the packaging of other, legitimately purchased goods. These types of
incident were only rarely detected. As record 22803 illustrates, this is
probably in part because of the good fortune required to notice what was
happening.
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Record 22803
[M] the store manager found a carrier bag containing a coffee maker
under the main counter. On closer inspection of the bag he discovered a
Sony Playstation memory card still in its packaging hidden inside the
coffee maker. [M] asked around and found that [S] had purchased the
coffee maker. [M] left the bag until 17:30 when [S] was going home and
carried out a staff search. The Playstation memory card was still inside
the coffee maker ...
However, it is clear that employees did not take the random search regime
very seriously; because many had taken no effort to conceal the items they
were stealing. The items were easily discovered by the search. In these
cases, and a number where the items had been found less easily, the
employees had a story to cover for the item when it was detected. An
example of this is the extract from record 5927 below.
Record 5927
... [M], manager, instructed [A], assistant manager, to conduct a staff
search on [S], [S] was taken to the rear of the store where in amongst the
items in his pockets, [A] discovered the above pager out of its box. [A]
asked what he was doing with the pager to which [S] replied it was his
friend's. When questioned as to the number of the pager, [S] replied he
was unable to tell him as it was his friend's. [A] asked why [S] had the
pager and he replied he had it so that his friend and parents could contact
him ...
[But eventually he admitted the theft and said where he had hidden the
box.]
Despite the quite detailed stories recounted in some records, in many
cases the exact method of removing the items from the store was not
known. These incidents were also included in the 'walk out' theft
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category. The extract below from record 111226 below is typical of this
type of report:
Record 111226
I [security manager] conducted an interview into the theft of the items of
software games. During the interview [5], part-time sales, admitted to me
after finding the products at his home address, that he had stolen the
items over a period of days from the above store ...
The second most commonly detected type of stock theft was grouped
under the label 'rubbish drop'. It represented 17 per cent of all thefts of
products. In these cases the employee took the goods outside (typically
hidden in the rubbish) and left it there, for collection later. Sometimes
they collected the goods themselves, but sometimes they left them for
collection by an accomplice. An example of the latter is record 108318,
from which the relevant portion is given below.
Extract from record 108318
Report given by [G], security manager.
On 21/03/98, [S] was observed to open the rear goods-in door without
authority. Outside the store were two of [5]'s friends and upon seeing a
member of staff, [S] moved a box of rubbish with his foot back into the
store. On closer examination of the rubbish, the member of staff [W], saw
what appeared to be a Sony Playstation joy pad within. This matter was
reported to the store manager who in turn informed myself.
On Saturday 28/03/98, I attended the store and interviewed [S] regarding
this matter. [S] fully admitted to the theft of the joypad and two Sony
Playstation games, which he placed in the store's rubbish for his friends
to collect at a later date ...
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These cases of I collusion' are not separated from those cases where the
member of staff worked on their own because who collects the goods
makes little real difference to the way the theft is achieved (and therefore
to the ways it could be prevented). The outside accomplice was not
essential to any of the offences. Also, there was a pragmatic reason for not
making the distinction. In some cases it was never discovered who was
going to collect the goods, which would further complicate analysis by
adding the need for a third category of 'collection agent unknown' .
The next most commonly discovered type of dishonesty (11 per cent of
stock thefts) was an opportunity only recorded for delivery drivers. Itwas
the theft of items of scrap. Instead of returning scrap items, which they
collected when delivering new products to customers' homes, to their base
distribution centre, the drivers sold them to second hand shops or scrap
dealers. The numbers of employees found guilty of this type of dishonesty
is, in a way, disproportionately great, in that, because each vehicle had a
driver and a 'mate', there were always two employees detected for every
incident. The frequency with which drivers took stock, and the relative
ease with which they could be persuaded to confess to doing so, suggests
that the company's interpretation of the practice, and the way the drivers
viewed what they were doing, differed significantly. The passage below
from record 90467 below is an example of this.
Extract from report 90467
... I [security manager] interviewed [8] today about the sale of company
scrap, he admitted selling scrap belonging to the company on a regular
basis over the last five months which included two or three items two or
three times a week, collecting five and ten pounds for each item ...
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This seems likely to represent the effect Horning (1970) observed in the
factory he studied. He found that the workforce classified property into
three groups. They perceived differently' company property' (such as
parts that had to be accounted for), 'workers' property' (such as their desk
lights), and 'property of uncertain ownership' (such as parts to which they
had unrestricted access and scrap). Although taking home these items of
uncertain ownership was still viewed as 'theft' by their company, it was
not seen as such by the workers. Drivers probably classify scrap
appliances in a similar way and view them as less the property of the
company than, for example, the new stock they deliver, and consider
taking it far less seriously.
The classification' theft of scrap' was used just for this particular type of
offence where drivers stole the scrap appliances collected from customers,
in that it represented a clearly defined opportunity. However, many of
the 'walk out' thefts involved goods that were similarly 'marginalised.'
Promotional items, free gifts, and returned products, or parts from them,
were often the target in cases of 'walk out' theft. Record 118710 below
seems to provide evidence that employees did treat such items in a
different way to the way they treated other property.
Record 118710
Approx. six weeks ago a sound card was removed from a PC in the
technical centre by [S], Sales. [S] took the card home with him without
informing the management team. The card was discovered missing by
[W], deputy on Saturday 08/07/98. [W2], technician, asked [S] if he had
the card and he said he did. [S] returned the card two days later. The
branch are currently interviewing [S]. [S] stated that he did not see this as
a problem as this is not a stock item ...
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The most common of the types of stock theft that relied on an outside
accomplice were labelled 'collusion handover'. In these incidents the
employee handed goods over to an accomplice. In most cases the handing
over of the goods was undertaken as if a legitimate customer transaction.
Extract from Record 102875
..[A witness] stated that he watched [an accomplice] engage in
conversation with [S] by the Sony playstation display before [S] was seen
to leave the shopfloor momentarily and then returning with a playstation
cartridge, place it inside a [company] carrier bag and pass the bag to the
[accomplice]. The [accomplice] left the store with the bag ...
As many products in electrical stores are kept in stock rooms off the shop
floor, it is far from uncommon for salespeople to be seen handing over
goods in this way, and it would not necessarily arouse suspicion.
Despite this there were a number of employees who went to greater
lengths to disguise the handing over of the stock. There was one incident
in which an employee passed the stock to his accomplice in the store's
toilet and there were a number of cases where goods were found to have
been added to a legitimate purchase. Record 32630 is an example of this:
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Extract from Record 32630
[S] brought a boxed electric fan to the cashier for a sale for a customer.
[M), manager took over the sale because he noticed [S] was nervous and
[M] thought this strange. [M) picked up the box and noticed it weighed too
much for just an electric fan. [M] then opened the box in front of the
cashier and the customer. Inside the box were a number of items
including personal stereos and shavers ...
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The remaining categories accounted for very few detected incidents -less
than seven per cent of stock thefts.
'Deception' is a grouping within the category of 'walk out' theft incidents
where there was greater deceit involved. It is not intended to have any
relationship to a 'criminal deception' in legal terms. It merely picks out
those incidents which involved more guile - or nerve - than others,
because they may represent specific opportunities for prevention activity,
or, more commonly, they represent checks against which to test whether a
proposed prevention method would work. For example, in one case a
salesperson, in order to obtain phone vouchers to steal would go to the
manager and ask for phone vouchers for a customer, who turned out not
to exist - a case to be borne in mind when specifying more secure controls
on the storage of vouchers. In another case an engineer invented a
fictitious customer in order to order a part to repair his own equipment - a
case to mind when assuming that the loss of parts is represented by those
listed as missing.
The next grouping was of thefts 'via delivery'. Some of these were cases of
delivery drivers who succeeded in adding additional goods to their
deliveries. There was also a handful of retail staff who had used the
delivery system to get stock for themselves out of the branch.
The final two types of offence only had one case each in the research
period. One was labelled 'return out of hours'. In this a manager returned
to his shop and opened up after leaving for the night and took money
from the safe. This type of incident had been more common in the past.
However, before the start of the study period, reporting had been set up
within the intruder alarm system records of systems being 'set' as stores
were closed and 'unset' when stores were closed. These exception reports
identified any unusual activity, such as alarms being unset again after
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being set at night. This reporting had already made an impact on this
type of incident.
The other case was one of collusion with an outside accomplice in which it
was shown that the employee had deliberately created an opportunity for
the accomplice to steal the goods. He left the back doors open, apparently
by accident while taking the rubbish out. His accomplices used this
opportunity to steal a number of televisions. However, by great good
fortune they were caught by another shopkeeper and a police officer.
Having been caught they then implicated the company employee who
confessed to his involvement. Given the very considerable number of
instances where employees have been identified as the cause of thefts of
stock - the 'negligence' records referred to earlier - there is clearly an
opportunity for this type of offence to be very much more common than
the one instance identified.
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Figure 4.03
Cash theft and fraud dishonesty
8th February 1996 to 17th August 1998
Cash theft and Fraud
Collusion
Credit fraud Petty cash Other
4%
Incentive,
Refund
5%
Collusion Not
fully paid Staff
6% Other purchase
7% 8%
Cash
9%
Credit
23%
Type of cash theft or fraud Number
Refund 47
Collusion credit 46
Cash 18
Staff purchase 16
Other 12
Collusion not fully paid 12
Banking 10
Under rung 10
Credit fraud 8
Petty cash 8
Collusion other 4
Incentive, software & expenses 8
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The most common type of fraud, or theft of cash, was 'refund fraud'. To
complete a refund fraud there are quite a number of controls for the
employees to overcome. The employee has to be able to log on to the till
system as a manager grade operator, using a personal identification
number (PIN). An original till receipt number, the original branch for the
purchase, and the original date of purchase all have to be entered (though
they are not actually checked on-line by the system). A customer name
and address have to be provided, and a customer's signature taken, and
finally, there is a system for identifying the returned stock. The following
extract, from record 31812, gives some impression of the opportunities for
and risks to offenders represented by these controls.
Extract from record 31812
[S] is a full-time cashier in the store. An [interim stock count] was carried
out and three VCRs were found to be missing from stock. Audit trails
revealed that three VCRs had been refunded over a two-week period
using the manager's pin number. [M], the security manager was
contacted and attended the store today. [M] looked back through the
CCTV tapes of the dates concerned on the refunds and each time [S] is
on the cash desk. She has been creating false receipts and then
refunding the receipts and keeping the money so the tills balanced but
stock was created that didn't exist. [S] was called into the office and
interviewed by [M] and [branch manager] ...
Most of the refunds, like the record 31812, from which I gave the extract
above, involved no actual stock being returned, and the value of refund
being taken by the employee. The value involved was usually taken as
cash, but sometimes represented a refund to the employee's own credit or
debit card. In addition, in most cases the original transaction had nothing
to do with the employee concerned. However, there were a limited
number of cases involving a member of staff refunding their own
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transactions. In one case they returned a purchase as faulty and upgraded
it to a model very considerably dearer without paying the difference. In
another an employee refunded their own purchase of a hi-fi but didn't
actually return the unit.
Onl y one case less common, as a type of offence detected, than' refund
fraud', was for the employee to collude with a customer in a credit fraud.
In round figures those cases labelled 'collusion: credit fraud' accounted for
the same proportion of the fraud and theft of cash cases - 23 per cent.
Some of these cases related to applications for new credit accounts, while
others were frauds involving credit or debit cards.
In some cases of credit application fraud there seemed to be no prior
arrangement between the fraudster and the employee. Establishing the
level of involvement in this type of credit application fraud can be very
difficult. There are a great many instances in any retail business where an
employee processes a fraudulent credit application in good faith, without
realising or suspecting something is amiss. However, when an employee
completes a number of credit agreements for the same customer each for
identical goods, or with varying personal details, it seems very likely that
they have knowingly colluded in the fraud. It is difficult to tell at what
stage innocence becomes 'turning a blind eye' and at what stage 'turning a
blind eye' becomes' conspiracy to defraud'.
One aspect to consider is the reward involved. Some employees were
found to have been rewarded by the fraudsters with some of the goods
that they obtained through the frauds. These were often' sold' to the
employee at a discount price rather than given outright. Record 2026 is an
example of this.
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Extract from record 2026
[S] was suspended pending further investigation after he admitted
purchasing an item from a customer who had opened multiple credit
agreements at the store ...
However, employees are always rewarded by the extra sales (and
commission) that frauds bring. If the number of frauds is considerable
enough, the rewards will be substantial. Record 91362, refers to a manager
who encouraged fraud in his store, and as a result boosted his commission
and won company accolade for his sales performance.
Cases believed to be this sort of 'arms length' collusion, and cases where
the link between the' customer' and the employee seemed probable but
was not established, were the most common types of collusion in credit
application fraud. In contrast, a handful of cases were the subject of more
'professional' criminal conspiracies involving employees. Record 106611
below is an example of this.
Extract from record 106611
Report given by security manager, [G].
DC [P] of [given] CID, arrested an employee, [S] on Friday 06/03/98 at his
home address on suspicion of being involved in a large-scale fraud
operation.
It has been established that [S] was responsible for processing five
fraudulent transactions during late January/early February.
The transactions took the form of [given credit supply company] credit
applications, repeat business transactions and a purchase made by
personal cheque.
117
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
The common factor is that [8] was both the assistant and operator and
the same cheque guarantee card was used to validate the cheques
presented, as deposit payments and for ID purposes for the credit
applications, despite the fact that the customer's name and address
changed with each transaction. The value of the property involved in the
suspect transactions is £5147.
The police are to interview [5] concerning his alleged involvement in
offences of fraud commited against other retailers who do not form part of
the [company] ...
In the detected cases of plastic card fraud it was more common than
amongst cases of application fraud to find that the employee represented a
component in a relatively sophisticated operation. Case 117984, from
which I include an excerpt below, is an example of this.
Extract from record 117984
[8] has today been arrested along with four others in connection with
fraud. It has been discovered that [5] was accepting cloned credit cards
at the store to be used as payment for camcorders. The total value of the
fraud is £5300. The police were in the store today waiting for the
suspects to arrive at the store to make the purchases. When the
suspects arrived the police arrested them ...
Having an 'insider' greatly reduces the risks to faudsters. This is
particularly true in cases like the one above, when using cloned cards,
which often do not bear close scrutiny, but it is also true when using stolen
cards. The employee accomplice omits checks others would conduct
(allowing, for example men to use cards with the title 'Mrs'), and he
doesn't respond with suspicion when cards are not authorised by the
system, (sometimes putting through card after card until one is accepted.)
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Many of the cases where the member of staff acts as the inside contact
seemed to represent much less 'professional' collaboration on the part of
the employee than portrayed by the example above, however, and was
undertaken for friends or acquaintances. A small number (three) of the
reports give accounts of the employee being approached by strangers and
invited to collude in credit card fraud, but given the probability that
employees would want to protect their accomplice, how credible these
accounts are is open to debate. An example extracted from one of these
records (9502) is given below.
Extract from record 9502
Security manager, [G] was contacted by the branch manager to say that
he had had three requests from the credit administration department for
proof of purchase for credit card sales. [G] visited the branch, carried out
an investigation, and found three further associated credit card sales,
making a total of six to the value of 11.9k. [S], full-time sales, was
interviewed by [G] and during the course of that interview admitted that
he'd been approached by some Asian men to process credit card sales
which were fraudulent. In return [G] received a Sony Playstation and a
quantity of games and accessories which were part of the purchases
made on the stolen credit cards ...
Among the records of plastic card fraud there are no cases of employees
regularly overlooking credit checks purely for the increased sales it would
bring to them in the way that credit application fraud seem to have taken
place. This is unlikely to mean that this does not happen, or to the same
extent. It is more likely to reflect the additional information recorded in a
credit application fraud which can make obvious the collusion of an
employee in a way that the limited information recorded about a plastic
card transaction can not.
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A further eight employees (four per cent of fraud/ theft of cash cases) were
involved in credit card fraud. In these cases they did not seem to have
directly involved an outside accomplice (typically processing the
transaction on their own) though at least two of the cases involved a wider
criminal circle from which the cards were obtained. These cases were
grouped under the label' credit fraud'.
If the two categories of credit fraud (the collusion incidents and these
'solo' offences) are added together then credit card fraud is the most
common of the fraud and cash theft cases, representing 27 per cent of the
total.
Three types of cash theft or fraud represented ways of taking the cash paid
by customers before it had been paid into the bank. These were the
offences labelled' cash theft', 'Under-rung' and 'banking'. However
simple thefts of cash were not as common as credit frauds or refunds, and
even if each of the three types are added together they represent less than
20 per cent of cases.
'Cash theft' itself was the third most common type of detected fraud or
cash theft offence. Of the eighteen cases all but three involved taking cash
straight from the till. (Two of the other three were thefts of vouchers and
in the last case the cash taken was left by mistake by a customer.) Any
shortage of cash from the till is discovered at the end of the day, but
establishing that theft, and not a mistake giving change, is the cause, and
that a particular member of staff is involved is more difficult. A relatively
typical case, 108572, which illustrates this, is given below.
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He could not provide any explanation as to why he had opened the till in
this way ...
Extract from record 108572
On Tuesday 31/3/1998 a till shortage of £38.38 was idenitified in till one.
Following an initial recount and check of the till drawer and surrounding
area the cash could not be located. The discrepancy was acknowledged,
however little investigation was carried out at the time and staff were not
searched. On this particular day the branch manager was not present.
When the manager returned to the branch on Wednesday 1/4/1998 she
was made aware of the till shortage and carried a thorough investigation
by checking the audit trail and viewing the CCTV recording that monitors
the cash desk area.
Shortly after 19.00 hrs a trainee manager, [S], is seen to open the till
drawer and his hands enter the till drawer and he is then seen to place his
left hand in his trouser pocket. Following this action [8] closes the till
drawer. The audit trail does not record this action.
When interviewed on Thursday 2/4/1998 [8] denied stealing the missing
cash. He initially stated that he had opened the till drawer at this time
using the management function 'no sale'. However as previously stated
no such transaction appears on the audit trail and he then stated that he
must have opened the till drawer [in an improper way].
The category 'under-rung' (which represents another ten cases) is a very
similar type of offence. In these cases employees stole cash destined for
the till, but to avoid the till showing a 'shortage' at the end of the day they
didn't ring the sale up through the till, or only recorded a portion of it,
and then pocketed that cash. Almost all the cases were then detected
following customers returning to the store after the sale with some query
and someone discovering that they had either not been given a receipt at
all, or had been given a receipt that wasn't correct. Record 116288
illustrates this:
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Record 116288
A customer came into the store to obtain a refund on incorrect goods
purchased two hours earlier but did not have a receipt. A full audit trail
did not show any transaction which could be interpreted as being correct.
The customer identified the sales person who had put the sale through.
[S], sales, admitted to taking the £5.99 to [store manager]. The police
were called and [S] received a police caution and signed a caution
admitting the offence. She has been suspended for five days on full pay
pending a disciplinary hearing. The hearing is on Monday 9.12.96 at [a
particular] divisional office. [The security manager] has been informed.
The third way in which the cash paid by the customers was stolen by
employees was by them taking cash from the money collected together
from the tills ready for banking. There were ten cases of this.
Two of the categories of incident were forms of giving excess discount.
These were the eight per cent that were grouped under the title 'staff
purchase', and the six per cent that were labelled' collusion: not fully
paid'. As has been discussed earlier these cases are difficult to establish as
criminal, and were judged serious enough for inclusion on the basis that
the employees were dismissed. However, whilst I was satisfied the cases
included could be considered more than just 'breaking company rules',
only three of the 28 cases were reported to the police.
The 16 cases of this type that involved staff buying things were grouped
together under the label: 'staff purchase'. In some cases the employee had
sold themselves goods with an unreasonably high (and unauthorised)
discount. In others they had used their staff discount facility to make the
sales, but they were really for friends and relations not entitled to it under
the rules of the scheme.
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Twelve of the records were for sales made by a non-employee, for whom
the employees added additional products or didn't take the full payment.
These were the incidents catagorised as 'collusion: not fully paid'. In a
similar way to some of the thefts of stock in the category 'hand-over' a
number of these incidents were not only for trivial amounts, they also
didn't seem to have been undertaken with the full understanding of the
beneficiary. Record number 955 below is an example of this:
Extract from record 955
On Sunday 28/12/97, [S's] father came into the store to purchase a
hairdryer. [S] had not de-tagged the item and the gates activated as his
father left the store. A manager, [M] went over and checked the receipt,
in doing so he found that the purchase had been put through at a 20 per
cent discount as a price match by [S].
[The 'price match' discount turned out to be unjustified.]
.... [M] spoke to [S's] dad who said that he believed [S] was trying to
impress him. He said that when he realised [S] had done this he then
decided to return the item. [M] believes that this was only returned
because he had seen the receipt. ..
Petty cash in the company is accounted for through the till system. Eight
incidents involved staff obtaining money though this system for
themselves, often producing false receipts or other paperwork to support
their deception. An example of this is record 118091, which is quoted from
below.
Record 118091
Report given by security manager, [G).
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On Friday 07108/98 I received a phone call from Area Administrator [A],
informing me of a possible theft of petty cash, which had been noticed by
a member of staff by the name of [B], whose alertness has probably
prevented further losses.
On Monday 10/08/98, I visited the store with [A] and eight petty cash
transactions were shown to me of which six had obvious alterations and
two with no receipts for stamps. The amount was approximately £40 in
total.
I interviewed [S], who was responsible for putting all the transactions
through the till and when presented with the evidence, she admitted theft
of cash.
The police were called and she was arrested for deception and theft and I
suspended her prior to leaving the store.
It appears that no reference was taken up until the last few days and it
was found that she had been dismissed from her previous job for
suspected theft. She also informed me that she had been previously
arrested and cautioned for the theft of a ring.
Area Manager and Divisional Personnel have been notified.
Four of the cases fell into a category called 'incentives'. This was set up to
categorise those incidents where staff dishonesty manipulated a staff
bonus or incentive scheme to gain a benefit they weren't entitled to. All of
the cases that fell into the period under study referred to staff who
invented fraudulent phone service applications (which each attracted a
small commission payment).
Three further cases involved the fraudulent copying of software, and there
was one case where an employee had misreprented his travel costs to get
an expenses payment he was not entitled to.
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Sixteen further cases were grouped together under an umbrella' other'
code, of which four involved collusion with outsiders. They represented a
wide range of dishonest activities. Examples include: re-using credit
vouchers (three cases), defrauding the company's product insurance
scheme (two cases), charging their own loyalty bonus card with points due
to customers, getting a colleague to refund product that the employee
hadn't purchased, stealing lost property cash, selling a phone the
employee had found to a customer in the shop, putting in false overtime
claims, and stealing customers' credit cards or recording their card
numbers for use in other frauds.
Profile of staff offenders
Basic comparison of people caught to people employed
The records of staff dishonesty reported in the study period, the little over
two and a half years between 8th February 1996 and 17th August 1998,
comprises 474 individuals.
Of these 280 were on the main retail payroll, 80 were on the casual payroll,
46 worked for service and distribution and 34 were taken on as temporary
staff at Christmas. In addition there were 24 contractors six work
experience students from schools, and four other staff. This is set out in
table 4.01.
Alongside the numbers of staff found to be dishonest in each of the payroll
system groups, I have given the overall number of staff employed in that
group over the period studied (or where exact records were not kept, an
estimation). I have then derived a percentage figure for what proportion
of all staff in that group were found to be dishonest.
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It is clear that the relationship between the numbers caught and the
number employed is not a simple reflection of the honesty of staff in that
category. A lower proportion of casual staff was caught being dishonest
than the proportion of main payroll staff caught. This doesn't necessarily
mean they were more honest - it reflects the ease of catching them. These
staff work fewer hours and are thus less available to be caught, and arrive
and finish at different hours to the rest of the staff - making it less easy for
them to be included in regimes such as staff searches. The differences in
the figures also reflect differing opportunities for dishonesty. Distribution
and service employees are not necessarily more naturally honest than
retail staff - but they do have far less access to cash or easily hidden items
of stock than the retail staff do.
The personnel system does not keep records of the work experience
students and contractors, and it was not possible to get a listing of all the
temporary staff taken on at Christmas. In combination with the people
whose records could not be found on the payroll system, this meant that
there were 406 offenders for whom there was base data on the personnel
system to compare them with in detail.
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Table 4.01
Employee numbers
Employee group Dishonest Detected
employees dishonesty
as % of all
employees
(a) Main payroll 278 1.02%
(b) Casual 79 0.76%
(c) Service & distribution 46 0.66%
(d) Xmas casual staff 34 1.25%*
(e) Contractors 24 1.76%*
(f) Work experience 6 1.20%**
(g) Main payroll staff not found in personnel 2
records
(h) Employee of acquired business not yet 1
on payroll
(i) Direct sales subsidiary 1
Totals and average 471 0.95%
On payroll system 437
(a), (b), (c) & (d)
With base records 403
(a), (b) & (c)
* Estimated on the basis of these staff representing 10% of the
workforce
** Based on an estimated number of people on work
experience
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How representative are the records?
The records of those detected for dishonesty are undoubtedly a small
proportion of all those engaged in dishonesty throughout the business.
Across all the payroll groups the figure averages out at around one per
cent of the staff employed being found dishonest. In contrast Hollinger
and Clark (1983, 42) found that 6.6 per cent of retail staff admitted to
taking store merchandise, and that ...
When combined with discount privilege abuse, getting paid for more hours
than were worked, under-ringing a purchase, borrowing or taking money
from employer without approval, over-claiming on expenses, and
damaging merchandise so as to buy at a discount, total involvement in
dishonesty was 35.1 per cent.
There are a number of reasons why the company's figures might be
expected to be lower than Clark and Hollinger's figures. Electrical
retailers, having fewer items of higher value stock, to which access by
customers and staff is often restricted, have better chances of rigorous
stock control, and generally less opportunity for employee theft to go
unnoticed than the retailers Hollinger and Clark studied (department
stores and discount retailers). Also the definitions I have applied in
categorising the records were more stringent - excluding 'production
deviance' and many cases of discount privilege abuse which Hollinger and
Clark's questions included. Indeed giving discount privilege to those not
entitled to it made a very great contribution to that 35 per cent figure, yet
many detected cases were not categorised as dishonesty in my data.
Nevertheless, it's difficult to believe these factors would make a very great
difference - certainly not sufficient to account for the 97 per cent reduction
needed to bring their estimate of prevalence down to my level of detected
crime.
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A way of investigating the actual level of dishonesty is to compare the
financial values for the costs of the offences detected as recorded in the
offender records with the financial figures that would be affected by
employee dishonesty for the company as a whole. The cost of detected
dishonesty derived from offender records expressed as a percentage of the
overall cost of dishonesty to the company derived from the company
accounts gives a financial measure of the percentage of dishonesty that is
detected. If those that are detected can be taken as typical, then this also
gives the percentage of offenders detected, from which the true prevalence
of dishonesty can be derived.
Two issues complicate this seemingly simple concept.
The first difficulty is that there are two values you could adopt as the
value of loss for which an offender could be recorded as responsible. The
incident record will identify the' proven' losses that the investigation has
directly linked to the individual. In many cases, there is evidence of other
offending. Even if the incident recorded was a first offence, if they had not
been caught it is reasonable to assume that the majority of offenders
would have offended again. Therefore, it is reasonable to estimate an
annual value that the offender would have been responsible for if they had
not been caught, and to use this as the value associated with detected
offenders. So the 'two values' I mentioned are a 'known' value of loss
associated with an offender, which is accurately determined by the
investigation, but which most probably doesn't reflect the real cost of the
offender. We also have a value for the estimated 'real' cost of the offender,
which seems more realistic, but relies on arbitrary estimates. (More
detailed discussion of the method of estimation is given in Annexe B.)
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The second difficulty is, of course, that there is no one line in company
accounts labelled 'value lost through dishonesty'. The costs of dishonesty
comprise one portion of a number of costs in business accounts. Deriving
a proportion of the financial value that can be attributed to dishonesty has
to be a process that involves a large degree of estimation, or to be more
accurate' guesswork'. However, whilst guessing may be the only way to
arrive at a figure for what proportion of the financial cost in question is
attributable to employee dishonesty, the guess is bounded by an absolute
value - it cannot be greater than the total cost of the financial measure in
question. So the guess is within unequivocal parameters. Also, experience
and applied common sense can give some guidance to what proportion of
the financial measure in question could be accounted for by dishonesty.
This is not an absolute' accounting' measure, but it can give another valid
perspective, or context within which to view the offender records.
The process is complicated by the fact that different types of dishonesty
have impacts on different financial systems within the company, so
different types of incident need to be compared to different base financial
figures.
There are essentially five financial measures in the company accounts
which each include a cost caused by employee dishonesty. The first is the
value of 'charge-backs' made by credit providers. These will include the
cost of employee collusion in credit fraud. Secondly, there is the stock
loss recorded in the stock accounting system. It is within this 'shrinkage'
figure that the most common forms of employee dishonesty show up.
Thirdly, there are the 'overhead' costs of running the business. These
costs will be inflated by the value of any resources dishonestly misused by
employees (such as unauthorised phone calls adding to the phone bill).
The fourth figure is the profit margin achieved. This figure will be
diminished by the costs of dishonest reductions in the profit achieved, for
example, through giving unauthorised discounts. Finally, the fifth
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company financial measure affected by dishonesty is the value of cash
'written off' as missing. This figure accounts for mistakes such as giving
customers too much change, and includes the cost of cash stolen by
employees.
I will deal with each of the financial cost figures in turn, and I will try to
make an educated guess at what proportion of the total figure employee
dishonesty represents. The information that informs these guesses varies
considerably in each case.
The first cost is the most difficult. It is problematic to obtain an accurate
figure for credit fraud losses. The majority of the losses are borne by the
credit providers and not the retailers. Theoretically, the retailers become
liable for losses if employees are implicated in the fraud, but, as this would
clearly lead to great reluctance on the part of retailers to investigate losses,
in practice it is rare for the losses to be charged back to the retailers. So the
value involved in credit fraud (the incidents' collusion: credit fraud' and
'credit fraud') usually represents a 'potential charge-back' rather than an
actual loss. However, the only figures the credit providers can be relied
upon to regularly or routinely pass on are the value charged back. In
other words, the details of the value of fraud where the retailers have not
followed the correct procedures and they are able to charge back the loss.
Special requests have to be made to gather information on the full extent
of credit fraud. The information is not easy for suppliers to provide.
There are particular difficulties for credit' account' suppliers (those
affected by the credit application fraud) in trying to distinguish between
'bad debt' and fraud, and there can be a long delay before an account is
established as being in arrears at all. Credit card frauds have a similar
delay problem arising from the delay while charges appear on customers'
bills and are queried. To complicate matters further, credit and debit card
transactions are handled by a third party intermediary that deals with
each of the card companies. So these enquiries have to be passed on by
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them. The figures are regularly gathered, and losses for suppliers who do
not provide figures are filled in by assuming they lose at a comparable rate
to other suppliers. But there are potential sources of error in the process,
so the resulting figure has to be treated with some caution.
The question is then 'what proportion of credit fraud involves an
employee?' I would guess that the figure is unlikely to be more than ten
per cent. My only evidence for this is the analysis of fraudulent credit
transactions that I regularly undertake. If collusion was greater than ten
percent of the total fraud value then I believe this analysis linking frauds
back to the sales people who put them through the till would show far
more frequent links to particular members of staff. On the other hand, the
frequency with which staff are found to be involved with the offenders
detected means that I would be very surprised if less than one per cent of
credit fraud involved employees.
However when I first worked through the figures, I found the actual
values identified in the investigation records for the offenders detected for
collusion in credit fraud actually represent one per cent of all loss reported
by the credit providers. So, if the percentage of credit fraud represented
by employee collusion was what I had come up with as my lower
boundary guess, which was also one per cent of all fraudulent
transactions, then it would mean that we are catching every last one of the
employees involved - which is unlikely to be the case. As a result, I re-
assessed both the figures from the suppliers and the values associated
wi th the offender records.
After investigating what the figures supplied by the credit suppliers
meant in terms of the percentage of fraudulent credit business, I decided
that only half of all the fraud was being reported back to the company,
and increased the base figure accordingly. I also removed one £53,000
fraud figure from the investigation records because it targeted the
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business accounts division of the business computer supplier business,
and on reflection I decided fraud from their credit suppliers would not
have been included in the base figure I was given.
In cases of credit fraud most investigations involve identifying all the
fraudulent transactions that a particular individual was involved with. It
is rare for there to be a suspicion that there was 'more' without further
investigation being carried out. Therefore the figures for the known and
suspected values are very similar, and they make little difference to the
values for the proportion caught.
Table 4.02 below shows the detection rates derived for each source of loss.
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Table 4.02:
Percentage of estimated employee theft loss represented by
offender records
Loss type Basis of % detected % detected
estimated (known value (estimated annual
loss involved) value)
Against Against Against Against
High Low High Low
estimate estimate estimate estimate
of total loss of total loss of total loss of total loss
Potential Between 1% and 10% 2.3 22.9 2.4 24.2
of estimated outside
charge back credit agency losses
Overheads Between 0.01% and 1.4 13.9 1.8 17.5
1% of branch
controlled expenditure
Stock Between 35% and 0.8 1.2 3.0 4.8
55% of stock audit
loss
Cash 20% to 50% of sales 0.8 2.1 1.5 3.7
audit write off
Margin Between 5% and 0.0 0.9 0.1 2.3
0.025% of all
discounts
Total 1.2 1.3 1.9 4.5
(excluding charge back)
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There are four values in each case. These are the upper and lower
estimates for the overall value of staff crime in the financial measure,
applied to the actual value identified in the investigations and then to the
estimated annual value. For 'potential charge backs' I have derived a
wide variation in possible detection rates: the company detects between
two per cent and 24 per cent of employees who collude in credit fraud.
To obtain the lower figure for the detection rate it has to be assumed that
the proportion of credit fraud that involves employees is appreciably high.
The alternative is to accept that a very high proportion of staff collusion in
credit fraud is detected. There is some merit in either explanation. Itmust
be very attractive to the fraudster to recruit an 'insider' to put transactions
through for them, and it must seem to the employee that it would be very
easy to avoid suspicion. On the other hand plastic card fraud data is
routinely analysed, and the relative proportions of fraud taken by
different operators does easily identify collusive employees.
Another difficult financial measure to deal with is that of 'overheads'.
Many thefts - such as those of petty cash, office equipment or parts-
rather than causing a stock audit shortage, or a cash shortage, instead
increase the overheads of the business. Clearly a great deal of expense
that cannot be subject to theft (such as rates and electricity bills) go into the
company accounts for overheads. Some consumables that are within the
discretion of the site managers are separated out under one accounting
line, labelled 'branch controlled' expenditure. This contains most of the
items vulnerable to dishonesty, and therefore forms the best basis to start
from. However, establishing what proportion of that expenditure is
misappropriated by employees is very arbitrary. There are no subsidiary
sources of information to contribute to an estimation in the way that there
are for stock losses. I have assumed that the employee loss would
represent a similar proportion of the total 'turnover' as employee theft
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represents of stock losses, and have estimated the total employee theft loss
as lying between one per cent and a tenth of a per cent of these overheads.
These figures put the detection rate for dishonesty that puts up overheads
between one per cent and 17 per cent. The relative care with which petty
cash and expenses are scrutinised does make a high detection rate for this
type of incident seem legitimate, but the base figure is considerably less
reliable than it is for stock theft, and creates a large margin for error.
Clearly most 'walk out', 'hand-over' and the other forms of 'stock' theft
can be compared to figures taken from the company's stock control
system. A number of incidents that are categorised in my system as
'fraud' also represent a stock shortage in terms of their impact on the
accounting system. In most of the 'refund frauds' stolen cash taken by the
perpetrator is converted by the fraudulent till transaction into a stock
shortage. 'Under-rung' incidents, where items are omitted from the sale
that goes through the till, result in stock loss, not a shortage of the cash,
even though that is what the dishonest employee takes.
In contrast to credit fraud values, missing stock is measured very
accurately by the company as part of its accounting functions. Full stock
checks are conducted around every nine months by the company. Every
individual product line has an individual product code by which it is
accounted. By comparing figures for stock delivered to a store with the
number of products of each type recorded as sold by the till system and
those remaining in stock, accurate accounts of the products missing can be
compiled. The average prices paid to the suppliers are applied to these
missing units to establish a financial value for the lost stock. (This system
of accounting for 'units' using an EPoS system is much more accurate than
the older system of accounting for the value of products sold against the
value of products in stock. In these systems finding mistakes is very
difficult, and accounting for price changes often causes errors.)
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Deciding what proportion of the stock loss is attributable to staff crime is a
process which has more evidence to support it than is the case for most
other figures. Known losses of stock through damage, burglary, or known
thefts (those where there is clear evidence such as CCTV footage of the
crime) are written off the stock system as they take place, and do not form
part of the loss established by the stock audit count. So, there are
essentially five ways that the loss of stock can occur. First, suppliers may
not have delivered the stock that they charged for. Second, staff may have
given out the wrong goods to customers. (Customers will tend to bring
back the lower specification product given out by mistake for a higher
specification unit, but will tend to keep higher specification product if they
are given that when they have paid for a cheaper model. This results in
'cross-overs' - a count correct in units, but with a shortage of one line, a
surplus in another line, and a net financial loss.) Thirdly, staff may have
given the stock out without accounting for it through the till system. (For
example, they may not ring up a free gift given to 'clinch a deal', or they
may not bother to 'write-off' items like printer cartridges and batteries
used in the store.) Fourthly, customers may have stolen the stock without
the theft being noticed. And, fifthly, the stock may have been stolen by the
employees.
At an individual store audit level there are many more accounting failures
that could cause a loss, such as not accounting correctly for stock returned
to the warehouse. However, whilst such accounting failures will result in
a shortage in one place, each of these shortages will cause a matching
surplus somewhere else. So at the top' company' level accounting errors
will cancel each other out.
It is clearly impossible to be absolutely confident about apportioning this
'unexplained' loss between the possible causes. However, there are a
number of sources of information that can assist with making an
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estimation. One perspective is to look at the probability of a particular
product type becoming missing in a particular way and the loss associated
with that line. Clearly shortages of American-style refrigeration are
unlikely to represent shoplifting, and are relatively unlikely to represent
staff theft either. Losses of products such as phone vouchers, which are
very attractive, easy to conceal, but not kept where customers have access
to them are likely to represent employee theft and nothing else. Assigning
an estimated probability of each type of loss to each type of product in this
way, and then applying the resulting proportions to the stock loss by type
gives an indication of the relative values in each type of loss. Analysis of
stock counts and audit investigations into 'bad results' give another
perspective. The estimated proportion that comes out of this process is
that employee dishonesty accounts for around 45 per cent of stock audit
losses. Establishing a margin of error in this estimation is even more
problematical, but my guess from the types of stock missing is that staff
theft is very unlikely to be more than 55 per cent of all losses, and I find it
difficult to believe it could be any lower than 35 per cent.
In terms of stock theft the variations between the known value of the
thefts or frauds, and the estimated annual value is much greater. My
estimations at individual case level have aggregated to an annual loss four
times greater than the value associated with the detected incident.
Applying these values produces a detection rate for incidents which result
in stock loss of between one per cent and five per cent.
The relatively straightforward theft of the cash customers pay before it
gets to the bank causes a till 'shortage' or a banking 'shortage'. The
accountancy here is not as absolute as one might at first imagine. Till
shortages result from mistakes such as giving the wrong change as well as
theft, and banking shortages are usually the result of errors that are
rectified later. It is possible to extract from the accounts a figure for the
final 'write-off' figure for cash that is not reconciled. As an estimate I
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have taken between 20 per cent and 50 per cent of this as the proportion of
employee theft, giving a detection rate of between one per cent and four
per cent.
Another group of incidents causes a reduction in the profits, or 'margin'
that the company makes. Any of the unwarranted discounting incidents,
such as 'staff purchase' or those' collusion: full price not paid' incidents
where the price was reduced for the accomplice, and many of the 'other'
fraud incidents fall into this group. As an approximation to all 'margin
reductions' I have used the value of all discounts given in retail
transactions. Again deciding on an employee dishonesty base against
which to compare these losses is largely arbitrary. I estimated that the
figure lies between five per cent and a quarter of a per cent of all discounts
being' dishonest'. These figures produce rates of detection between 0.01
per cent and two per cent, the lowest for any type of loss.
So, excluding the values for credit fraud (which seem unreliable) the
average percentage of dishonest employees who are detected lies
somewhere between 1.2 per cent (using only the known value per offender
and the high estimate of loss) and five per cent (using the estimated
annual value per offender and the low estimate of total loss).
It is difficult accept the lowest of the figures derived as a true boundary to
the estimates. If around one per cent of the workforce is detected for
dishonesty (as derived from comparing detections to the number of
employees) and that detection rate represents around one per cent of all
employees (as derived from comparing the average loss per offender with
the financial figures) then we are asserting that all the employees are
dishonest. Whilst it is not impossible that this is the case, and that the
company's losses are contributed to by virtually every employee
committing just offences with the values that are represented by the
detection records, this does not square with the experience of people (like
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myself) who have worked in the stores. It seems more appropriate to
conclude that those employees who were detected have caused losses
prior to the ones they were detected in connection with, and to scale up
each offender's losses to give an estimated loss attributable to them (in the
way described in Annexe B). Using only the estimated figures produces a
more credible lower boundary.
Using the estimated value of losses from offender records gives a
detection rate between 1.9 per cent and 4.5 per cent. Working on the
overall detection rate of 0.95 per cent of the workforce, this would place
the prevalence of dishonesty among the workforce between 50 per cent
and 21 per cent (the average of the two being 36 per cent).
These are very similar figures to the rates that Hollinger and Clark's self-
report study established for the retail staff they studied. They derived a
figure of 35 per cent of the employees behaving dishonestly. (Which
would equate to a rate of three per cent of all offenders being detected in
the situation we have of just less than one percent of the workforce
actually caught being dishonest.)
There are two main lessons that can be derived from this.
The first is for the study of the records. Those who are arrested are not a
large proportion of those involved in dishonesty, and of course, by getting
caught, they can be said to represent the least successful participants. Any
findings derived from analysis of this data need to be treated with great
care.
The second is to recognise what this means for loss prevention. If, at best,
only five per cent of dishonest staff are caught, then 95 per cent are getting
away with it. This has implications for the 'propaganda' message
disseminated by the company. In the same way that the 'using drugs kills'
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message had no credibility in places where drug use had reached
significant levels among the target audience, so a prevention campaign
based on 'we'll catch up with you' loses credibility in the face of such a
low chance of detection.
There is also an implication for the overall policy in dealing with
employee dishonesty. If the current level of resources devoted to
detection only result in five per cent of the dishonest staff being caught,
then the opportunities for reducing overall losses through increased
detection do not look healthy. Assuming the unlikely possibility that
increasing resources would increase the dishonesty detected at the same
rate as currently, then providing ten times the resource would still give
the employee a 50:50 chance of evading detection.
Age
When looking for factors that may have an influence on involvement in
dishonesty, age seems to show promise. Many researchers have
commented specifically on the relationship between the age of staff and
their level of employee dishonesty. It has been found that younger
employees are less influenced by severity or the certainty of punishment
(Hollinger and Clark 1983) and that they are more likely to be involved in
'social' theft. (Hollinger et al. 1992.) It has also been suggested that
younger staff steal more than their older counterparts as a response to
their lowly social position in the organisation (Tucker 1989). It is also
likely that employees will desist from dishonesty as they experience
'maturing' events in their lives, but young males are less likely to give up
theft than young females (Graham and Bowling 1995). On the other hand,
older employees have been found to be involved in more serious thefts
(Horvath 1990, 233).
In other areas of crime prevention the age group involved could be a
difficult factor to make use of. In relation to employee dishonesty there is
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perhaps greater scope. At the most extreme level, through recruitment
policy, this is a society that could choose not to have any youngsters
within it.
The employees caught being dishonest are predominately young. 133 of
the 403 employees detected as dishonest (within the payroll groups for
whom there were base records to compare with) were under 21.
However, to find that a third of all offenders were under 21 is not as
significant as it may seem at first, because, in common with other retailers,
the company tends to employ a lot of young people. What is needed is to
compare the number of people in a particular age group who were caught
being dishonest with the total number of employees in each age group.
One basis for comparison would be a 'snapshot' of those employed at a
given point in the study period. This tends to be the basis of comparison
for most 'personnel' issues - comparing the group in question to those
currently employed. However, for a study that covers a substantial time
period, the snapshot becomes less appropriate. Not only do changes in
the company create changes in the number of staff employed, the changes
are seasonal. Most employees are taken on just before the Christmas
increase in trade. Taking a number of snapshots and averaging them
would be a possibility, but it would be difficult to be sure that the seasonal
variation was accounted for correctly.
A more accurate base figure can be obtained by identifying all the
employees who were employed during the study period. This is the
figure that I have used for the comparison of dishonest staff numbers to
those employed in table 4.01. However, it is not so easy to use figures
derived in the same way for establishing a basis for age. The problem is
deciding when you count them as being in a particular age group. People
will have moved between age groups in the course of the study. Suppose
you take a date at the end of the study period. Someone who is aged 19
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then and put into the 19 to 21 age group, has actually spent all the study
period in the age group before. Another problem with taking any
particular date to compare the personnel records with is employee
turnover. In the course of the study period, of course there have been a lot
of starters and leavers. The turnover is likely to be greater among younger
staff. So it is possible that many of the young staff that would be included
in a simple head count do not represent an accurate base record against
which it is correct to compare the number of staff found dishonest. They
did not represent the potential for becoming a case of detected dishonesty
for very long. Just counting the number of people employed could be
misleading, and account needs to be taken of their lengths of service.
The method employed was to calculate for each individual employee the
number of days of employment they spent in each age group, taking
account of the date they joined and left the business. There were a number
of permutations of dates, but for example, if an employee was already
employed before the start of the project, and their 18th birthday was before
the end of the project, and they left after their 18th birthday (or are still
employed) then the days employed in the under 18 age group was the
difference between the start of the project date, and the date of their 18th
birthday. Then, for this employee, the difference between their 18th
birthday and the end of the project were then counted as days employed
in the 18 to 21 age group.
Itwould have been possible to add another factor to account for the actual
hours worked (as contracted) and differentiate between part-time and full-
time employees. However, I did not include this factor into the
calculation. I felt that the risk of dishonesty related to length of time spent
as an employee rather than the exact hours worked. This is because I
found no evidence to suggest that because someone is employed longer
hours they steal more. It also seemed unlikely (and there were no
apprehension records to support the notion) that anyone would steal more
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regularly than once a week, and, as all the employees worked at least once
a week, they all seemed to have similar opportunities. It is possible to
argue, in fact, that the part-time employees have more opportunities than
the full-time staff to evade controls.
Table 4.03 below represents the results of this calculation. There were a
total of 17 million days of employment in the study period. Only 3.7
million of these (21 per cent) were worked by staff under the age of 21.
Therefore the discovery that 33 per cent of dishonest staff were under 21
does constitute over-representation by younger staff within the offender
records.
Whilst the days worked represents an accurate measure from the
personnel records to act as a base for calculations, the measure that results,
Idishonest staff detected per hundred thousand days employment', is
hardly an intuitive one. To put the figures into a more comprehensible
context, I have translated them into' average' employees by dividing the
days by the average total of days employed overall by the 44/000
employees who had worked within the study period (that average being
384 days). This allows a table to be presented showing the much more
meaningful measure of Ipercentage of staff found dishonest' to be
presented.
Presented in this format (table 4.04) a clear relationship can be seen
between age and the likelihood of being detected as dishonest. The
apprehension rate drops from 1.3 per cent or 1.4 per cent for those aged
less than 20 down to 0.2 per cent for the 51-55 age group, and to zero
beyond that.
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Table 4.03
Days employed by age group
Days employed
Days employed % of total days represented as
Age group in this age of number of
group employment
employees
(thousands)
on the basis of the
overall average days
worked per employee
Less than 18 1,181 7% 3,074
18 to 20 2,493 15% 6,491
21 - 25 3,653 21% 9,512
26 - 30 3,085 18% 8,032
31 - 35 2,083 12% 5,423
36 - 40 1,449 8% 3,774
41 - 45 1,102 6% 2,870
46 - 50 920 5% 2,396
51 - 55 611 4% 1,591
55 - 60 321 2% 835
Over 60 217 1% 566
Total 17,114 44,561
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Table 4.04
Comparisons of dishonest and all staff by age group
Age Group Number % found
found dishonest
dishonest
Less than 18 41 1.3
18 to 20 92 1.4
21 - 25 112 1.2
26 - 30 81 1.0
31 - 35 41 0.8
36 - 40 18 0.5
41 - 45 11 0.4
46 - 50 4 0.2
51 - 55 3 0.2
55 - 60 0 0.0
Over60 0 0.0
Total 403 0.9
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Table 4.05
Breakdown by payroll group and age
% found dishonest
Age group Main Casual Service and Total
distribution
Less than 18 0.8 1.5 3.2 1.3
18 to 20 1.4 1.5 0.6 1.4
21 - 25 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.2
26 - 30 1.1 0.0 0.8 1.0
31 - 35 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.8
36 - 40 0.5 2.3 0.4 0.5
41 - 45 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.4
46 - 50 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2
51 - 55 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2
55 - 60 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Over60 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 0.9 1.4 0.6 0.9
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The relatively high proportion of staff in the 26 to 30 age groups seems to
contradict conventional wisdom on the delinquency of the young, and the
reduction in offending associated with maturity. It does, however, accord
with the self-report study from the Home Office (Graham and Bowling
1995) in which far fewer young men reported giving up crime as they got
older than arrest figures would suggest. The assertion in that publication,
that this fact was accounted for by offenders moving to less visible types
of crime, such as stealing from their employers, seems born out by these
figures.
However, there are a number of possibilities for why fewer old employees
were found to be dishonest. Given the unrepresentative nature of the
data, it cannot be said with any certainty that it represents lower levels of
dishonest behaviour among older staff. It is possible that younger
employees are more likely to arouse suspicion than their older colleagues,
or that the prejudices of managers or investigators against young staff
count against them. My earlier calculations provided evidence to suggest
that a quarter of all employees are involved in dishonesty at one time or
another. This means that any investigator or manager who instigates an
investigation on the basis of a prejudice against young employees stands a
one in four chance of having their prejudice confirmed. However, young
staff have had less opportunity to learn how to avoid detection, so another
possible explanation is that it may just be easier to catch dishonest
youngsters.
Table 4.05 shows the underlying detection rate by payroll group. The
overall trend of reduced detection rates as age increases is similar in each
group. The inconsistent figures (service and distribution employees under
18, and casual staff aged 36 to 40) reflect very small actual numbers in
some groupings when split down to this level. (Both the figures I
highlighted represent a single individual.)
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When comparing this table (in which the employee numbers are calculated
on the basis of days of employement) with table 4.01 (which is based on a
simple headcount) an alternative viewpoint on the casual staff group is
given. The high turnover in this group means that although there was a
high 'headcount' over the study period in this group, they did not stay
long, and represented a much lower' opportunity' for dishonesty to
compare with the numbers caught. The result is a detection rate higher
than the main retail payroll group.
Gender
The Home Office study found that young women were more likely to give
up offending sooner than their male counterparts (page 64). Table 4.06
shows a breakdown of the company offender records by age and gender.
The table shows that very many fewer female employees are dismissed for
dishonesty. There are fewer female employees in the company, but there
are still far fewer female dishonest employees as a proportion of the
female workforce than male staff as a proportion of the male workforce -
on average a proportion 79 per cent lower.
There is some evidence of older female staff being less involved in
dishonesty, in that the older dishonest employees are predominately male
as opposed to female. (There were no dishonest female employees over
the age of 45.)
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Table 4.06
Age and gender
Number of Dishonest
employees employees as %
found dishonest of all employees
by gender of that gender
Age group Female Male Female Male
Less than 18 2 39 0.2 1.7
18 to 20 7 85 0.4 1.8
21 - 25 13 99 0.5 1.4
26 - 30 5 76 0.2 1.3
31 - 35 2 39 0.1 1.1
36 - 40 2 16 0.1 0.7
41 - 45 3 8 0.3 0.5
46 - 50 0 4 0.0 0.3
51 - 55 0 3 0.0 0.3
55 - 60 0 0 0.0 0.0
Over60 0 0 0.0 0.0
Total 34 369 0.2 1.2
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Table 4.07
Proportion of employees in each gender group detected as a
result of management suspicion
Initial indication Female Male
% of all % of all
Number dishonest Number dishonest
female staff male staff
Management suspicion 5 16 74 23
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However, in relation to the other proportions for female employees, the
0.3 per cent detection rate in the 41-45 age group represents a high rate for
an older age group.
The simple relationship of offending to age shown by the male figures-
the younger the age group the greater the proportion dishonest - is not
replicated among the female employees. For example, the peak age (as a
proportion of the workforce) for female staff to be detected for dishonesty
is older than for the male staff. It is in the 21 to 25 age group whereas for
men the peak detection rate is within the group aged 18 to 20. This flatter
distribution curve for females reflects the distribution by age and gender
of all indictable offences reported by Tarling (1993, 17).
However, Tarling also noted that for particular offences the peak age,
mean age, and shape of the curve were very similar for male and female
offenders. He concluded that:
... the difference between the shape of the aggregate age-crime curoes for
males and females ... (which showed that on average female offenders are
older) stems from the fact that females are more inclined to commit those
sorts of offences which are committed by older people rather than that
females commit a similar range of offences as their male counterparts but
commit them later in life. (Page 19)
The narrower range of offences available within the scope of employee
dishonesty would seem to preclude this type of effect. However, female
employees were less common perpetrators of walk out theft, which had
one of the lowest mean age of offenders, and were not represented at all
among those who perpetrated rubbish drop theft, which had the lowest
mean age of all.
152
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Whilst it can be seen that the company is far less likely to dismiss female
employees for dishonesty than it is to dismiss their male counterparts, it is
open to speculation whether female employees are indeed more
trustworthy, or just more likely to evade detection. It is probable that a
prejudice among managers that male employees are most likely to be
responsible for theft influences the detection rate. The way in which the
dishonesty was detected may provide some evidence of this.
Many dishonest employees first came to notice as a result of suspicion by
managers, whilst many other cases carne to light as a result of other
factors, such as employees being caught 'red-handed'. If substantially less
female staff were detected following managers becoming suspicious of
them, then it would tend to support the idea that female employees evade
detection through being assumed to be more trustworthy. In fact a 42 per
cent greater proportion of male staff are detected as a result of rousing the
suspicions of the management team, as shown in table 4.07. This finding
(though not providing proof) gives some credence to this notion.
Length of service
Another facet of employment that could be expected to have an influence
on rates of dishonesty is the length of service an employee has. One might
expect those employees with a lower length of service to be over-
represented among those detected for dishonesty. New starters have
made less of an investment in their employment and are likely to be less
committed to their jobs. An alternative viewpoint, but one which would
have the same effect, is the notion that employees with longer service are
more likely to have learnt ways of avoiding their dishonesty being
detected.
A simple count gives the impression that these factors do have an effect.
Over 42 per cent of the staff found dishonest had less than a year's service
with the company.
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There is of course a relationship between age and length of service.
(Employees cannot help but be older when they have established longer
service.) If the culture of the company has a positive effect on dishonesty,
then offending among younger staff may be the result of less time spent in
the company absorbing that culture rather than a function of age.
A topic that invites speculation is whether the lower detection levels
among older employees represents workers who had stolen when they
were young desisting from crime as they grow older. It is only possible to
study this fully with a longitudinal study, and honest reporting from
employees who were not detected and dismissed. However, there are
some indications available from comparing the distribution of lengths of
service and age among dishonest staff in the workforce as a whole.
Table 4.08 shows the distribution of dishonest employees and all
employees by length of service. The number of all employees given in
each group as the basis of comparison was calculated in the same
meticulous way as the basis for the age groups. The numbers represent
the actual days of employment worked by employees in each of the
groups scaled up to average I employees' on the basis of the average days
employed overall. In this way the large number of new starters who leave
in their first seven months, do not have the disproportionate influence
they would have if they were included on the basis of 'headcount' in each
group.
As can be seen, the weighting towards shorter lengths of service is still in
evidence when the figures are expressed in this form, as detection rates in
each length of service group.
The average for those with less than five years' service is one per cent of
the workforce found dishonest - but for those with six or more years'
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service, the average is less than half that. However, the detection rate for
the one to five year service group is as great as the group with less than
seven months service. This doesn't suggest longer service has anything
like a quick effect on honesty.
It is also noticable that this one to five year service group is the largest
within the workforce, representing over a third of all employees. There
are far fewer employees with more than five years' service. This is a
continuing feature of the workforce. Five years on from the study period,
the majority of staff will not have moved into the six to ten year service
bracket. The turnover in employees means that most of those with less
than five years' service will have been replaced by new starters, and a
similarly small proportion of the workforce to this will have over five
, .years service.
This relatively consistent detection rate below five years' service doesn't
suggest a model of employees starting with a greater disposition towards
dishonesty but growing out of it as they build up longer service. Instead it
suggests a large' churning' population of workers with a similar
disposition towards dishonesty throughout their relatively short
employment.
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Table 4.08
Comparisons of dishonest and all staff by length of service
group
Length of service group Dishonest Percentage
dishonest
Less than 7 months 107 1.1
Less than one year 63 0.9
01 - 05 years 187 1.2
06 - 10 years 35 0.5
11 - 15 years 8 0.3
16-20years 2 0.2
20 years or more 1 0.1
403
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Table 4.09
Dishonesty by age and length of service
All with base records Number found Percentage found
dishonest dishonest
Length of service Old Young Old Young
Less than 7 Months 17 90 0.5 1.3
Less than one year 23 40 0.9 1.0
01 - 05 years 81 106 0.9 1.5
06 - 10 years 26 9 0.5 0.8
11 - 15 years 8 0 0.3 0.0
16 - 20 years 2 0 0.2 -
20 years or more 1 0 0.1 -
158 245 0.6 1.3
Main retail Dishonest Percentage found
dishonest
Length of service Old Young Old Young
Less than 7 Months 12 41 0.5 1.2
Less than one year 14 20 0.8 0.9
01 - 05 years 65 84 1.0 1.6
06 - 10 years 22 9 0.5 0.9
11 -15 years 8 0 0.4 -
16 - 20 years 2 0 0.2 -
20 years or more 0 0 0.0 -
123 154 0.7 1.3
Casual retail Dishonest Percentage found
dishonest
Length of service Old Young Old Young
Less than 7 Months 1 47 0.5 1.7
Less than one year 1 14 1.0 1.0
01 - 05 years 0 16 0.0 1.2
06 - 10 years 0 0 0.0 0.0
11 - 15 years 0 0 - -
16 - 20 years 0 0 - -
20 years or more 0 0 - -
2 77 0.5 1.4
Distribution and service Dishonest Percentage found
dishonest
Length of service Old Young Old Young
Less than 7 Months 4 2 0.4 0.4
Less than one year 8 6 1.2 1.9
01 - 05 years 16 6 0.7 0.9
06-10years 4 0 0.3 0.0
11 -15 years 0 0 0.0 -
16 - 20 years 0 0 0.0 -
20 years or more 0 0 0.0 -
32 14 0.5 0.9
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Age and length of service
Table 4.09 investigates the relationship between age and length of service
by cross-tabulating detection rates by length of service and a classification
into 'young' and 'old'.
The distinction between 'young' and 'old' was taken as the age of 26. The
basis of the definition of 'young' in the base employee records was
specifically whether an employee was employed for longer (more days)
during the project period while under 26 than the days employed at age 26
or older.
In line with the findings of Hollinger and his co-authors (1991) the
younger new starters are much more likely to be dishonest than the older
new starters, and the older group has a considerably lower proportion of
dishonesty in each length of service group.
The younger group has a consistently high proportion of dishonesty. The
peak is at a stage that represents quite long service for this age group: the
one to five years' service group. The detection rate among those relatively
few young employees with six years or more is lower (at 0.8 per cent), but
is still far higher than the older group with the same length of service.
These figures certainly give no indication that young staff are becoming
more honest as a result of becoming established in the workplace society
or identifying with the company culture. Indeed the breakdown by
payroll group shows that the most pronounced instance of young staff
with longer service being found dishonest is among the main retail payroll
group. So those young employees who would perhaps have been
expected to be most influenced by company culture - those who joined the
permanent retail payroll- were most likely to be detected of dishonesty
later in their career.
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Marital status
If longer service is not having a significant effect on offending, then
perhaps there are other events associated with age and maturity that could
be having an effect. One event often associated with desisting from
offending is marriage. (For example, see Farrington 1994, 528.)
Marital status is not held in personnel records in the same form as the
other data items that I have used, and it is not possible to establish
'detection rates' in the same way. The best query I can achieve is to
establish what proportion of employees (as a 'snapshot') was married, and
this can be compared with the proportion of dishonest staff that was
married. Table 4.10 compares this marriage 'rate' among those found
dishonest and the rest of the staff. There are too few young married
employees to give any reliable comparison between offenders and non-
offenders (though the two percentages were similar). A larger number of
older employees are married, and so there is greater chance in a difference
being significant. Among these older employees, a lower percentage of
the dishonest employees were recorded as being married than the
percentage of all employees who were recorded as married. This
supports the view that marriage is a factor in restricting dishonesty in
older staff.
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Table 4.10
Dishonesty among young married and old married employees
Percentage of the group who were married
Offenders All staff
Young 3.0 2.5
Old 26.4 33.7
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]obgrade
Another grouping of employees that one might expect would influence
their offending is their rank in the company. A more senior employee
might be expected to offend less than his lower graded counterpart for a
number of reasons: higher rewards should reduce the need for additional
rewards from dishonest activities, and higher status would suggest a
greater personal investment in the organisation and therefore more to
lose. However, a factor acting in the opposite direction, making offending
more likely is the fact that higher status generally provides greater
opportunities for dishonesty.
There are, however, several problems with comparing the rank of
offenders with the number of employees overall of the same rank. There
are a great many grades of employee within the company personnel
database (particularly in the distribution and service part of the business),
and they do not have a structure of higher level aggregations. To
investigate the figures, I have built aggregations that seemed appropriate,
but it is particularly difficult to be sure that the grades that do not have
offenders are grouped into an aggregation against which to compare an
appropriate group of offenders.
Also, it is common for a job to be done by someone whose grade suggests
that they perform a different role. (For example, many of the employees
who are responsible for warehouse work in retail units actually have an
'administration' grade.) Furthermore, (in contrast to the multiplicity of
grade distinctions in service and distribution) within the retail part of the
business, there may be 'rank' distinctions that would be observed in a
store that are not visible from the employment database. A department
'head' may have the same grade as the employees reporting to him or her.
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Table 4.11 provides a comparison based on overall aggregation of grades
into some high level groupings. This identifies delivery and warehouse
jobs as those with the highest level of detected dishonesty. This has some
logic to it. Delivery drivers have greater unsupervised access to stock than
any other group, and a particular opportunity to steal scrap (in the way
described earlier). Warehouse staff have continual access to small high-
value items of stock. However, I fear that the aggregation process has
distorted the results. I suspect that there were employees who were not in
the delivery grade who undertook delivery roles, and I am confident that
there are many employees whose job grades appeared to be management
or other who should have been included in the warehouse category.
What can be established with some confidence is that the' delivery' grades
and the 'warehouse' grades are the lowest grades that would be involved
in these tasks. So, in line with Tucker (1989) we can assert that dishonesty
(or rather detected dishonesty) is associated with those in more lowly
positions in the organisation - a finding he interprets as dishonesty being
a reaction against low status. However, whilst these particular 'lowly'
grades do indeed have a high detection rate, and the management grades
have a lower rate, the difference is not very great. The comparison
between management dishonesty at 0.7 per cent and shop staff at 1.2 per
cent is comparable, for example, to the difference between the rates for the
21 to 25 age group and the 31 to 35 age group. If higher rank was a real
disincentive to dishonesty a more pronounced effect could have been
expected.
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Table 4.11
Job type
Job title group Number Percentage
found dishonest
dishonest
Delivery 30 2.8
Warehouse 33 2.0
Security 4 1.5
Shop sales and administration Staff 236 1.2
Management 65 0.7
Other 35 0.3
403 0.9
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Table 4.12
Job grade
Grade Number Percentage
(shop workers only) found dishonest
dishonest
Technician grade 1 4 2.8
Cashier (full-time) 4 2.4
Sales 111 1.5
General manager 26 1.2
Deputy manager 29 1.2
Administrator (full-time) 19 1.1
Saturday staff 6 1.1
Sales (part-time) 26 0.7
Administrator (part-time) 10 0.6
Other 43 0.4
278 0.9
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In an attempt to overcome the problems associated with the aggregation
process, I prepared another set of figures based on the 'raw' grades of
employees and offenders. However, to a large extent the problems
remained. Some grade groupings (particularly in distribution) had very
few people in them. The result was a lot of small grade groupings in
which there were no offenders and therefore showing a zero rate of
detection and there were other, essentially similar, grade groupings in
which there was a single offender and a small number of employees
therefore producing a very high rate of detection. These circumstances
produced some high' detection rates' for groups but with no confidence
that they were in any way significant. At the same time within retail the
grading structure was not detailed enough making very few distinctions
possible.
Table 4.12 provides these results, showing the proportion of employees
detected as dishonest for all main retail payroll grades where there were at
least four offenders in that grade during the study period. Forty-three of
the dishonest employees were in grades that had less offenders than that,
and have been included in the table as 'other'.
The results are surprising in a number of ways. The highest detection rate
was for the technical staff grade. Though the actual placing in the ranking
is not very meaningful given the small number of cases (four) that it is
based on, it is surprising to find a high detection rate at all. Technical
employees (generally computer engineers working in retail units) have
relatively high status, and would not have as great an opportunity to steal
as other retail employees. The detailed circumstances may give something
of a clue. In three of the four cases the items taken by this group of
employees were low-value computer discs that they used day-to-day.
Smigel's (1977) observations on the way that property was classified in a
factory setting provide a possible interpretation of this. It is possible the
technicians regarded these discs, which they worked with, as property of
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'uncertain' ownership or even as their own - and would not have seen
taking them home as theft.
The cashier grade is less surprising to find with a high detection rate.
Essentially meaning 'till operator', the grade is one of the lowliest in the
company, and because the till operators do not get commission on sales,
one of the lowest paid. Their offending could therefore be interpreted as a
rebellion against their lowly status (after Tucker (1989) or simply in terms
of need or greed resulting from low pay. There is no hint of
'misinterpretation' about the actual incidents these staff were involved in.
One was a straightforward theft of games software, two comprised
involvement in high-value credit card frauds and the other was a fraud
involving re-use of vouchers. Opportunity is another factor that would
increase the risk among this work-group. Their continual use of the till
gives these operators greater opportunity in respect of scams such as re-
using vouchers, and less visibility when colluding in credit card fraud.
It is not very surprising to find those with the main sales grades having a
relatively high detection rate. Like cashiers, they have relatively lowly
status in the stores and considerable opportunity. What is more
surprising is that detection rates for the grades of manager and deputy
manager are so similar to the lowly sales grade. The much higher ranking
than was identified in the first aggregated table is the result of limiting the
investigation to just retailing, and excluding the distribution and service
managers, a group who do not share the same opportunities as retail
managers. Management employees have far greater opportunity than
other staff (being generally responsible for operating the controls against
dishonesty). However, their high detection rate is surprising given the
potential restraining factors their position could be expected to provide:
higher status; increased' accumulated capital' in terms of service, status
and learning which they jeopardise; and increased material benefit from
employment, which would make the rewards of dishonesty less necessary.
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A more detailed investigation into retail management grade dishonesty is
included later in this section. Given the high rate of detected dishonesty
among management grade employees in retail, opportunities for reducing
dishonesty by increasing benefits or stake-holding in the company look
bleak.
Another surprise is that part-time staff ranked lower than the full time.
Part-time employees would be expected to have less commitment to the
company and less compunction about stealing as a result. There is no
evidence for this being the case given that so few are caught, though the
findings may be affected by my methodology in calculating the base to
compare offenders with. Part-timers have been included on the basis of
their length of employment - not their actual hours spent at work. Being
in the store less, they may have a lower chance of detection simply
because they are present less of the time. Also, because they often arrive
and leave at irregular times they probably have a reduced risk of detection
because the controls such as searches are less easy to administer at these
times.
In summary, rank does not seem to be a good grouping for distinguishing
targets more at risk of offending. However, the link between job title and
criminal opportunities gives a crime prevention opportunity in terms of
targeting the message. For example, it would seem profitable to convey
more forcefully to new technicians the company attitude to taking home
small value items such as discs, and to target cashiers in the prevention of
collusion in credit card fraud.
Age, length of service and type of dishonesty
The type of dishonesty detected varies with age and length of service as
well as rank. The three are, of course, related - gaining longer service
inescapably leads to older age and often to promotion. And, even if
employees are not promoted in terms of grade they gain additional
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responsibilities as they work longer for the company, and gain additional
opportunities to misuse the responsibility they are given.
Table 4.13 shows the mean age and length of service for the types of
dishonesty summarised into nine categories. The data is also presented in
figure 4.04 in the form of a scatter graph. Aside from 'rubbish drop' thefts
(which have a very low average age) and pirating software (which has a
high average age) there seems a strong relationship between the age and
length of service of offenders for each category of offence. Higher mean
ages relate to higher mean length of service.
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Table 4.13
Mean age and length of service for each type of dishonesty
Mean Mean
Type Age Length of
service
Among offenders Among offenders
Refund 26.4 3.5
Fiddles 25.7 3.0
Cash 25.1 2.8
Credit 24.9 2.2
Collusion 24.1 1.8
Walk out 24.1 1.4
Software 26.7 0.7
Rubbish 18.6 0.3
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Figure 4.04:
Mean age and length of service for each type of dishonesty
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The offences rank themselves along a line of increasing age and length of
service in a scale that could be described as representing increasing
sophistication. At the bottom end with an average age of 24 and length of
service of one and a half years is simple walk out theft. At the top with an
average age of 26 and length of service of three and a half years is refund
fraud.
This insight suggests opportunities for targeting crime prevention
information. Measures preventing simple stock theft are better targeted at
the young new starter, and refund fraud prevention needs to be aimed at
the older, more experienced employee.
However, the apparent increase in sophistication is more likely to
represent the opportunities open to employees with greater experience
than a preference for these types of dishonesty which in itself is associated
with greater age and experience. All employees have access to stock
which is all you need to walk out with it, but a management PIN and a
degree of experience in using the till is required to undertake refund fraud
and this will require a more experienced member of staff. This
interpretation is not so favourable to targeted crime prevention.
Nonetheless, one type of offence, 'rubbish drop' does seem to be
exclusively associated with young new starters. This no doubt has a
relationship with opportunity, in that this group of staff are more likely to
be given the menial tasks. However, given attractiveness of the
opportunity and the over-representation of the young in offending, it
seems that not giving employees in this category the task of dealing with
the rubbish would be an effective crime prevention measure.
Being caught
How the offenders were caught is another factor that could show
distinctions between groups of employees. There are two aspects to the
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process of getting caught that have been coded separately. The first is
how someone in authority became alerted to the fact that there was
dishonesty to investigate, and the second is how this particular individual
was identified as being dishonest.
Table 4.14 shows the overall breakdown by the 'first alert' aspect of being
caught. Separate columns are given for the main retail, casual retail and
service and distribution employees.
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Table 4.14
First alert to dishonesty
Percentage of detections in this group made in
this way
Typeof first alert Main Casual Total Service and Total
retail retail retail distribution
Management suspicion 24 26 24.2 10 22.6
Search 11 13 11.6 8 11.1
Non-management staff 10 16 11.0 10 10.9
External source 6 10 7.1 23 8.9
Stock check 5 6 4.8 23 6.9
Missing cash 8 0 6.5 3 6.0
Customer query 5 7 5.8 5 5.7
Stock found (hidden) 2 10 3.9 0 3.4
Police 3 4 3.5 0 3.1
Group Security Mgr. 1 1 1.3 13 2.6
Head office query 3 3 2.6 3 2.6
Area administrator 3 0 2.6 0 2.3
Audit 3 1 2.6 0 2.3
Guard 3 0 2.6 0 2.3
Inspectorate 3 0 2.6 0 2.3
Hotline 3 0 1.9 3 2.0
Checking programme 2 0 1.6 0 1.4
CCTV 1 0 1.0 3 1.1
Regional office 2 0 1.3 0 1.1
Back door alarm 0 1 0.6 0 0.6
Tagging system 0 1 0.6 0 0.6
Other 0 0 0.3 0 0.3
Not Known 16 13 15 15 15
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Overall, management suspicion was the most common first indication that
there was something amiss. Though it represented many fewer of the
service and distribution cases than the retail ones (10 per cent as opposed
to 24 per cent). This disparity reflects the fact that most distribution or
service managers are responsible for a workforce that spends much of its
time 'on the road' and out of their direct supervision.
Record 116098, from which an extract is given below, is a typical example
of the cases that were classed as belonging to this 'management suspicion'
category.
Extract from record 116098
On 24/6/98, 25/6/98, 30/6/98, 217198, 1117/98, and 14/7/98, [8], sales,
accepted cheques from customers that were not [checked via check
guarantee agency]. These dates corresponded to the management's
days off.
[MJ, manager, had become suspicious of this and alerted [0], deputy. [0]
witnessed a woman enter the store, who matched a description given by
[M). and pay for goods with a cheque. [0] went to the shop floor and
inspected the cheque, he found it to be unsigned. He instructed [5] to
obtain a signature from the customer. He then went to the office and
called the police. The police questioned (5). he was arrested for
conspiracy to defraud, deception ...
As with many of the cases the first alert aspect is open to many other
interpretations - in this case, for example, it could be considered that it
was the problem cheques that were the real alert to a problem. It is also
probably the case that with the benefit of hindsight managers are going to
be likely to make reports that overplay the importance of their suspicions.
However, in all these cases the essential component of the dishonesty first
coming to light was some action by the management team.
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The next most common way that dishonesty first came to anyone's
attention was through a search (11 per cent of all cases). The next was
information from non-management employees (10.9 per cent). Adding
these cases to the 22 per cent first noticed because of management
suspicion, and the few (two per cent) of cases which first came to light
through a call to the confidential phone 'hotline', this means that nearly a
third of all cases came to light because of a member of staff. This has
implications for crime prevention. If the most significant contribution to
the detection of dishonesty is made by honest employees then the crime
prevention message should be sensitive to this. It is possibly something
that propaganda could capitalise on - encouraging more people to report
dishonesty. Certainly, it needs to be sensitive to not harm the willingness
of employees to come forward with information about their colleagues.
External sources, such as concerned members of the public or other
retailers accounted for nine per cent of the first alerts. Along with
customer queries (six per cent) they could be said to represent incidents
discovered by chance. Incidents discovered by chance suggest an
intriguing possibility of gaining another perspective on how common
incidents are - perhaps a window on the incidents better hidden within the
workplace environment. However, on closer inspection, the frequency of
the types of incident detected in this way are bound up with the method of
detection, and provide very little other insight. Half of all the incidents
that came to light in this way were thefts of cash - most through
employees not ringing up the sale and instead pocketing the cash. These
incidents are difficult to detect in any other way than customers returning
to query why they do not have a correct receipt. A number of the others
were rubbish drop thefts, which are often more obvious to someone seeing
what is happening outside the back door than to those inside the shop.
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Sixteen per cent of the cases were first noticed by the target of the theft
going missing. (Stock checks accounted for seven per cent, missing cash,
six per cent, and stock found hidden, three per cent). Almost all the cases
would have an impact on company systems of course, as described earlier.
Itmay therefore seem unusual that all staff dishonesty does not come to
light in this way. The explanation seems to lie in the range of possible
explanations whenever stock or cash is found missing - administrative
mistakes, theft by outsiders, or miscounting - and the difficulty, even
when employee theft seems the most likely explanation for the loss, in
linking the loss to anyone in particular. To detect straightforward theft by
an employee from a routine stock check (as described in the following
excerpt from record 956) is somewhat exeptional.
Extract from record 956
Following a report by the branch of a [routine stock check] discrepancy on
games software [G], security manager attended the branch where he
interviewed a member of staff. The staff member admitted taking a Sony
playstation game from the secure cage on 19/05/98 and concealing it in
his bag which he left in the staffroom. It was then his intention to take it
from the branch when he finished work at 20.00 hrs ...
Many of the cases identified by stock checks represented specific checks on
scrap items being returned to the service centre, which detected theft by
drivers. In other cases following up on stock checks identified refund
fraud. Record 109873 is an example of this:
Extract from record 109873
[D), an assistant manager, did an exchange product check on Saturday
morning on a VCR but could not find it. She ran an audit trail which
showed a refund of £169.99 in cash. The original purchase was made on
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a Mastercard and the refund was put through under a completely different
name and address. The original customer has been contacted and they
still have their VCR and know nothing of the refund.
The refund receipt has been found in one of the bins in tiny pieces ...
There were a variety of other initial indications that accounted together for
another 18 per cent of the cases. As can be seen from the table they
included the police, other security or regional office inspections, and
devices such as tagging systems or CCTV.
There were substantial differences between the ways that distribution and
retail employee dishonesty became known. Management suspicion, as
noted earlier, contributed far less frequently to detections in distribution
whilst stock checking and information from external sources were far
more common. On the other hand the main retail and casual retail payroll
cases were very similar in the proportions detected in each way.
Investigating just the retail employee cases further, it was found that there
were variations in the age and length of service of employees caught in
particular ways that are similar to the variations in the age and length of
service associated with different types of dishonesty. Table 4.15 below
shows the mean age and length of service for each category of Ifirst alert'.
It shows a wide variation. At one end are those cases first discovered by
area administrators, where the mean age was 31 and the mean length of
service was over ten years. At the other end of the scale is the handful of
cases discovered by a back door alarm activation, which had a mean age of
19 years, and a mean length of service under one year.
These values have then been plotted with length of service on one axis and
age on the other as Figure 4.05. Like the plot created for types of
dishonesty, the relationship between age and length of service is relatively
consistent - grouping most types of first alert on to the same line through
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the chart. The 'other' cases that didn't fit the classification system, cases
brought to light by CCTV, those where stock was found hidden, and those
discovered by a back door alarm, were the exceptions, having a lower age
than the other categories.
As with the types of dishonesty the chart broadly represents an increase in
sophistication as age and length of service increase. Simpler methods of
detection, such as searches and stock checks, are at one end, and more
sophisticated investigation by regional team or area administrators are at
the other end. To a large extent this is because the methods of getting
caught are related to the types of dishonesty. For example, the back door
alarm going off is never going to detect a refund fraud.
However, the effect of this relationship can be excluded if we look at the
method of detection within the same type of dishonesty.
Tables 4.16 and 4.17 show the mean age and length of service for each first
alert category for two relatively common types of dishonesty, walk out
theft and refund fraud. In both cases the general principle that the older
and longer serving the employee, the more difficult it is to detect the
dishonesty seems to remain true.
Hollinger and Clark (1983) found that young employees were less likely to
be influenced by the threat of getting caught. This is consistent with the
fact that younger employees were more often caught more easily.
The category of first alert associated with the youngest staff, 'customer
query', represented employees who took the risk of using mobile phones
they had stolen. In one case they had replaced the phone in the box the
customer bought with a dummy, and in the other case the phone had been
refunded for a customer but the account not cancelled so the employee
could still use the phone. Also among walk out thefts, the staff caught
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through staff searches, that is caught whilst in the risky act of taking goods
out hidden on their person, were relatively young compared to the other
categories of alert.
179
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Table 4.15
Mean age and length of service for each category of
first alert to dishonesty
(shop employees only)
Mean Mean
Initial indication Age Length
of
service
Area administrator 31.6 10.3
Other 26.0 10.0
Regional office 28.5 7.0
Missing cash 26.4 4.3
Hotline 29.8 4.2
Inspectorate 25.5 4.1
Group security manager 24.8 2.5
CCTV 21.3 2.3
Checking programme 27.2 2.2
Audit 26.5 2.1
Branch staff 24.2 2.1
Police 25.1 2.0
External source 23.8 1.5
Head office query 22.4 1.5
Customer query 25.1 1.3
Management suspicion 23.8 1.3
Tagging system 22.5 1.0
Search 23.7 0.9
Stock check 23.3 0.7
Guard 22.4 0.4
Stock found (hidden) 19.4 0.4
Back door alarm 19.0 0.0
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Figure 4.05:
Mean age and length of service for each category of
first alert to dishonesty
(shop employees only)
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Table 4.16:
Mean age and length of service for each category of
first alert to dishonesty, for walk out thefts
(shop employees only)
Walk out theft
Length Age
of
service
Branch staff 2.4 29.3
Inspectorate 5.5 28.0
Tagging system 1.0 27.0
Hotline 0.0 26.0
Stock check 0.8 25.2
Management suspicion 1.6 24.6
Police 1.0 24.5
Search 0.9 23.8
Guard 0.6 22.6
Audit 0.0 22.0
External source 0.4 21.6
CCTV 0.0 20.0
Stock found (hidden) 0.4 19.0
Customer query 0.0 16.5
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Table 4.17
Mean age and length of service for each category of
first alert to dishonesty, for refund frauds
(shop employees only)
Refund
Length Age
of
service
Area administrator 6.3 36.0
Missing cash 19.0 35.0
Hotline 10.0 29.0
Audit 8.0 27.0
Inspectorate 4.7 26.3
Head office query 2.0 26.0
Management suspicion 2.1 25.4
Checking programme 1.5 25.0
External source 0.0 25.0
Branch staff 4.0 22.7
Customer query 1.0 22.0
Stock check 1.0 18.0
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The second aspect of Igetting caught' was how the offence was attributed
to a particular individual. The percentage of offences in each category are
shown in table 4.18 below. In the majority of cases (46 per cent) it was an
investigation by the security manager that proved who was responsible,
though a substantial number (17 per cent) needed no further investigation
as the offender was caught 'red handed' when the offence first came to
light. In another 13 per cent of cases it was an investigation by the
manager which led to the offender being identified. However, there were
a number of cases where the proof fell short of certainty. In these cases the
investigation report does not record a confession, or incontrovertible
proof, even though the individual was dismissed at the subsequent
hearing. These cases I have labelled 'balance of probability' (five per cent).
Investigations by the police (five per cent), evidence from the Electronic
Point of Sale (EPoS) records (two per cent), paper records (0.2 per cent),
and investigation by personnel manager (0.2 per cent) also made a
contribu tion.
Ranking these factors by average age and length of service reinforces the
finding from the 'initial alert' factor that younger employees with shorter
lengths of service take more risks. They are more often caught 'red
handed' and it is the older employees whose offences require the
involvement of a security manager to investigate before they could be
linked to them. The only finding that seems to contradict this is that so
many of the cases in the category of only proved on a 'balance of
probability' involved young new starters. If the 'balance of probability'
cases are seen as representing' difficult to prove' cases, then one would
expect them to involve older staff. An alternative perspective, (which
there are not sufficient resources to investigate) is that these cases
represent different approaches at the disciplinary hearing to older and
younger staff. There is probably a greater willingness on the part of senior
management to dismiss younger staff on the basis of a balance of
probabilities. Younger employees have no former service to act in
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mitigation. Also, those with less service (typically the younger employees)
have less protection under employment law, and have built up less of a
career to be compensated for losing in the event of being found to have
been unfairly dismissed, so the risks from any legal retaliation by such
employees are very much less. It is very likely that similar cases where the
employees were older would not have resulted in dismissal and hence the
case being included in the study data.
185
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Table 4.18
How offences were attributed to a particular individual
Percentage of those detected in this group
who were identified in this way
How offence was Main Casual Total Service and Total
attributed to an retail retail distribution
individual
Security manager 48 28 43.5 65 45.9
investigation
Caught 'red handed' 17 23 18.2 9 17.1
Management 12 24 14.3 2 12.9
Not known 11 4 9.2 15 9.9
Balance of prob'lty 5 5 5.0 7 5.2
Police 4 11 5.3 2 5.0
EPoS evidence 3 1 2.2 0 2.0
CCTV 1 4 1.7 0 1.5
Paper records 0 0 0.3 0 0.2
Personnel manager 0 0 0.3 0 0.2
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Table 4.19
How offences were attributed to a particular individual
How offence was attributed to an individual Length Age
of
service
Investigation by group security manager 2.8 25.7
Not known 2.5 24.1
EPoS evidence 1.9 26.1
CCTV 1.5 20.3
Management 1.2 23.4
Paper records 1.0 23.0
Police 1.0 22.4
Caught 'red handed' 0.9 23.4
Balance of probability 0.8 22.0
Personnel manager 0.0 22.0
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Figure 4.06:
How offences were attributed to a particular individual
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Cost of offences
Another feature of dishonesty that may distinguish between groups of
offenders, and is relevant to assessing the risks before targeting crime
prevention measures, is the value of the loss.
Table 4.20 below shows the frequency of offenders being detected for a
range of groups of value involved in the dishonesty. (This is the value
determined to be associated with the dishonesty at the time of the offence.)
The most noticeable feature of the table is the high number of very low-
value offences. Forty-six per cent of all offenders were dismissed for
offences costing £50 or less. Two thirds of the offenders were associated
with values of £150 or less. This effect is even greater in the distribution
and service operation, where it is 68 per cent of cases in which the value
involved is less than £50.
The predominance of low-value offences in distribution reflects the large
number of instances of theft of scrap appliances, which of course, have a
very low commercial value. In retail, however, where the value of stock
available to a dishonest employee could be so much greater, it is
surprising that employees are prepared to risk the consequences of getting
caught for such low-value goods.
Clearly the majority of employees that are detected for dishonesty are not
making much money from it. It seems a very low reward to balance
against the risk. If the model operating is a 'rational choice' one, then the
risk of detection must seem very low - or employees must believe that the
company would not take such low-value losses seriously. Given the low
value of the rewards, it seems more probable that the employees are not
interpreting what they are doing as a balance of risks and rewards.
Perhaps the goods (as with the engineers' discs) are being interpreted as of
no real value and indeterminate ownership. Perhaps they are being seen
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as a fair balance against unfair treatment. Clearly from this type of
analysis these are not questions that can be answered. However, the
analysis does challenge a simplistic rational model. It also has implications
for the crime prevention message. A common employee theft prevention
tactic is to stress that employee theft is 'not worth it' because the long term
effects of detection would reduce earning potential in years to come.
('You may be living the high life now on your ill gotten gains, but a
criminal record may mean you never get another good job again and lose
a fortune in legitimate earnings.') The values involved show that this is
not an appropriate message - with values this low it seems obvious that
the dishonesty is not worth it.
However a more objectively economic perspective can give a different
viewpoint. Farrell and his co-authors (2000) proposed a model of crime
prevention based on identifying offending as 'an economic labour supply
problem involving a time-allocation decision.' In this model 'the
individual's decision is based on whether the additional benefit of
spending an extra unit of time in criminal activity is outweighed by the
cost.' Crime prevention interventions are then seen as increasing the time
required to commit it. (The authors argue' ... effort is time, and time is
risk'.) For employee dishonesty the 'investment' involved in allocating
time to dishonesty is very small because the employer is already paying
for the time. From this perspective, legitimate use of the time at work has
limited opportunities for producing an additional benefit (one would have
to work very hard, for example, to earn a bonus or raise) whereas the
benefit from using that time for theft is appreciable. From this perspective
there are no uses of time at work that are more productive than theft, and
almost any reward is economically 'viable'.
At the high value end of the scale there are quite a few (seven per cent) of
cases (all within the retail payroll groups) where the value exceeds £4,000.
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Table 4.21 refines the figures for offences involving the shop workers only,
and breaks down the figures by type of dishonesty. It is immediately clear
that the cases with values in excess of £4,000 are almost exclusively credit
frauds. (Values over £4,000 represent 64 per cent of all credit frauds where
the value was known.) As has been noted earlier, credit fraud is a
contradiction in that the rewards for the dishonest employee are the
greatest, but the actual loss to the business is relatively low, because the
majority of the losses are born by the credit providers.
The value of credit fraud was far higher than the other types of
dishonesty, with only 18 per cent of cases under £1,000. The distribution
of losses differs considerably between the other types of dishonesty as
well. Cash thefts, fiddles and walk out theft are weighted towards low-
value incidents, all with over 50 per cent of incidents involving values
under £50. Rubbish drops, collusion and refunds have greater numbers of
higher value offences (though collusion values were all lower than £1,000,
whilst a significant number of refunds and rubbish drops went over that
figure).
Another way to investigate the cost of offences is to investigate whether
there are characteristics of the offenders associated with higher or lower
cost offences. Looking at this issue from a 'rational choice' perspective
suggests that there should be a relationship between the value of offences
and the age and length of service of offenders. Older employees have
,invested' more of their time and energy in achieving their longer service,
have achieved greater status in the company and they generally benefit
from greater legitimate rewards. From a rational or economic view of
offending it would seem less likely that these older and longer serving
employees would risk their status and the investment they have made in
their employment for a low value illicit reward. In contrast young new
starters who have invested little could be expected to risk their job for
lower returns.
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Table 4.22 below shows the average age and length of service for cases
grouped into five categories of loss. (Credit frauds have been excluded
because although few in number, their high values relative to the other
types of dishonesty disproportionately affects the results.) The results do
little to support the proposition that older employees with greater service
will steal more. The mean age of those cases whose dishonesty had a
value less than £50 was actually marginally greater than the mean age of
those cases where the value was over a thousand.
Average lengths of service are more in keeping with what might be
expected. The average length of service of those who were dismissed for
the least value (less than £50) was lower at 1.9 years, than for the highest
group (an average of three years for cases where the value exceeded
£1,000). However, the top and bottom of the value range did not produce
the top and bottom of the range of average lengths of service. The £101 to
£500 value range had an average length of service of 1.4 years, and the
£501 to £1,000 had an average length of service of 4.1 years.
Of course the older, longer serving employees may have taken far greater
value from the business, by stealing more regularly. It is also possible that
their greater experience may make them better at concealing their
previous crimes from investigators. (They may be more resilient to
questioning by security managers, and confessions to security managers
represent the basis of most knowledge about values aside from any value
involved in catching someone 'red-handed'.) Table 4.23 presents data that
could give a perspective on this. The cases here are grouped not by what
was proved but instead by an estimated value. The figures estimated for
each case represented what the offender could have got away with
annually if circumstances of the offence they were caught for was
representative of repeated offending. They were derived by assuming
that the offenders would continue to steal whenever they could. Hence, if
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an investigation had established three offences by a particular employee in
their last month, I assumed that they had been involved in similar value
offending at the rate of three offences a month since they started - or since
the beginning of the year if they had over a year's service.
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Table 4.20
Distribution of values involved in dishonesty by payroll
group
Percentage of cases by column
Value group Main Casual Total Service and Total Cumul-
retail retail distri bution ative
total
00. Not known 16 9 14.3 11 13.9 13.9
01. £1 to £50 45 38 43.5 68 46.4 46.4
02. £51 to £100 13 14 13.4 5 12.4 58.8
03. £101 to £150 7 7 6.9 12 7.5 66.3
04. £151 to £200 4 8 5.2 0 4.6 70.9
05. £201 to £300 3 4 3.3 2 3.2 74.1
06. £301 to £500 4 7 4.9 5 4.9 79.0
07. £501 to £750 3 3 2.9 2 2.9 81.8
08. £751 to £1,000 3 4 2.9 0 2.6 84.4
09. £1,001 to 5 13 6.9 2 6.3 90.8
£2,000
10. £2,001 to 2 0 1.6 2 1.7 92.5
£3,000
11. £3,001 to 1 0 1.0 0 0.9 93.4
£4,000
12. £4,001and 9 3 7.5 0 6.6 100.0
above
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Table 4.21
Distribution of values involved in cases by type of dishonesty
Percentage of cases by column
Value Cash Fiddles Walk out Software Rubbish Collus'n Refund Credit
group
00. Not 0 29 4 33 21 12 13 37
known
01. £1 to 61 55 55 50 38 37 29 3
£50
02.£51 to 15 23 15 50 15 13 10 0
£100
03.£101 2 5 9 0 12 10 7 0
to £150
04. £151 5 5 7 0 0 13 2 0
to £200
05. £201 2 0 3 0 8 7 2 3
to £300
06. £301 5 0 5 0 0 10 10 3
to £500
07. £501 2 5 1 0 4 0 10 3
to £750
08. £751 0 0 1 0 0 10 7 6
to £1,000
09. £1,001 2 5 3 0 19 0 12 18
to £2,000
10. £2,001 0 0 1 0 4 0 7 0
to £3,000
11. £3,001 2 5 0 0 0 0 2 0
to £4,000
12. £4,001 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 64
and above
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The average age and length of service based on this estimated 'total' cost
of offending for each offender is much closer to the predicted relationship.
However, there are still some aberrant values (both the age and length of
service means for the £51 to £100 value group being out of step, for
example). And the relationship is in part a function of the methodology -
those with shorter service had less opportunity to have stolen for a longer
time, and will necessarily have a lower average value.
Amongst those who are caught being dishonest, the older and longer
serving employees cost the company marginally more, but the more
significant finding seems to be that very many of them are as willing to
risk being caught for trivial values as their younger counterparts.
Whatever features of the social environment of the workplace are
contributing to a willingness to act dishonesty, without what most people
would see as a rational reward to risk ratio, they don't represent a sub-
culture restricted to younger employees.
However it is possible that it is rank rather than age and experience that
gives the greatest opportunities for dishonesty, and hence the best
relationship with value. Table 4.24 shows that this is not entirely the case.
For each type of dishonesty the average value associated with the higher
grades are seldom the lowest, but they are rarely the highest either. Cash
loss incidents, in which management grade employees are responsible for
the large sums waiting to be banked, whilst other employees only have
access to the smaller values in the tills, show the clearest increase in
average loss with increasing rank. However, in contrast, refund fraud
shows almost the reverse of the predicted relationship. The few part-time
shop workers who perpetrated refund frauds accounted for an average
loss nearly five times as great as the managers who did the same.
The variations in the average loss by rank for different types of dishonesty
suggested that it may be profitable to investigate the relationship between
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age and length of service of offenders and the average values they stole,
broken down by type of dishonesty. The results are presented in table
4.25.
The table splits offenders (again just the shop staff) in each category of
dishonesty into young and old and into long-serving and new starters.
(New starters being those with less than two years' service, and young
meaning 24 or younger.) For each of the four groups produced, the mean
known loss, and number of offenders is given. (To exclude the least
representive values, the average loss has not been entered for any
'quadrant' with less than five offenders.)
Of the four values, one diagonal represents the most common types of
employees: young new starters and long-serving old employees. The
other groups (older new starters and long-serving young staff) are more
unusual. Overall young new starters have a lower average loss than older
longer serving employees - but the highest average losses are established
for young long-serving dishonest employees. However, looking at the
underlying figures by type of dishonesty this overall pattern derives from
the cash and walk out thefts. However, for collusion and 'fiddles' it is the
other way round and young new starters are the group with the highest
average loss.
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Table 4.22
Mean ages for offenders by known value of loss group
Known value
Value Mean age Mean length
group of service
00. Not known 23.5 1.7
01. £1 to £50 24.7 1.9
02. £51 to £100 24.8 2.0
03. £101 to £500 23.0 1.4
04. £501 to £1000 24.7 4.1
05. £1,001 and above 24.1 3.0
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Table 4.23
Mean ages for offenders by estimated total value of loss
group
Estimated total value
Value Mean age Mean length of
group service
00. Not known 23.3 2.2
01. £1 to £SO 21.9 1.6
02. £S1 to £100 26.8 0.8
03. £101 to £SOO 23.8 1.6
04. £S01 to £1000 2S.7 2.2
OS.£1,001 and above 2S.2 2.4
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Table 4.24
Average known value of loss by offender job title
Job title Cash Collu'n Credit Fiddles Refund Rubbish Soft're Walkout
Manager £2,401 £26 £4,443 £39 £334 £446
Assistant £599 £150 £9,781 £49 £665 £454
manager
Senior £23 £0 £5,843 £28 £380 £182
sales
Full-time £177 £152 £4,168 £394 £475 £41 £553
shop
Engineer £85
Delivery £25
staff
Part-time £60 £216 £3,544 £217 £1,601 £194 £40 £113
shop
Warehouse £0 £195 £590 £0 £55
person
Security £90 £5
guard
(employee)
Security £1,637 £600
guard
(temporary)
Other £153 £222 £256 £128 £100 £29
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Table 4.25
Mean loss and number of offenders grouped by age, length of
service and type of offence group
Incident Type Age group Long serving New starters
Mean (n) Mean loss (n)
loss
Cash Old £722 14 £810 7
Youn_g - 4 £87 16
Collusion Old £72 6 £231 8
Young £65 2 £203 18
Fiddles Old £133 6 £40 8
Young £245 5 £326 12
Refund Old £422 22 £822 6
Youn_g £724 10 £520 9
Rubbish Oldl 0 13\ IYoung 1 £388
Software Oldl 0
I
1
IYoung 0 2
Walk out Old £251 16 £165 29
Youn_g £1,505 11 £100 60
Overall Old £385 64 £294 60
Youn_g £771 33 £214 148
Young = 24 or younger
Long-serving = two years' service or more
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Economic motivation to dishonesty
In that those with higher rank represent those with higher economic
security, the finding that higher ranking employees had similar detection
rates to many lower rank groups accords with one aspect of the work by
Hollinger and Clark (1983). They reported (page 60) Ivery little evidence
to support the hypothesis that employees became involved in theft
because of greater economic pressure.' The finding that higher ranking
and longer serving employees were also often involved in low-value
offences also accords with the view that economic pressures were often
not the main motivation towards dishonesty.
In general it is difficult to investigate this relationship further from central
information, because the company knows no more of the economic
situation of employees than their wages. However, the company does
know of some employees with severe financial problems. There are a
small group of employees who have court order deductions direct from
their wages. Whilst it is possible that some of the court orders are as a
result of conflicts over whether they should pay - for example in the case
of a disputed maintenance payment - the majority of these court order
payments represent employees who have got into severe debt.
To investigate the link between dishonesty and financial problems the
detection records were compared with the records of court orders against
wages. Itwas predicted on the basis of Hollinger and Clarke's findings
and what had been observed in relation to rank and length of service that
there would not be any greater incidence of court orders among the
dishonest employees than among other employees. There was an
additional piece of theory that would suggest this might be the case.
Cressey (1953) found that his financial trust violators had all got an
unshareable problem. They they stole in order to keep their secret hidden.
If this group had been taken to court for debt then their financial problem
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was hardly secret any more. If the problem was therefore Ishared'
Cressey's criteria for financial trust violation would not be in place.
Payroll records of court orders were only kept for a limited period, and
the offender record data was not cleaned and ready for comparison until a
year after the study period ended, so the comparison was done on data
that does not match the other records reported on in this section. The
payroll records of dishonest employees from the two years to 1/5/1999
were investigated to discover any court order payments.
Of the 400 offenders passed to payroll for comparison, 12 matches were
found to have had court orders payments made from their wages. This
means that three per cent of staff found to be dishonest had court orders,
whereas it is less than one per cent of all staff who have court orders. So
whilst it is rare for an offender to have a court order, it is more likely than
among employees as a whole.
Putting the figures into the same' detection rate' format as other figures is
not easy because of the way that the court order records are kept.
Whether offenders had court orders was discovered by searching their
payroll records to see whether deductions were made. So we know there
were only 12 of the dishonest employees discovered over the last two
years who had court order deductions made against them at any stage in
their period of service.
There is a report that shows that there are 237 retail and 92 service and
distribution employees who had court orders to be paid in the period the
research was conducted. However it is not reasonable to leap to the
statistic that 12 out of 329 or 3.6 per cent offend because each period there
is turnover in the numbers. What we need to compare is the number who
had court orders against them in the last two years. Sadly no historic
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records of this type are kept. The only summary record of court orders is
that of current payments required.
The best that I could do was to make an estimate based on the experience
of the employee who dealt with the deductions. He estimated that there is
a turnover of about 12 persons or five per cent every period. This would
equate to 312 additional people, giving 549 in total.
This gives an estimate for the company as a whole of 1.6 per cent of staff
with court orders being found dishonest. This is 50 per cent higher than
the Idetection rate' for all employees, which was 1.07 per cent of all
employees at that time.
The figures are very small and it is difficult to attribute great significance
to them, but clearly there are a minority of employees for whom financial
problems lead to being caught and dismissed for dishonesty. In addition,
most of the staff we catch are younger and new starters. These employees
are less likely to have court orders. This means that (for as much as our
dishonesty records can be considered statistically significant) court orders
are probably a more significant predictor of dishonesty among older and
more established staff.
Evidence of 'social' factor in offending
It would be valuable when deciding on how to target crime prevention
messages to know what social environment the offending takes place in.
Is dishonesty seen as deviant within the workplace, or is it regarded as
normal behaviour within some social groups at work? Is the offending a
shared social activity as typified by the supermarket workers described by
Altheide and his colleagues (1978) and Mars's (1974) dock-workers, or is it
a secret activity undertaken by isolated deviant individuals?
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The security reports generally portray the impression of isolated
individuals who offend the sensibilities of all other employees. However,
it is only natural that this would be the case. It is unlikely that a security
investigation would identify this sort of a culture. Nevertheless there are
a few cases that show employees supporting each other in dishonesty. For
example record 17120 identified a branch where a practice defined as
dishonest by the company had been defined as acceptable among all ranks
of employees from manager down.
Extract from report 17120:
Report from [G], Group Security Manager:
I visited the store on Wednesday 22/4/97 to investigate a banking
discrepancy as detailed in SR 16881. I interviewed [S] who had carried
out the cashing up and banking procedure on Wednesday 2/04/97.
Initially [S] denied having any knowlege or involvement in the
discrepancy, however, after further questioning she admitted to taking the
£20 in question on 2/4/97, believing it to be a till over. During the interview
[S] alleged that it was common practice for the manager of the store, [M]
to share any till overs with all the staff. I interviewed [M] who denied the
allegation but admitted to having used a £5 till over to purchase lottery
numbers ...
However, there were very few cases of more than one employee being
involved in a single incident (only six per cent). This tends to support the
view that social support for what the company would view as dishonesty
is rare. (Though, of course, if a culture supportive of dishonesty were
operating it would be natural for staff not to 'squeal' on their colleagues
and always say they worked alone.) In the service and distribution part of
the organisation the proportion of incidents involving more than one
member of staff was much bigger at 22 per cent. It is tempting to interpret
this in terms of differing cultures, but whilst there may be an element of
205
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
this, it primarily reflects the fact that distribution vehicles involved in
scrap theft are two-person operated. This means it is nearly impossible for
one employee to be involved in scrap theft without the other worker of the
crew being implicated, and therefore all these incidents, and they are a
common type of dishonesty in the distribution business, involve two
perpetrators.
Mars (1982) categorised the culture of workplace dishonesty into four
groups following Mary Douglas's (1978) 'group' and 'grid' measure of
culture. The shop workers in his study he portrayed in terms of checkout
cashiers in a supermarket, and categorised them as 'donkeys' being low
'group' and high' grid' - highly regimented in terms of rank distinctions,
but isolated in terms of face to face relationships. This culture would tend
to produce isolated acts of 'anti-social' dishonesty in the way portrayed by
the offender reports. The sales staff in a large modern electrical retail
outlet, having considerably more autonomy and authority than checkout
workers, and being measured and rewarded more on performance than
other forms of status, are probably lower on the grid dimension. Working
on their own without any great mutual support and a fair degree of
competition, they are probably no higher up on the 'group' scale,
however.
One of the characteristics Mars associated with these low' group' cultures
in terms of dishonesty was that there would be little social pressure to
restrict thefts to reasonable bounds. This is in contrast to higher 'group'
cultures where the shared nature of the dishonesty meant that no one
individual would be allowed to risk the long term prospects of the group
as a whole. There are a number of examples among the dishonesty
records of high value thefts that would be consistent with a lack of social
pressure to keep thefts within tolerable limits. For example, Case 10151
regards an employee who stole computers valued at £16,000 in two weeks
by sending them all for delivery to a single address without any payment.
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Such excessive losses couldn't fail to come to light, and it is likely that if
more of the workgroup had been involved in the dishonesty losses would
have been controlled at a lower, less noticeable, level.
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Table 4.26
Percentage of offenders who worked together
Old Young
5% 11%
208
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
However, in some of the smaller outlets in the business there is a greater
sense of team working and shared working. Many of these branches are
in relatively isolated areas, and have much more long-established
hierarchies of status and advancement with employees slowly 'working
their way up the ranks' in one store or a handful very locally. Such sites
are more consistent with Mars's higher 'group' and 'grid' hierarchy
cultures of dishonesty. One example of such a culture may be the 'till
discrepancy sharing' branch described in record 17120 above. It certainly
demonstrates one of the characteristics Mars associated with such
offending - the I social' use of the benefits taken. Another record (outside
the study period) identified a branch where the employees all gave heavy
discounts to other local traders in return for similar favours in return -
particularly regular free lunches from the local burger restaurant.
However, the detection records provide some evidence that a culture
supportive of dishonesty is rare.
The first element of this evidence is the length of service of the employees
detected. Heirarchical cultures of dishonesty, because they need an
established progression of rank, would need to involve relatively long-
serving staff. The social control in such groups as Mars's rubbish
collectors, or Bensman and Gerver's (1963) aircraft workers using the
illegal tap tool, restrict illicit behaviour by new employees, controlling
their initiation into the rule breaking community. In the records studied,
overall, long-serving employees are under represented among those
detected for dishonesty. This could be taken as evidence then that such
cultures are rare.
The second element of evidence against social support for dishonesty is
the relative frequency by which the first alert to dishonesty comes from
other employees. Itwould be surprising for over ten per cent of all
dishonest employees to be 'grassed on' by their co-workers in such a
209
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
culture. The records provide anecdotal evidence that it is often employees
working closely together who identify each other. The extract below from
record 102045 is an example of this.
Extract from Record 10245
[8], casual sales, and [W], warehouse, went out to the skip to dispose of
some rubbish. [S] emptied a box and [W] noticed something shiny in the
bottom of the box. [W] had a look in the box and noticed four console
games in the bottom of the box. [S] pleaded with [W] not to tell anyone
but [W] informed [the manager] ...
An incident outside the study period demonstrates this further. A group
of employees waiting to go to the pub with a colleague became suspicious
of something he was putting in his car and set about getting him caught.
If drinking groups will inform on one of their number it suggests that the
informal social structure does not tolerate dishonesty - certainly in this
branch.
Furthermore, not only do they inform on their co-workers, but also they
prefer to do so openly - taking the information directly to their line
manager. Whilst ten per cent of arrests resulted from someone who went
to a line manager, only just over one per cent of the information came via
the confidential answerphone system which is provided so that employees
can give information and yet remain anonymous. This again argues
against an entrenched culture of dishonesty.
However, given that the members of such a 'society' would also protect
themselves vigorously, manage loss through informal social controls so as
to not attract attention, and encourage conformity, it would be very much
less likely that such perpetrators would get caught. It is perhaps possible
in the light of the huge proportion of offenders who didn't get caught to
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put forward an alternative interpretation that the young new starters
predominantly caught represent the employees rejected by the hidden
culture of dishonesty within the business.
Where staff were caught working dishonestly together, as is shown in
table 4.26, it was more likely that they were young staff. As a proportion
of the offenders in each age group, young employees were twice as likely
as old staff to be caught colluding with someone else to steal. (There were
no collusive relationships amongst employees that spanned age groups.
No young employees were dishonest in collusion with older employees.)
Hollinger and his colleagues (1992) found that younger employees were
more likely to engage in 'altruistic' property deviance. (In their research
this was represented by the practice of giving free meals to friends.) It is
possible that dishonesty among younger staff in the retail business studied
was also associated with this social form of theft. It is possible that
offences that are categorised here as 'collusion' are the types of crime that
would be this type of altruistic crime. It is interesting therefore to note
that these offences are equally disposed among old and young staff.
Collusion in credit fraud with outsiders and collusion with outsiders by
handing over stock to them without (full) payment - are equally common
as a percentage of offenders, in both age blocks. If young people are more
likely to collude with their friends to help them steal there is no evidence
of it in the figures.
Dissa tis/action
Greenberg (1990b) has provided experimental evidence of how workers
use theft as a way of redressing imbalances in what they see as the equity
of their employment situation. The financial or 'expressive' benefits of
dishonesty can counteract unfair treatment or extra work that isn't
rewarded by legitimate means. The incident of excessive discount given
to his friends by a dissatisfied worker quoted earlier provides evidence
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that employees who are dissatisfied do retaliate through dishonesty. But
how many other acts of dishonesty in the study were motivated by
dissatisfaction is not known. No other incident report records any counter
allegation of unfairness, or unreasonable treatment.
However, among the discipline records that were separated out from
those classified as dishonesty there were a couple of cases which identify
the existence of informal reward structures. Managers have been
disciplined for finding' fiddles' to reward employees, when they wanted
extra work done by them without having to pay them overtime, or as
incentive schemes in addition to any official rewards. These few isolated
cases suggest that the culture in the shops is supportive of a notion of
balancing impositions from the company with informal rewards - which
would be interpreted as dishonesty if detected.
The culture of the company is often likened to a 'barrow boy'. Sales are
fought for very aggressively and managers refer to the eleventh
commandment - don't get caught. Manipulations of stock records to get
extra stock supplied through the replenishment system are not
uncommon, and managers have been found to come up with fiddles, such
as holding sales back until the competition period, in order to have a
better chance of winning company promotion competitions. One
divisional manager, responsible for nearly a third of all stores in one chain,
put out an instruction one Christmas on the general theme of 'the way we
do things' which epitomises this culture. The single-page exhortation to
increase sales had the general message that his division was to achieve
sales irrespective of any other criteria and actually included the line 'there
are no rules'.
In some cases it is clear that this culture had an effect on the attitudes to
dishonesty and what is classed as dishonesty. One manager received
three' first and final' written warnings for giving excessive discount to his
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friends. The problem of classing his behaviour as 'dishonest' was
essentially that managers are allowed considerable discretion in how they
run their business, and as his overall level of discounting was not
excessive, it was difficult to conclude that these deals were not legitimate
in that context.
Clearly, another type of study is required to investigate whether
dissatisfaction is a factor in dishonesty within the company. Although the
offender records, and other investigations often suggest that it is
important, the offender records themselves are not going to be a suitable
source of data to investigate it further.
Geographical distribution of offenders and losses
The view of security staff within the company is that staff dishonesty is
clustered around certain areas of the county. Stores within the M25 and
those in some conurbations such as Manchester, Birmingham and Bristol
are thought by insiders to be more prone to losses from employee
dishonesty. Hollinger and Clark (1982, 60) found no consistent differences
between the different geographical areas they studied, inferring that
differing community pressures had no significant impact on offending.
Figures 4.07, 4.08 and 4.09 below show 'heat maps' of the detection rate
(i.e. the number of employees detected for dishonesty divided by the
number of employees employed during the study period) for retail
employees. Central London, Birmingham, Manchester and Bristol, are
indeed in the higher rate (darker) bands.
There are local factors or community pressures that can be used to explain
these higher rates. Without entering into an extended evaluation of these
areas, it can generally be accepted that urban areas such as these generally
have higher crime rates and there is a greater opportunity to take on
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employees who come from a social environment where dishonesty is
common.
These urban areas also traditionally provide personnel officers with
problems recruiting and retaining high-grade employees. This is probably
partly because in the cities there are greater opportunities for the more
able among the workforce leaving fewer well-qualified workers wanting
to take up retail careers. It may also relate to the higher cost of living in
many of the big cities (and particularly the capital) resulting in salaries
that are less adequate to maintain mature employees. This means that
lower calibre individuals generally staff stores in the major city centres.
However, there are a number of other areas that are less easy to explain in
terms of recruitment problems or high local crime rates. Powys, Blaenau
Gwent, Denbighshire, Rhondda eynon Taff, and Dumfries and Galloway,
are all areas which are in the top 25 counties for detection rate, (see table
4.27) and yet are not normally associated with high crime rates. The initial
instinct may be to discount the meaningfulness of these results. Looking
sceptically at some of the results in Wales it is certainly true that they
could be interpreted as anomalies resulting from a few small shops in an
area, against which a small number of detections have had a
disproportionate effect.
To investigate the credibility of the heat map a similar map was created of
the stock loss recorded at audit (expressed as a rate by dividing by the
sales value). The stock found missing at an audit will include some
administrative errors and some undetected theft by customers, but a
considerable proportion (which as discussed previously can be estimated
at between 35 per cent and 55 per cent) will be staff theft. Similarities in
the areas with high audit loss and high staff crime detection will identify
areas where a high detection rate is related to an underlying loss problem.
This map is shown in figures 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12. There are clear
214
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
similarities between the hot-spots in the two maps, and this is particularly
noticeable for some of the counties that seemed less likely to be high areas
of crime. Powys and Dumfries and Galloway are both in the top twenty-
five, for example.
Using Pearson's correlation confirms that there is a reasonably strong
correlation between the two rates of -0.22 and it is significant at the 0.01
level. (The rate is negative because the worst audit results are represented
by negative numbers.) The correlation is essentially positive, the higher
the number of employees detected (divided by the total number of
employees) in an area, the higher the stock audit loss rate (of loss divided
by sales).
There is of course a direct link between the two figures in that many of the
offenders will have caused a stock loss. As any stock loss would be
accounted for at the stock audit it seems natural to expect there to be a
similarity between the stock audit rate and the detection rate. However,
the strength of the correlation between the two rates is still significant
because the value of loss associated with the offenders is such a small
proportion of the total audit loss. (As established earlier, stock losses
attributable to the offenders detected during the study period account for
between three per cent and five per cent of the total loss).
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Figure 4.07
Distribution of detection rate geographically (by county)
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Figure 4.08
Distribution of detection rate geographically (by county) -
detail of South-East
Figure 4.08
Distribution of detection rate geographically (by county) -
detail of Midlands
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Table 4.27
Detection rate by county - top 25 counties
County Detection rate
Powys 0.136
Blaenau Gwent 0.125
Haringey 0.068
Kensington and Chelsea 0.061
Denbighshire 0.060
Rhondda eynon Taft 0.053
Islington 0.048
Dumfries and Galloway 0.045
Lambeth 0.041
Bedfordshire 0.037
Walsall 0.034
Bexley 0.034
Lewisham 0.033
Barnet 0.031
South Gloucestershire 0.030
Camden 0.030
North Lincolnshire 0.030
Westminster 0.030
West Lothian 0.030
North Yorkshire 0.029
Hackney 0.029
Enfield 0.028
Isle of Wight 0.028
South Tyneside 0.028
Redbridge 0.028
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Figure 4.10
Stock audit loss rate by geographical area (county)
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Figure 4.11
Stock audit loss rate by geographical area (county) - detail of
South-East
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Table 4.28
Stock audit loss rate by geographical area - worst 25 counties
County Audit loss
Nottingham City -0.021
Kensington and Chelsea -0.010
Merton -0.007
Camden -0.007
Wandsworth -0.006
Hammersmith and Fulham -0.006
Powys -0.006
Lewisham -0.006
Kingston-upon- Thames -0.005
Harrow -0.005
Wokingham -0.005
Hounslow -0.005
Haringey -0.004
Armagh -0.004
Dumfries and Galloway -0.004
Oldham -0.004
Angus -0.004
Southwark -0.004
Lambeth -0.004
Bradford -0.004
Solihull -0.004
Barnet -0.004
Barnsley -0.003
Bromley -0.003
Herefordshire -0.003
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The correlation gives validity to the notion that some areas of the country
were (during the study period at least) more prone to staff dishonesty. At
the same time it suggests that those who were caught are reasonably
representative of the dishonest population as a whole.
There are a number of possible explanations for the geographic variations.
As I have said, one of them is the variation in the culture of the social
groups that employees are drawn from and their norms relating to
dishonesty. These norms could relate to crime in general, or as specifically
to the interpretation of taking home a portion of the production which
Ditton (1977b) argues is a cultural heritage in the large urban areas since
the industrial revolution sucked agriculural workers off the land. (It is
interesting to speculate when considering some of the high loss areas that
are surprisingly high, such as North Yorkshire and Mid Wales, the
existence of a historical link to traditional heavy industries may be a
shared feature of high-risk areas.)
Another possible explanation is the quality and type of employees
available. Less capable workers will not necessarily be less honest, but it is
generally found that a worse run store provides more opportunities for
dishonesty. The demographics of the area may lead to predominately
young employees, and young employees are associated with greater
offending. The local job market could also encourage greater turnover in
employees, and there is an association among the employee dishonesty
detected and shorter lengths of service.
It is also possible that a culture that engenders dishonesty has grown up in
the local stores. In part that could result from the tone set by the local
management - the area manager who will oversee thirty or so stores in
one area. In part it could develop through the interchange of employees
and managers between stores. Though there is little evidence so far of
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store cultures openly supportive of dishonesty there are other possibilities.
A local culture supportive of 'sharp practices' to maximise sales, may
encourage fiddling by staff and informal reward systems being set up by
managers. A repressive management culture locally may lead to greater
theft by employees in retaliation.
One piece of evidence is not supportive of area management as the
explanation for the regional variations. The management structure is
exclusive to a particular 'chain'. Each group of shops of the same name,
though the same company owns them all, have different area managers. I
have looked at the individual stores that make up the higher detection rate
in each county, and it shows that the problems are not limited to one
particular chain in the local area. However, an area manager only covers
one chain. The fact that the increase in detection is not limited to just one
chain in each area suggests that the local management tone as set by the
area manager is less of an influence. However, there is considerable
interchange of employees of other ranks, from salesperson to manager,
between chains, so the notion of a local culture spread in this way is still
possible.
To investigate the relationship between crime statistics or general
demographic features of the population and the rate of dishonesty
detected in each area could represent a complete study in its own right. It
is beyond the scope of this research. Similarly, I have no data on
management attitudes and levels of dissatisfaction that could be related to
the offender data.
The aspect that can be investigated further within this study is the way in
which stores in each area are staffed.
There were three factors that I thought would be most important. The first
was the experience of the manager. As there is no data on the length of
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time in post at that grade for managers, I decided to try using the age of
the managers as a proxy for experience. The younger managers are
necessarily limited in the length of their experience, and whilst older
managers may only be recently appointed, in practice this is less common.
For each geographic area I compiled the number of days of employment
recorded against managers who were under 25 and the number of days of
employment recorded against all managers. Representing the young
manager's days of employment as a proportion of all days of employment
by managers I derived a rate for young management in each area.
The second issue was the preponderance of young employees in an area.
Areas where there are a disproportionate number of young staff may
represent a higher risk and a greater chance of a culture supportive of
dishonesty developing. The measure derived from the personnel data was
a ratio of days employed by all staff under the age of 25 as a proportion of
all days of employment.
Thirdly I investigated the proportion of recent starters (defined as those
with less than two years' service). A high proportion of new starters
represents two potential effects: a greater risk resulting from employees
with less invested in the company and also less experience in managing
stock to minimise opportunities for others.
The full table of correlations is given as table A.01 in Annexe A. Young
managers were not significantly correlated with audit losses, but there was
a weak correlation (0.15) with the detection rate (only significant at the
0.05 level). Counties with lots of young managers seem as good as any
other at keeping audits low but seem a little more likely to find dishonest
employees. (It is perhaps worth noting that a high proportion of young
management in a county is correlated strongly with both young
employees and new starters in that area. To a certain extent, there is an
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overlap here in that the young managers are part of the young employee
proportion. )
In contrast, for young staff there was a weak (-0.15) correlation with audit
losses (only significant at the O.OSlevel), but no significant correlation with
the detection rate.
The same was true for the proportion of new starters in the area - a weak
(-0.15) correlation with audit losses (only significant at the O.OSlevel), but
no significant correlation with the detection rate.
So whilst more young new starters seem to lead to higher audit losses,
there is no evidence this relates to greater dishonesty. In contrast, a high
proportion of young managers in an area does seem to be an indicator of
dishonesty. It is still very possible that the higher audit loss and detection
rate in particular areas means that the social environment outside the
workplace represents the greatest influence on the honesty of the
workplace. However, there is a suggestion that quality of the store
management may be an important factor too.
Managers
It is clear that the integrity of managers could affect the moral climate of
the store, so it was challenging to find that such a high proportion of
managers themselves were dismissed for dishonesty.
A more detailed investigation of the records of management dishonesty
was instigated. It focused on the records of general managers dismissed
but the data gathering for this part of the study was started a little before
the end of the main study period. Because of this, it did not include all
the general manager records in the main study, taking the 21 records
available up to the end of December 1997. Whilst it is clearly impossible
to subject such a small number of cases to statistical analysis, it was felt
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that further investigation of these incidents may, nonetheless, reveal
insights that could be useful in preventing future incidents. The
investigation represented a more qualitative search for patterns in a wider
range of data than was gathered for the other offenders in the study
period. However, the profiles derived represent a more subjective
interpretation.
In addition to the description of the incidents reported in the incident
records, four additional sources of data were gathered.
Firstly the personnel files of the managers dismissed for dishonesty were
obtained. These provided information on their disciplinary and appraisal
history of the managers, and in most cases their previous work history as
represented by their application forms.
Secondly, informal telephone interviews were conducted with managers
of nearby stores and personnel department employees who had known
the member of staff. These interviews were aimed at gaining a wider
context for the incident for which the managers were dismissed. The
format for the interviews was to introduce myself and my study (in terms
of the company goal of preventing manager dishonesty), referring to the
case in question, and asking very open questions about what the
interviewee' could add to the official record'.
Thirdly the records of the disciplinary hearings were obtained, so that the
evidence presented and the defences made could be reviewed in
conjunction with the summary represented by the incident record.
Fourthly records were obtained from the sales administration department
of the degree to which each of the managers complied with administrative
procedures, such as processing credit paperwork quickly.
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The data was not complete in every case. In some cases gaps were clear.
(For example when original application forms to join the business were
missing it was clear that they were not there). However, it is possible
other records were not there, but it was not possible to know for sure.
(For example, from interviews with colleagues, it was probable that some
records of previous disciplinary hearings were not in the files, but these
missing records would be indistinguishable from a clean record.)
Three profiles of different types of offender very quickly presented
themselves from the data. It is clear that they are subjective assessments,
and they represented stereotypes held by the other employees I spoke to.
One group of managers were characterised by serious personal or
emotional problems linked with the offending. Another group, rather
than behaving dishonestly for personal gain as such, had shown a cavalier
disregard for rules, regulations, and ultimately the law. The offending of
the third groups seems to be overwhelmingly opportunistic in nature.
There were five managers (24 per cent of the group) whom I discovered
had experienced some serious personal problem at the time of the
offending. These cases seemed very reminiscent of the accounts made by
Cressey (1953) of the 'unshareable problems' he found a characteristic of
financial trust violation. However Cressey gave the impression that the
'unshareable problems' were secret problems. In a number of the cases
researched other managers were fully aware of the gambling or marital
problems that seemed associated with the dishonesty. (Though of course
they may just have been demonstrating a less remarkable hindsight.)
However, it was the severity of the personal problems, rather than their
unshareable nature that was striking. In case 102219, for example, the
dishonesty seemed to represent a 'cry for help' rather than a covert way to
cope with a hidden problem:
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Extract from record 102219:
Report given by [G], security manager.
On the 12/01/98, [8], manager of [given branch], phoned the police
station in [given town] and requested a member of the police come to the
shop.
PC [name given] attended the shop and [8] informed him that he had
stolen two Sony Playstations and four games from the shop. He was
taken into custody and examined by a doctor as to his physical and
mental condition prior to being questioned. The doctor gave the go-ahead
for questioning.
During questioning, [8] admitted a number of thefts and false accounting
over a period between 1986 and 1997 involving [a number of branches].
A number of these items he stole, he sold on to friends and family.
The police searched [8],s house and recovered a Canon camera and a
Toshiba VCR ...
This group generally seemed to be slightly older with more experience as
a manager than the majority of managers, but they seemed to have come
into management quickly. They averaged 36 years old, against a company
average of 31. As a group they had an average of 4.5 years as a manager
as opposed to an company average of 3.9 years. However they had a total
length of service with the company, on average of seven years, whereas
the average for all managers was to have been with the company ten
years. They all seemed to have started their management career
successfully, but had suffered reversals recently - though whether
personal problems had caused the set-back at work, or work problems had
caused personal difficulties could only be speculated about. All of these
managers were poor on compliance issues, and many had disciplinary
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records. Specifically, three out of the five had received formal warnings
for time-keeping.
The values of these cases were all relatively high. On average they
represented a loss of £2,421 each.
The second group of managers, those whom I characterised as taking a
cavalier attitude to their position of responsibility, represented the largest
group of management offenders. (There were 13 of them or 62 per cent of
the total). The incidents gave the impression of an arrogant disregard for
rules, rather than a desire for particular benefits that meant that rules had
to be broken to obtain them. Rather than trying to transfer the ownership
of company assets to themselves, they often behaved as if the company's
assets were theirs already.
The value of the losses involved in cases where the loss could be
established were very small, an average of £83 for each case. However, in
some cases the benefits to the individuals were difficult to establish. Some
of the cases represented encouraging fraudulent business, which though it
represented very large potential losses to the company (which were
recorded in the reports), represented relatively low rewards to the
managers represented by additional performance related bonuses (which
was not recorded in the reports). A number of cases represented
fraudulently generated incentive payments and tended to be based on a
limited number of sample cases without a clear idea of the total number of
frauds being established.
In many cases there was no direct personal benefit, and company property
was given away without authority. In other cases there seemed to be an
arrogant refusal to account for money the subjects were supposed to be
accountable for. The following extract from record 27365, is a case that
includes a number of actions typical of this group of managers.
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Extract from record 27365:
As a result of investigation carried out by [G], security manager and [A],
area administrator, [G) visited [a particular retail outlet] on Friday 26/9/97.
[G] interviewed the manager [8] and he was subsequently suspended
pending a disciplinary hearing. [8] will be arrested by the police this week.
The details are as follows: [8] was interviewed regarding four different
incidents.
The first incident related to a Royal Mail divert, that was supposed to have
been instigated at the [particular town] branch upon its closure. [8] was
the branch manager, and was requested to organise the divert. [8]
withdrew £15 from petty cash, but did not place the divert. During
interview [8] admitted that he had failed to carry out the divert, he also
admitted to keeping and using the money for a period of two months. He
stated that he had only repaid the money when questioned by [A] about
the matter. There is also an issue of the fact that [8] deliberately misled
[A] by the fact that he told her that he had paid for the divert by personal
cheque. He admitted that he had deliberately misled [A]. [8] also stated
that he had repaid the £15, but on examination it appears that a sum of
£12 was returned into petty cash on 28/7/97. [8] stated that this was as a
result of the phone call from [A], chasing the divert situation.
The second incident involves film developing and is as follows: [8] had
placed AP8 films for developing on five occasions since June this year.
From audit trail records it is apparent that two of the developings were not
paid for. During interview [8] admitted obtaining free developings on the
two occasions in question.
The third issue was whilst [8] was manager at [another] branch. A
customer [given name], purchased a Psion link lead from the branch.
[The customer] later phoned and spoke to [8] stating that he had
purchased the wrong lead, and could another one be ordered for him. [8]
ordered the correct lead, and a couple of days later [the customer] called
in to the branch to collect his correct lead. Because [the customer] called
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in on the off chance he did not have the old lead with him. [5] gave [the
customer] his new lead, (value £80) and told him to pop in the old lead
when he was passing. [5] admitted that he should not have done this.
The last issue was regarding a raffle prize for [a car club], of whom [5] is
a member. Last Christmas, [5] provided a 5ega Mega drive to the above
club. During interview [5] was asked if he had provided the mega drive
from branch stock (value £29.99). He admitted that he had, and that he
had reduced its value to zero, using [an improper method]. [5] also
admitted to not having the gift authorised ...
What appear from the report to be ready admissions from the manager in
this case strongly suggest he did not see his actions as wrong. (Indeed, the
third issue in the report seems to me very capable of re-definition as
simply 'very good customer service', and involving little more than a
calculated risk with company property.) Accounts of disciplinary
hearings, or appeals involving this group sometimes included the
assertion that the actions were perhaps 'wrong' but not 'criminal.' One
interpretation of these cases is to say these managers seem to be casualties
of the culture the company tries to build to maximise sales. A common
theme of exhortation to managers is to tell them to be entrepreneurs and
treat the businesses they run as their own. This group seems to have taken
that a little too strongly to heart.
Many of this group had only recently became managers. Their average
length of service as managers was 2.5 years as opposed to the company
average of 3.9 years, and nine (69 per cent) had been a manager for a year
or less. One interpretation is that they had not had sufficient time in post
to have learnt what was acceptable behaviour for the role.
The overall group fell into two separate sub-groups depending on
whether they had disposed of the company assets as their own, or had
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manipulated their businesses by false accounting or encouraging
fraudulent business.
The sub-group that displayed the cavalier attitude to company property
(eight cases) shared a low overall average length of service of seven years,
against the average company manager who had ten years' service. They
were not good at compliance issues, and half of them had been disciplined
in some way prior to the incident in question. None of them had had any
experience of management in any other company, prior to their promotion
within this company.
The sub-group that displayed a cavalier attitude to producing 'business'
(five cases) had an even lower average length of service (five years.) They
were usually very good at 'compliance' issues and seldom (1 case) had a
history of disciplinary action against them.
The third profile that suggested itself within the management dishonesty
only represented three cases. These were characterised by an absence of
any discernible motivation other than personal gain. The incidents had a
recurrent theme of opportunism. For example, one manager was left
unattended in another store's stockroom while collecting an item of stock
being transferred to his shop, another was undertaking a project in
another store.
They were on average older than other managers (37 as opposed to an
average of 31) but were average in terms of length of service: ten years
with the company (against the company average of ten), 3.3 years as a
manager (against a company average 3.9). At £420, the average loss for
this group was not trivial, but nonetheless is not very considerable. All of
the managers in this group had an unblemished record in terms of
discipline, and were good in terms of compliance issues.
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Loss prevention lessons can be learnt from all three profiles of managers.
For example, the personal problems of the first group of managers were
well known to their colleagues, and some of the area management team.
Greater support may well have prevented them going off the rails. A
possible lesson from the second group is that their 'cavalier' actions may
have been prevented by better standard setting through training or
experience. The third group, for example, could act as a reminder that a
disposition towards dishonest behaviour is not removed from employees
when they reach a particular rank and that all staff need to be included in
control regimes to some extent.
However, I feel the second profile of managers represents a more serious
issue because of the implications for the culture of the company as a
whole. If they can define law and rule breaking as acceptable in terms of
their position or because they believe they must achieve targets and
prestige irrespective of all other considerations, then they may be having a
considerable negative effect on the attitudes to integrity within their
branches - fuelling dishonesty at all levels.
Investigating how the integrity of managers is perceived, and whether
there is any evidence of a link to dishonesty seems like a good idea.
Action taken against offenders
At first glance it seems that there can be little relevance in what happens to
offenders after they are caught to the management of preventing
employees becoming offenders in the first place. However, the detection,
dismissal and prosecution of offenders are not just undertaken on the basis
of retribution or removing the risk of future losses (though these motives
no doubt playa part). These actions are also intended to act as a deterrent
to other employees. Research, such as that by Hollinger and Clark
(1983b), confirms that the perceived certainty and severity of punishment
were both key deterrents to crime in the workplace. So when assessing the
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strategy for the prevention of dishonesty it is important to consider how
credible those risks are.
As has already been established, the actual risk of detection (assuming the
values associated with the offenders detected are representative) is not
very great at less than five percent. If employees know that only five in a
hundred dishonest employees get caught then they may not consider it a
credible risk. However, if the dishonest staff in the company are working
in an isolated fashion (in a Mars's 'donkey' culture) then the actual
detection rates may be hidden from the work-force. If they wouldn't
know how many of their colleagues are also stealing, they don't know
what risk they are running. The way detected offenders are dealt with
may then represent the best information that other dishonest employees
have on the risk they are taking.
As has been established, the selection of the cases for study was on the
basis that, as a result of the disciplinary action against them, they all 'had
to' leave the company. Missing from this study there may be a substantial
number of cases of employees whose dishonesty was very similar to the
cases identified, but who were not dismissed. From the perspective of the
investigators these include some' celebrity cases' of employees who they
believe should have been dismissed. (They cite one manager who they say
received' first and final' written warnings on three separate occasions for
abusing his authority in a way that they believed dishonest.) It is clearly
impossible to establish the extent to which employees are 'let off r by their
superiors unjustifiably. The only credible criterion for deciding whether
the case was proved to be dishonesty was that the individual was
dismissed. However there were many employees recorded in the security
database after investigation in categories that fell short of Idishonesty' and
it is very probable that among them were many individuals that other
employees believe Igot off'. The impact of these I failed' cases must be to
reduce the perceived risk.
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Those that resigned rather than being dismissed may well also represent a
poor propaganda message to the rest of the workforce. From the
perspective of personnel and, to a certain extent, the security department,
a resignation during an investigation may represent a success. It achieves
the goals of ridding the company of a dishonest employee and of avoiding
the danger of retaliatory action under employment law. However, it is
likely that to other employees the offenders may have been seen to 'get
away with it'. The number of employees allowed to resign is quite
substantial. During the study period 20 per cent of the offenders left
rather than being dismissed. The fraud and theft cases had a slightly
higher percentage of dishonest employees who left without dismissal (22
per cent) compared to the theft of stock cases (18 per cent). The fraud and
theft of cash cases are generally more complex which suggests that the
decisions not to dismiss and to agree to a resignation may have been
partly influenced by the potential for legal challenges that more complex
cases bring.
The outcome of the public action against the dishonest employees is given
in table 4.29. The information was not comprehensive. In many cases the
information on sentencing was not available, and it only known that the
offenders were arrested. The police generally proved to be unwilling to
recognise the rights of a 'corporate' victim to be told the outcome of legal
action, and records relied on security managers updating records at the
time of trials they were involved in. Records were better kept for shop
employees than for distribution and service employees, so I have
restricted the cases to those.
The table shows that a high proportion of the cases (39 per cent) was not
reported to the police at all. These cases include those where the suspect
was allowed to resign. In similar fashion to the resignation figures, a
greater proportion of the more complex fraud and theft of cash cases were
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not reported (51 per cent), than the stock theft cases (26 per cent).
However twice as great a proportion of stock thefts were not progressed
further by the police after they were reported (12 per cent as opposed to
six per cent). The total not progressed by the police represented nine per
cent of the total. This means that 48 per cent of all cases of dishonesty
received no sanction through the criminal justice system.
We know that 11 per cent of the total did receive a criminal record of some
kind, either as a police caution (six per cent) or after being found guilty in
the courts (five per cent). Some of the other cases (eight per cent of the
total) were recorded as having progressed to a charge, but it is not known
for sure that they went to trial. Also it is not known how many of the (31
per cent) recorded as arrested but about which nothing more is known
were cautioned, charged, or not proceeded against further. Assuming
other employees know nothing more of the outcome of the public action
than reached the security records then they will know that detection only
represents a 50:50 chance of a criminal record. If they know more, perhaps
knowing the offenders outside work, then they will know that it
represents better odds than this.
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Table 4.29
Legal action taken (shop workers only)
Action taken Fraud or Stock theft Total
theft of
cash
Not known 5 3% 3 2% 8 2%
Not reported to police 97 51% 43 26% 140 39%
Reported, but not progressed by 12 6% 20 12% 32 9%
police
Arrested - nothing further known 48 25% 61 36% 109 31%
Charged - nothing further known 10 5% 19 11% 29 8%
Cautioned 8 4% 13 8% 21 6%
Tried (and found guilty) 9 5% 9 5% 18 5%
189 168 357
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Summary of findings from offender records
The offender records have provided a wealth of information. It is clear
from the finding that detected offenders only represent around one in
every twenty dishonest staff that it is not possible to know whether the
offenders detected are representative of all dishonest employees.
Nonetheless, they have given some insights into the influences affecting
employee dishonesty in the company, and the correlation between
detection rate and audit loss rate by county suggests they are not
unrelated to overall patterns of offending.
The findings from the analysis can be compared back to the summary of
potential influences on employee honesty discussed at the end of the
section on previous perspectives on employee dishonesty (and
represented graphically as figure 3.01). The offender records seem to
provide some supporting evidence for most of the forces identified in that
model.
On that map of 'forces' influencing for or against dishonesty I separated
those which were encouraging or discouraging a willingness to be
dishonest from those associated with the willingness to commit a
particular dishonest act. Then within each of these groups I distinguished
between internal and external forces.
In the area of that map showing the external forces influencing the general
willingness to act dishonestly the integrity of immediate superiors was
identified as an important element. Integrity by superiors was seen as
having the potential to reduce dishonesty, whilst collusion by superiors in
dishonesty was seen as a serious potential influence towards dishonesty
by employees. The degree of dishonest behaviour detected among
managers certainly establishes that the potential for this influence is
present. The way that many of the managers (62 per cent) investigated
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had acted not so much for personal gain as out of arrogant disregard for
rules or laws suggests that their behaviour was known to and therefore
influencing their employees. The case of the till 'overs' being used for
lottery tickets (case 17120 quoted above) comprises strong anecdotal
evidence to support this. The cases where managers actively encouraged
fraud to boost their business provide more evidence. Having said that,
management suspicion is the most common reason why dishonesty in
other employees was first identified (24 per cent among shop employees
detected). This could be seen as redressing the balance. However, it is
also possible that it represents a dual standard within the management
culture that defines simple theft of stock as wrong, but condones other
dishonest acts such as sharing till' overs'. An attitude survey among the
employees as a whole is needed to investigate the extent to which
employees question the integrity of their managers, and look at the
relationship between this and perceived levels of dishonesty. This is
undertaken in a following section.
The quality of treatment by managers was identified as another potential
influence on the honesty of their employees. There was no evidence from
the offender records to show that this was a factor operating here, and
there was only one case where dissatisfaction with the company was
recorded as being behind the dishonesty. Again we must look to a wider
attitude survey to investigate the possibilities here.
Turning to the' internal factors' affecting a general willingness to be
dishonest, we find support for many of the potential factors here actually
operating.
It was decided that employees may 'neutralise' their knowledge that they
had done wrong when acting dishonestly by finding ways to redefine the
act. The records of theft seemed to show some evidence of this. Many of
the items stolen were 'scrap' or damaged items. Others were of low value
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and sometimes items used day to day by sales people or engineers for
testing or demonstration. This suggests that the employees were taking
items that they could redefine as other than theft because the value meant
that it could not be harming the company or because it was seen as 'theirs'
already.
The deeper investigation into the dishonesty by managers identified a
number (5) of clear cases where severe personal problems were
underlying the dishonesty. This is evidence that the potential factor
labelled 'unshareable problems' in the diagram is indeed an influence in
the company. What is not known is how many employees in ranks below
manager also betrayed a position of trust because of personal problems.
However, the values involved tended to be large, and the values
associated with lower ranking employees were less. (It is true that this is
not the case for credit card collusion, but credit card collusion was not the
sort of dishonesty associated with this sort of motivation.) Also the cases
depended on a high level of responsibility and that is less likely to be
associated with low rank.
Itwas also proposed that family and peer group pressure - the norms
from outside the work environment would have an influence. The
geographic distribution of offenders detected, and the correlation of those
areas with areas of high audit loss suggest that attitudes brought into the
work place do indeed playa major role in encouraging dishonesty. The
number of detected cases of collusion with outsiders provides evidence
that peer pressure has an impact on dishonesty.
The factors affecting a willingness to commit a particular dishonest act
were dealt with separately.
The relatively high estimate of the prevalence of dishonesty (around 30
per cent of employees) provided by the offender records and other
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company financial records and the low detection rate (five per cent) means
that most of the factors in this section were present. In combination with
the relatively low rewards identified, it provides evidence that
opportunities were plentiful, and both difficulty and the risk of detection
were low. The low detection rate means that most dishonest employees
would have had positive experiences from previous dishonesty, and
perceived little threat to their self-image or risk to their financial security.
However, there was no particular evidence that these factors were actually
influential - offenders were not recorded as saying how easy it was, or
how low the risk was that actually influenced them.
Offender records can give little real insight into whether dishonesty
represented a good 'fit' with workplace norms. However, the relative
rarity of collusion between members of staff being detected, and the
considerable number of staff willing to be identified as having 'fingered' a
dishonest colleague, suggests that offenders, whilst apparently plentiful,
do not work as a team. It seems that the workplace norms do not support
dishonesty, but also that they do not act to control it socially as a mutual
protection measure either.
The evidence on certainty and severity of punishment was more
ambivalent. From one perspective the severity and certainty of
punishment could both be said to be high. Everyone of the offenders in
the study lost their jobs. However, as discussed already, this was a feature
of the definition used in the study. There seemed to be many employees
who had not been defined as dishonest who appeared to have undertaken
actions identical to those who were defined as dishonest. So, the certainty
and severity of punishment was lower than at first might appear. Also
many (20 per cent) of the detected offenders were allowed to resign
leaving them with little problem obtaining another job, reducing the
severity of the sanction. As far as external sanctions go, the severity and
certainty seem comparatively low. A detected offender stood only a 50:50
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chance of any action being taken against them at all by the police, and (on
the basis of the few cases where an outcome was known) the majority of
cases that were progressed resulted in a caution and not a criminal
conviction.
Though the analysis of offender records did not support prevention
activity by identifying a particular theoretical basis for dishonesty, it did
provide opportunities for targeting action. Many of these opportunities,
and the actual initiatives instigated, will be discussed in the next chapter.
Aside from particular targets for prevention, there was one consistent
'theme' throughout the analysis. This was that the nature of offending
seemed to change with the age and length of service of the offenders.
Young and recently employed employees were more likely to be detected
for dishonesty. Among those detected for dishonesty the young and
recently employed were more likely to have been engaged in more
straightforward stock theft offences, to have taken greater risks, and to
have been caught in simpler ways than their older longer serving
colleagues. On average, older and longer serving employees cost the
company more each than the younger, less long-serving employees.
Further investigation of differences between these groups of employees
will be undertaken as part of the attitude survey.
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(5) CASE STUDY: TARGETING INTERVENTIONS
This section is concemed with some of the interventions suggested by the
offender record analysis. Following a general discussion of the
opportunities, it describes, as a case study, the interventions actually
attempted in more detail and the way in which they were implemented.
The gathering of the data about detected offenders presented in the last
section was not an isolated academic exercise. It formed part of a project
within the business to reduce losses from employee dishonesty. The
information was used to target interventions and to investigate the impact
of interventions undertaken.
The project represented a close interaction between policy and research.
Reports were presented to the business a number of times during the
period that, for the purposes of this work, I have been referring to as the
'study period'. At each of those presentations (roughly six monthly) a
wider and more comprehensive picture of the data became available,
starting from a study of data from a six-month period and building up to
the full18 months data presented in the last section. Data for the complete
period was not available until long after the project was under way. The
presentations given usually focused on data from the six months prior to
the presentation date, comparing it with the previous six months, or the
equivalent period in the year before. (This latter approach was intended to
take account of the impact of seasonal effects such as the hiring of
temporary employees over the Christmas period.)
Consequently the policy changes that were taken did not have the benefit
of the data as it was presented in the previous section. With hindsight,
looking at this work as a case study, it may seem that the interventions are
not, therefore, as well targeted on the basis of the analysis of the data as
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they could have been. To avoid the limitations of this original analysis,
my approach here will be to write up more comprehensively the potential
preventative actions that the current level of analysis suggests. Many of
these opportunities were discussed at the time, though some were not.
After this I will go on to discuss the actual interventions undertaken.
Opportunities for prevention
How appropriate is the offender data for targeting prevention?
A possible limitation to the opportunities for prevention that may be
derived from the analysis is that it is not possible to be sure the records are
representative. It is possible to take the view that the records of detected
offenders represent only the offenders that are being caught, and that
prevention based on these records will focus on issues that are not a
problem. From this viewpoint the offender records are not hel ping us
focus on the real problem - the more successful thieves who are not being
caught. Certainly, as has been discussed at length earlier, the proportion
of offenders being caught is very low. Despite positive findings such as
the correlation between offender detection in an area and stock audit
losses, it seems right to question whether policy can be targeted on the
basis of a possibly very unrepresentative sample.
There are a number of reasons, however, why the problem of how
representative the data is becomes less important to the practical issues of
loss prevention than an unrepresentative sample may be in terms of
drawing conclusions about the nature of dishonesty.
The first reason for this is that, even if the records only represent the
Ieasily detected' dishonesty, it is still a valuable goal to prevent the type of
dishonesty that is currently being detected. The offenders currently being
detected are monopolising the attention of an investigation team and
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support staff. The offenders currently being detected are, as the previous
analysis showed, predominantly younger! relatively recent starters!
detected in relatively simple ways for offences providing them with
relatively low rewards. They do not give the impression of being
committed criminals! which suggests they may be more susceptible to
influences introduced to prevent them from offending. With more of
these offenders deterred from offending, even if the remainder of the
dishonest employees are not like them at all, the investigation team will
have more time to investigate other offenders - perhaps ones that would
be more difficult to deter.
Irrespective of how representative the analysis is, another reason for its
importance is that detection of an offender represents a problem, a failing
in the organisation - a vulnerability that prevention measures can address.
Whilst it may take a huge sample to establish a positive effect! it only takes
one case to prove a negative - in other words, that something is not
working.
Another issue relevant to this concern is that we can be reasonably sure of
the mechanism of 'unrepresentativeness'. It is the probability of detection.
If every type of person and offence were as easy to detect as every other
then the offenders would be entirely representative. Because we can make
educated comments about ease of detection, we can have some insight into
how representative - or otherwise - the records are. Where we believe the
relative risk of capture remains similar - for example in relation to one
particular type of offence - then we can be more confident that other
relationships in the analysis are more representative.
Crime-specific opportunities
The use of the groupings of offences into similar categories contained in
the analysis represents a particular source of inspiration for loss
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prevention activity that is not dependent on the representativeness of the
records because it helps identify opportunities to reduce risks that have
been proved to be failings, and result from ways of working that can be
changed.
The common features provide some crime-specific measures for
prevention. For example, 'hand-over' stock thefts rely on sales never
being checked by anyone else. A procedure of checking some of the
receipts of customers leaving the store would greatly increase the risks for
a potential offender. 'Rubbish drop' thefts rely on a number of features
that could be targeted. Clearly, changes to the procedure for putting the
rubbish out, such as always involving two employees could make a
difference. The delay before the goods are collected means that checking
of rubbish skips could identify' crimes in progress' and prevent losses
(even if they do not clearly identify an offender).
The walk out crimes should have been prevented by the existing regime of
searching employees. The fact that so many thefts were detected by a
search, and that the employees had so seldom taken steps to hide the
goods, shows that the searching regime is not robust enough to act as a
deterrent. If the searching policy were to be more widely adhered to then
it may act, as it should, as a deterrent.
The crime-specific prevention opportunities are not limited to thefts of
stock. Many of the fraud and theft of cash methods identify key
prevention lessons - though most of them represent failures in operating
existing controls. For example, the number of refund frauds perpetrated
by non-management employees shows the necessity for till Personal
Identification Numbers (PINs) to be changed regularly. The offender
records provide many similar learning points that need to be incorporated
into routine operational training.
246
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Analysis of the fraud cases can also provide information on the
characteristics of the transaction that can be used to detect other cases. For
example, the refund fraudsters commonly did the refunds early or late in
the day, when there were fewer other employees around. They commonly
used the same post-code in the fictitious customer details they recorded in
the transaction. Reports from the till system that highlight early or late
refunds or which sort refund transactions by post code, can then be used
to detect future cases. However, I recognise that my aim was to assist
with 'prevention' and it is perhaps debatable whether this sort of
information use can be considered 'prevention'. However, the detection of
offenders can be assumed to have a deterrent effect and the' propaganda'
to the employees about the sophistication of these techniques to identify
suspicious transactions can have a deterrent effect. The development of
these systems rely on the analysis of the offender records.
Contribution to the 'message'
Part of the crime prevention effort can go beyond' training' in the
conventional sense and can constitute a direct appeal to the potential
offender. For example, the business that is the basis for this studyhas
produced for their employees a video that warns of the consequences of
involvement in dishonesty (as a number of other retailers have done). The
topic is dealt with in a number of other company publications and is the
focus of formal training sessions. The offender analysis can contribute to
the message put over in these materials.
As has been mentioned, the scale of the problem - around 95 per cent of
employees involved in dishonesty in any year not being detected -
provides some implications for the prevention message.
Firstly, it shows that prevention has far greater potential than detection. It
simply would not be practical to provide resources sufficient to have a
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very much more substantial impact on losses through detection. (Ten
times the resources would still give a 50:50 chance of detection.)
Secondly, the numbers getting away with it means that the 'we'll catch up
with you' message is not so credible. Messages that promote the notion
that 'we'll catch up with you eventually' may have more impact; for
example, cases where employees have left - but were still prosecuted. The
impact will depend on how much the employees know is going on. The
signs are that employees do not have a shared culture of theft - and so the
negative impact of any disparity between a 'we'll catch up with you'
message and the reality of a low rate of detection is less than might be.
Moreover, of course, new starters do not know anything of the prevalence
of dishonesty within the company when the join. On the other hand,
indisputable cases of 'own goals' are represented by detected cases of
dishonesty where the action taken falls short of the robust approach
promised in the 'we'll catch up with you' message. When the message to
employees promised dismissal and prosecution, any cases of employees
allowed to resign and not passed on to the police clearly challenge the
credibility of the message.
The message to employees needs to take account of the relatively high
proportion of employees prepared to identify dishonest colleagues and the
strong role of management suspicion in bringing dishonesty to light which
were both revealed by the analysis of the offender records. It is important
not to alienate these employees, and to motivate future detections through
this route. Although it is likely that a third of all employees indulge in
some dishonest behaviour, the majority of employees receiving the
message will be honest, and this is something that should be capitalised
upon.
The fact that the average rewards from dishonesty are so low in relation to
the legitimate earnings that an offender is putting at risk needs to be taken
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into account in constructing the message. The 'crime doesn't pay' message
is hardly likely to be effective when the average values involved in
dishonesty are so small. Possibly propaganda that attacks other possible
motivations would be more effective, promoting alternative ways of
dealing with grievances, showing that crime isn't going to impress others,
or attacking the notion that it is has the tacit approval of work-mates.
The analysis showed that there was evidence of what could broadly be
described as 'neutralising' behaviour. Stolen cash was often explained as a
'loan' and items stolen were often marginal in some way - for example,
free gifts, repaired goods, or 'scrap'. This suggests that a message that
effectively defines taking such items as these as theft may make it more
difficult for the employees to neutralise their guilt. (Indeed given the low
values involved it is probably necessary to work to establish the 'criminal'
nature of most of the incidents. The low values suggest that if employees
could interpret the behaviour as criminal they probably would not do it.)
The association of particular offences with particular groups of staff gives
an opportunity to ensure that the message aimed at particular groups
involves the offences that they are more likely to be tempted by. For
example, new starters are most commonly detected for unsophisticated
offences, so it would be less effective to give them training that centred
around more sophisticated thefts.
The accounts of employees being put under duress to collude with an
outsider suggests that training needs to address this topic. If handled
effectively this means that employees who are threatened will have the
confidence to deal with the situation positively and report the incident to
the company. It also means that claiming they were forced to co-operate
becomes less attractive as a potential excuse for any member of staff who
is caught handing stock out to their friends, or processing stolen credit
card transactions for them.
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Another training issue revolves around the issue of dishonesty as a
response to a severe personal problem. One issue is to ensure that
managers who do find themselves in financial difficulty, or under any
other sort of personal stress, can be supported by the company and are
confident to come forward. A facet of the cases of manager dishonesty
that were associated with severe personal problems was that many of their
colleagues knew about the problems they had. So another issue is finding
a way to facilitate that information being passed on, and support being
provided.
The data on people
Analysis of the records establishes that employees in some groups are
more likely to be detected as dishonest than employees in other groups.
Though it is not possible to establish whether those who are caught are
representative of offenders as a whole, the disproportionate numbers
caught in some groups suggests that they are indeed more likely to be
dishonest.
Younger employees, female employees, and to a certain extent, recent
joiners are all groups that are over-represented in the detection figures.
Married employees seem to be detected less commonly.
Three potential actions can be taken in response to this.
One possibility is that these higher risk groups could be targeted with
additional'honesty training' giving them warnings and advice on this
topic. This approach has the benefit that it is particularly appropriate to
the groups most likely to be detected, irrespective of whether they are also
the most likely to be dishonest, on the basis that these groups are most
likely to be 'soaking up' the detection resources of the company. If they
can be deterred, investigative resources can identify cases that are more
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serious. However, in practice different levels of 'training' on this sort of
issue could be difficult to implement.
As employees joining the business tend to be younger than the rest of the
workforce, a focus on honesty training as part of induction training seems
a practical and appropriate way of targeting two of the high-risk groups.
In contrast, it is difficult to envisage providing less of this training to
female, married or older employees.
Targeting honesty training at new starters has another potential benefit.
The low value of the rewards in many of the cases of detected dishonesty
(approaching half of all cases valued at less than £50) shows that the
primary motivation does not rely on the absolute value of the rewards.
Many of the offenders detected do not make a substantial personal gain
from their dishonesty, and young new starters are (for most types of
dishonesty) least likely to do so. As discussed in the section reviewing the
previous literature on the topic, there may be many alternative
motivations for the offender. However, it is also possible that employees
join the company with the notion that dishonesty is tolerated, that the
company is not interested in catching them, and that it will not take the
incident seriously if they do. The loss to the business in terms of
recruitment and induction training costs are often considerably greater
than the value of the theft. There is therefore a strong economic argument,
as well as some moral justification for the company providing information
to new starters to counter these notions as soon as possible after they join
the company.
However, whilst young new starters seem to be the ideal target for
'honesty training' it has to be recognised that they are probably not going
to be the easiest group to influence in this way. The evidence lends
support to the view that they have a lower perception of the risks or
consequences of being caught, and that they do not desist as quickly from
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stealing, as they build up longer service within the company, as do their
older counterparts.
The second type of action that could be taken as a result of identifying
higher risk groups is to target them with greater restrictions. Itmay be
possible to put some age restrictions on certain high-risk activities, such as
counting the cash for banking. (Some companies do not allow employees
less than 18 years to operate tills, for example.) The strong association of
rubbish-drop thefts with young employees suggests that loss prevention
would be served by not allowing young employees to take out the
rubbish. However, it would be difficult for large-scale restrictions on what
young employees can do to gain acceptance within the workforce - and
gender-based restrictions are clearly going to be problematical. So, what is
more likely to be practical are restrictions based on length of service as a
proxy for the better predictor of age.
A less controversial method of achieving restrictions would be to educate
managers on the relative risks of younger staff. They could then more
informally allocate higher risk activities to lower risk staff.
The third way that the risk associated with these groups could be reduced
is through recruitment policy. Clearly, in retailing it would be difficult to
put a ban on young people entering the company. Itwould also be illegal
to prevent men joining the company. However, a positive emphasis on
recruiting from low-risk groups could reduce the proportion of high-risk
group members in the workforce. The policy would not be to ban young
men from joining, but to encourage more applications from mature
women.
Christmas casual employees were a group of employees that, it was
discovered, could be targeted in all three ways. They were identified by
the analysis as a group whose members were commonly detected as
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dishonest. A review identified that they were generally used for the
highest risk jobs, their induction training did not include setting any
standards for personal integrity, and their recruitment favoured the
highest risk groups. (As their employment was not recorded as
comprehensively at the centre as other employees, it was more difficult to
be confident about their rate of detection. Indeed the indication was that it
was actually lower than the rate for other employees. However, given this
was against a background of there being very little time to catch them
compared to other employees they were still considered an important
target for reducing dishonesty.)
The group of employees who had court orders to take money direct from
their earnings represented a small group which the analysis showed had a
higher than average risk of being detected for dishonesty. Again it is
possible that if they were to know that the company could provide
support for them, they may be less likely to offend. In part this is simply
because the potential to share the problem could prevent it becoming in
Cressey's (1953) phrase 'an unshareable problem'. It is also possible that
the offer of support, by singling them out, and overtly recognising the
potential for future problems, may mean that employees are less likely to
believe that it is possible to find a covert solution to their financial
problems.
Implications for the culture of the business
Beyond specific crime prevention or training, the offender records have
implications for the culture of the business.
There is some consolation to be taken from the finding that there is little
evidence of an overt culture of dishonesty among employees. Employees
were prepared to inform on each other, and were seldom caught colluding
with each other. On the other hand, the evidence of a geographical link to
detection rates may be evidence of a link to local cultures of dishonesty.
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In addition, the number of cases of dishonesty among managers,
especially those involving a cavalier attitude to responsibility, makes it
clear that those responsible for setting the moral tone of the enterprise are
not necessarily setting the right tone. This will need further investigation,
as it still needs to be established that there is a link between the integrity of
managers and the moral tone of the branch, and the prevalence of
dishonesty.
A more perplexing issue though, is that it is possible that there is some
ambiguity in what the 'right' tone is. One potential viewpoint is that the
highest possible ethical standards could be interpreted as bad for the
business. To caricature the situation: if every salesperson volunteered
every negative aspect of a prospective purchase to every customer, they
would be unlikely to make many sales. By the same token rule-breaking
could be interpreted in a positive light - it could be 'not being tied down
by red tape,' or 'focusing on the important issues,' or simply as being 'an
entrepreneur' .
This means that any attempt to change the culture of the business would
have to be very shrewdly done. It is unlikely that a culture based
primarily on keeping to a set of rules will be very successful.
Another aspect of the culture that needs to be taken into account is that the
stores where the employees did work together were primarily the larger
out-of-town sites with the most employees. These stores (where staff
worked together) had an average number of employees twice as high as
the average for all the shops. (They had an average of 33 employees,
whereas for the stores as a whole the average was 15 employees.)
It is possible to take the line that this is purely a function of the number of
employees available (on the lines that if you have a bigger barrel there is a
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greater probability of more than one rotten apple). However, it is also
possible that the increased stratification in the larger unit has an impact.
In the traditional smaller electrical outlet, there is perhaps less of a divide
between management and employees, giving less scope for resentment
and retaliatory dishonesty. This may be a factor behind the greater
evidence of employees working together in distribution that goes beyond
the explanation of drivers and mates being forced to collude by
'proximity'. The tendency of the business is to move to larger and larger
outlets. The danger of a culture of dishonesty among employees seems to
be increasing.
Contributions to the management of detection
The analysis of the offender records can also make a contribution to the
way the detection process is managed.
A key issue, as mentioned already, is the very small percentage of
dishonesty detected. Each employee removed from the company for
dishonesty is generally seen as a considerable success. However, they are
put into a different perspective when recognised as only around five per
cent of the dishonest employees. If the absolute numbers are less
significant, then the quality, rather than the quantity of detections could be
the more appropriate target.
One aspect of the detection that would constitute 'quality' is a focus on the
value associated with the offender. Concentrating on proactively looking
for types of investigation which are likely to involve higher values has the
potential to impact on loss reduction without increasing the number of
cases handled. This would prioritise the more expensive detection
resources on cases of refund fraud, rubbish drops, and major cash losses,
as these types of incident currently show the highest proportion of high-
value cases. In contrast, a greater amount of the less expensive deterrent
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measures (such as publicity) could be directed at the lower value offences
such as walk out thefts, software copying, and collusion.
Another aspect of the quality of each' detection' could be its deterrent
value. Each detection could be regarded as an opportunity for deterrent
impact rather than as an achievement in its own right. This approach
would call for publicising widely every employee caught being dishonest
in as dramatic a way as possible. The figures on the eventual outcome of
cases do not lend themselves to good deterrent publicity. A better
deterrent strategy would be to prosecute fewer cases more rigorously and
disseminate the message that everyone is dismissed and prosecuted by the
police. (It is of course possible to put that message across irrespective of
the facts, but the impact will be lessened the longer employees are in the
company and hear about real cases.)
In general, the analysis showed that there was an increase in sophistication
of offences as age and length of service increase. As a rule, the younger,
newly started employees were involved in dishonesty of lower value and
they were easier to catch. Older established employees cost more each
and were more difficult to catch. This supports the notion of a policy
involving putting effort into deterring the former, and more effort into
catching the latter.
The other aspect of the quality of detections relates to the status of the
employee. The impact of removing dishonest employees in more lowly
positions is considerably lower than the impact of detecting dishonesty
among employees of higher status. The impact is actually two-fold.
Firstly the dismissal of a higher-grade employee is going to get more
publicity than the dismissal of a lower grade employee. He or she will
simply be known by more employees in more branches, and the 'fall from
grace' will make a better story - so word will get around faster. The
second factor is the relative impact more senior employees can have on
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other employees if they are not detected. Whilst the minority of managers
detected whose dishonesty seemed associated with a severe personal
problem may well have run their branches in an exemplary fashion, the
majority of managers found to be dishonest had displayed a cavalier
attitude to rules and regulations. Such behaviour is certain to be
influencing the attitudes to honesty among their staff.
Using the Clarke and Homel grid
In addition to these general themes for boosting loss prevention, the
detection records helped provide a number other ideas. The offender
records acted both as a catalyst to identifying possible interventions, and
as a way of checking on the practicality of ideas generated.
In generating ideas the offender records worked well in conjunction with
the 'opportunity-reducing technique' grid developed by Clarke and
Homel (Clarke 1997, 18.) Clarke and Homers grid separates out potential
strategies conceptually into four areas: (1) increasing the perceived effort,
(2) increasing perceived risks, (3) reducing anticipated rewards, and (4)
removing excuses. Each area is then split down further into four sub-
strategies, as is shown in figure 5.01. The grid was found to be very
helpful in stimulating and organising ideas. Itwas used as the basis for
brainstorming sessions, looking for solutions in each box of the grid for
the problems represented by the methods of theft reported in the detection
records. The next section will work through the cells in the grid, drawing
out some of the implications.
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Figure 5.01
Clarke and Homel's sixteen opportunity-reducing techniques
Increasing Increasing Reducing Removing
perceived effort perceived risks anticipated excuses
rewards
1. Target 5. Entry/exit 9. Target 13. Rule setting
hardening screening removal
2. Access control 6. Formal 10. Identifying 14. Stimulating
surveillance property conscience
3. Deflecting 7. Surveillance by 11. Reducing 15. Controlling
offenders employees temptation disinhi bitors
4. Controlling 8. Natural 12. Denying 16. Facilitating
facili ta tors surveillance benefits compliance
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Increasing perceived effort
In retail employee theft prevention the concept of increasing the perceived
effort is particularly difficult to introduce. Employees are required to have
easy access to stock and need to take cash from customers. The traditional
approaches in box (1) of the grid, the concept of 'target hardening'
involving bolts, bars, locks and chains, are simply not appropriate.
However, from the detection records, it was clear that particular items of
stock were favourites for theft by employees. This provided opportunities
to restrict access to those particular types of stock that were favourite
targets for dishonest staff. Whilst most stock could be moved more freely,
a few high-risk types of product, such as games machines, mobile phones,
and laptop computers could be protected by keeping them locked in a
higher security area within the stock room.
Box (2) in the grid, 'access control' also seems at first sight less
appropriate in this arena, but it is particularly pertinent to 'access' to the
till system. Reviewing the offender records showed that the system of
'PIN' codes was a vulnerability. A short-term measure was to persuade
employees to change their PIN regularly to prevent it being learnt and
misused. However introducing a more secure system involving electronic
staff ID cards, or biometric readers to give access to the till were proposed
as more secure alternatives, and the company is working towards
incorporating them into the next generation of till systems.
'Deflecting offenders', box (3) in the grid, did not generate useful
measures, as the 'routine activities' which it would serve to deflect staff
from are so bound up with being able to perform their regular job.
However, in box (4), the issue of 'controlling facilitators' was a very
fruitful area for ideas. The offender records show a number of facilitators
that prevention could focus on. Some were obvious. For example, keys
were obviously a facilitator of many types of cash theft and key control
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was highlighted as an area of concern. However, others were less
immediately apparent. For example, many of the walk out thefts had
involved employees taking stock out of the store during the trading day,
and the smoking policy which meant that employees had the legitimate
reason of a smoke break to leave the store was identified as a facilitator.
Very many of the walk out thefts relied on hiding places in bags and coats,
or cars. There are simple ways in which reducing these opportunities
could addressed, such as having employees park in particularly visible
areas of the car park. The rubbish drop thefts clearly relied on rubbish
bags being taken out, and the possibility of using rubbish compactors,
which would compress store rubbish into a very small block inside the
store, were investigated. (Given the damage one of these machines would
do to any equipment that was hidden in the rubbish, it could be argued
this would have been more of a 'reducing anticipated rewards' initiative.)
Increasing perceived risks
The grid element number (5), Ientry / exit screening' had a clear application
to employee theft prevention in terms of screening employees on the way
out of the building by searching them. The company had long had a
policy of managers searching employees as they left work. However, it
was clear from the number of employees caught that the policy needed to
be addressed. If searching was being done regularly and effectively, then
it would be very strange that so many employees were prepared to risk
being caught taking out stock on their person. In addition, in a wider
sense, the opportunities for recruitment screening, attracting low-risk
groups such as mature women to join the company, could be seen as a
form of entry screening.
Despite, (or perhaps because of) the wide range of surveillance equipment
available on the market, the element of 'formal surveillance', box (6), led to
relatively few new ideas. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance of
back store areas had been trialled in a number of stores by the company.
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However, it rarely seemed to represent an effective deterrent. (Losses
were not appreciably lower in the stores that had back store CCTV, and
offenders were still detected stealing stock in them.) This was possibly
because there were so many legitimate reasons for employees to be
moving stock or cash around, and possibly because employees were aware
from reviewing shop floor CCTV of the difficulty of watching through
long recordings for a particular suspicious event. One idea that was put
forward however was to use the CCTV as a logging system - so that
employees declared to the camera what they had taken out of a secure
area. Triggered, (and especially digital) CCTV, which only recorded
particular events, such as a door opening or high-risk till transactions such
as refunds seemed to have more potential. In terms of frauds that relied
on the till, there was also the opportunity to develop surveillance
reporting that would trawl the transaction data for suspicious
transactions.
In terms of box (7) of the grid, 'surveillance by employees', the formal
searching regime seemed the closest match to the aims of employee
dishonesty prevention. However, the exhortations of the company to not
tolerate dishonesty in effect urged each employee to keep an eye on his or
her colleagues. There were some ideas related to this that could also apply
to the concept of box (8), natural surveillance. There was an opportunity
to make employees more aware of the common circumstances of
dishonesty (as identified from the offender records.) If employees were
more aware of the risk associated with, for instance taking the rubbish out,
they may be more aware of dishonesty. There were clearly groups such as
administration staff who may be alerted to the characteristics of fraudulent
transactions by staff and therefore maintain better 'informal surveillance'
of the paperwork systems. Incentives could also be offered to increase the
willingness to undertake' colleague surveillance'. The opportunities for
informal surveillance by the public seemed very limited, but the idea of
increasing the visibility of employees by having more glass walls and
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partitions into areas such as repair technician's work spaces, seemed likely
to make employees feel more exposed, and less inclined towards any
covert activity.
Reducing anticipated rewards
Clearly in terms of employee dishonesty there is little that can be achieved
through 'target removal', box (9). Whilst lower stock holdings of products
backed up by home delivery from local distribution centres may reduce
the potential for burglary there still have to be display models in store.
Whilst dummy phones may reduce the temptation to customers who may
steal, the employees still need to have access to the real thing. Having said
that, the increasing possibility of merging of internet shopping and the
high street through customer 'kiosks' where customers can browse and
order from 'on-line' catalogues has opportunities for reducing employee
intervention in the supply of goods and the taking of money.
As most of the property in a shop is destined for customers there is not a
great deal that can be achieved by conventional opportunities represented
by box (10), 'identifying property'. Indelibly marking products as the
property of the retail chain would not be popular with customers.
However, many of the detection records for mobile phone thefts resulted
from the fact that mobile phones are indelibly marked by their internal
serial number. Where an empty box showed what the serial number of the
phone was, the offender was often tracked down through the phone
records. So there are clear benefits from recording the serial numbers of
mobile phones.
Most electronic products do have a serial number and the keeping of serial
number logs for all products could have benefits. However, the work
involved in recording serial numbers, capturing the serial numbers of all
the products sold at the till point, would slow down the transaction
process too much for retailers to accept the measure. It is possible that in
the future RFID systems (electronic 'tags' which can send and receive
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information by radio) will have a role to play, transmitting the serial
numbers of products to store systems as they progress through the supply
chain, and storing the new ownership details when they are sold.
The aim of 'reducing temptation', box (11) on the grid, is best dealt with by
introducing accounting systems that reduce the number of 'unaccounted'
targets. Many of the thefts of scrap by drivers showed that there was a
'temptation' whenever customers requested the removal of scrap products
at the time of the delivery, without having indicated the requirement
when making the booking. There was a temptation to think of these
collections as more tempting because they were not accounted for. The
way the temptation could be removed was to ring the customers the
evening before (something already done to confirm times) and ask
whether there was any scrap to collect, and then record this on the
delivery paperwork.
The traditional approach to box (12) of the grid, 'denying benefits', is to
use measures that affect the value of the theft target (such as dye tags that
destroy the value of stolen clothes or electronic codes that lock car radios
when they are removed from the power supply.) These are clearly not
appropriate to the problem of employee theft. If' denying benefits' is
interpreted as preventing the detected offenders from benefiting from
their crimes, then the' civil recovery' process of suing the former employee
for the proceeds of the dishonesty and the costs of attempting to prevent,
and then detecting their dishonesty is one option. There is also the
separate approach of attacking the rewards to the offender through the
legitimate portion of his or her income, their employment. As has been
shown from the records of offenders detected, there is relatively little risk
of successful criminal prosecution. Without a criminal record, offenders
will have little trouble getting a similar job with another company.
However, if the industry maintains a database of all those employees
dismissed for' gross misconduct' then the offender will have a very much
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lower chance of getting a similar job without the dishonesty coming to
light. (There is a supplier hosting such a database.)
Removing excuses
Much of employee theft prevention represents a form of removing
excuses. The majority of this effort could be said to fit into the box (13) of
the grid, the one labelled: I rule setting'. The myriad small opportunities
for tightening up systems of accountability suggested by offender records
fall into this category. However, there were more fundamental
opportunities identified as well. Many of the managers who displayed a
cavalier approach to the responsibilities of their role were relatively newly
appointed. This represented a clear opportunity to improve potential
manager training and development to make the requirement for integrity
more overt. Itwas also proposed that the rule setting was put in the
context of closer supervision or mentoring of newly appointed managers
by senior and field management.
Under box (16), facilitating compliance, the most pertinent contributions
regarded the till systems. It is not that the crime opportunities themselves
could be removed by providing improved systems on the tills, it was that
improving the till systems could reduce the chances of employees learning
about opportunities. For example, one of the controls in place to prevent
refund fraud is the need to put in a receipt number, which whilst not
verified on line in the current system is subject to a validity check. If
employees are not provided with a system for dealing with legitimate
procedures for dealing with genuine customers who have lost their
receipts then employees have to learn to put in a fictitious number to
accommodate them. This learning ways around the system to deal with
genuine customers can easily transfer to illicit opportunities.
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Interventions adopted
Many of the opportunities for preventing dishonesty already mentioned
were indeed adopted. There were five interventions that could be picked
out as major projects and new initiatives rather than refinements of
existing practice. Each one had to be 'sold' to the business as a whole. The
key questions for the business decision makers were whether it was
compatible with other business objectives, and whether it could be shown
to be cost effective.
A fraud prevention training initiative was the first of these interventions.
The level of collusion by employees in credit fraud by customers,
particularly credit application fraud, was a crime-specific opportunity that
needed to be tackled primarily by removing excuses. The company
operations manuals were primarily interested in the mechanics of
obtaining authorisation for the credit from the credit provider. This could
give the impression that getting an agreement to pass authorisation checks
was all an employee had to do - even if it was clear he or she was dealing
with a fraudster. So, in part the strategy was concerned with 'rule setting'
- taking away the opportunity of that excuse. The operations manuals for
the company were updated to make it clear that every employee had a
much more active responsibility to prevent customer fraud. There was
evidence from the transaction data that some practices that had been used
to assist fraudsters were happening occasionally in other branches. For
example, the practice of re-submitting an application for a customer with
slightly different details in order to boost their chances of being accepted
for credit (say, giving them a couple of extra years residence at a particular
address) had occurred sporadically in other branches. A campaign was
needed to back up the rule setting by winning the 'hearts and minds' of
the employees. This was done by distributing leaflets to all sales
employees, putting the problem into a wider context, and setting out their
role positively along with the benefits it would bring.
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Getting acceptance from the business for this intervention was fairly
straightforward, because it represented a very conventional approach.
Security management has traditionally involved this sort of combination
of setting rules and selling the benefits. The costs were relatively low and
could be easily justified against the risks of charge-backs from the credit
providers of the value of frauds that could otherwise be predicted.
Therefore, it was generally easily agreed, swiftly implemented and well
received.
The next initiative involved tackling 'rubbish-drop' theft. This type of
theft relied on the ability to hide items in the rubbish when taking it out of
the store. Excellent facilitators of this were the black rubbish sacks used in
all stores. They made it very difficult to see what was being taken out. To
make this type of theft more difficult, the black rubbish sacks were
replaced by clear rubbish bags. This made it easier to check the rubbish,
either before it left the store, or when it was outside in the rubbish bins.
Cost justifying the change to the type of rubbish bags used in the stores
could have been difficult. However good the idea may have seemed, it
was difficult to put a value on the deterrent it represented. By good
fortune, it turned out that the clear rubbish bags cost virtually the same as
the black bags had done, and there was no real case needed to cost justify
the change. The initiative was therefore accepted by the business without
any problem.
The third initiative also targeted goods being removed from the store via
the back doors, but had a wider scope than just the rubbish-drop theft.
The project involved improving the alarms on all the 'non-public' doors.
It had always been policy that the goods doors at the rear of the shops
were protected by an alarm that sounded on the shop floor, and was
silenced by the manager entering his or her PIN into the system.
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However, once silenced the alarm had to be re-set manually, and in many
cases this meant that the alarm was no longer sounding. By upgrading the
software the alarms were re-programmed to automatically re-set
themselves after thirty minutes, meaning that the doors could not be left
silenced for longer. Apart from one designated goods door for which the
alarm could be silenced, all other doors were designated fire escapes only
and connected to the twenty-four hour fire alarm signalling. This greatly
reduced the opportunities for going out of the back of the stores with stock
undetected. However, the important aim was deterrent rather than
detection, so labels were printed warning of the alarms, and stuck to every
door.
This was a more difficult initiative to gain acceptance for. Itwas necessary
to negotiate the acceptance that only one set of doors would be used in a
store, contrary to the well-established customs in some branches. There
were cost and organisational barriers to getting the signage put up. Itwas
also expensive to have the alarm panel software upgraded to monitor all
the doors and to re-set the warning sounding on the shop floor when the
goods door had been opened.
Contrary to expectation managers welcomed the proposals. They saw
restricting the doors that could be used, or in having to regularly silence
the alarm once the goods door was open, as a minor inconvenience
compared to the benefits of increased control over their stock that the
measures gave them. The cost of the alarm panel upgrades was reduced
by combining the change with other upgrades, and combining the
upgrade itself with the cycle of routine maintenance visits. The cost of
putting up the signage was kept down by producing self-adhesive signs
that the manager could be sent in the post and put up him or herself.
With the improvements to door control and the rubbish removal
arrangements it had become more difficult for employees to remove stock
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through the back doors, but what of the front? The only real deterrent to
taking goods out when going outside on a break, or at the end of the
working day, was the search regime - and it was clear from the detection
records that this did not act as a sufficient deterrent. Although the best-
organised branches operated a system of randomly choosing a number of
employees for search every time they left the store, the majority of
branches found it too cumbersome and time-consuming to make searches
daily. In addition, because it was inappropriate for opposite genders to
search each other manually, there were often practical barriers to regular
searching. In smaller branches, especially those with a long-established
staff complement, managers found it embarrassing to conduct regular
searches.
These issues were addressed by the introduction of' airport-style' search
wands. These hand-held devices could detect the metal content of
electrical products, and were sensitive enough to pick up the metallic
coating inside a compact disk. Searching with a wand removed the need
for any physical contact, making searches less embarrassing and enabling
cross gender searching to take place. Searches were also very much faster
to carry out, so it became possible to introduce a policy of 100 per cent
searching - everyone being searched whenever they left the building -
rather than the previous loose arrangement of random searching.
There were many issues to deal with in the introduction of the search
wands. Aside from the cost of the equipment, there was the need to gain
the approval of the employees, and especially the management staff who
would be conducting the searches. New procedures needed to be drawn
up for briefing the employees, and they needed to take account of a wide
range of issues. One of the less expected issues, for example, was that
employees who wore metal body jewellery would activate the search
wand. To identify and deal with all the issues, the introduction of the
search wands was preceded by an extensive trial in selected high-risk
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branches. The experience of these stores proved the practical benefits of
searching with the wands: speed, efficiency, greater acceptance of
searching by employees being searched, and less embarrassment for those
doing the searching. The trial also allowed comprehensive procedures to
be developed.
The fifth intervention was the creation of an employee dishonesty
prevention video training program. There was already a video in the
business, and the new video was designed to replace it, updating it and
introducing the lessons learnt from the analysis of the offender records.
The previous video had been built around four dramatised scenarios of
dishonesty, with the central message being: 'If you steal you will be caught
- so don't'. The analysis of the offender records showed that this was not
a credible central message given the scale of the problem. Informal
interviews with employees also revealed other ways in which the
presentation could be improved. (For example, the role of the presenter
was found to be very 'preachy'.)
However, by showing the employees activities leading to arrest and
prosecution, the old video did display an unambiguous definition of the
dishonesty as 'crime' which it would be hoped made it more difficult for
new starters to mentally re-classify taking goods as 'perks'. The central
vehicle in the old video of dramatised events was retained in the new
video in order to continue to 'remove excuses' and' set standards' in this
way. The new scenarios were selected as the most common from the
research: walk out theft, rubbish drops, handover collusion, and refund
fraud. They were portrayed in a documentary fashion based on real
incidents rather than as 'drama'. In order to reflect the finding that such a
high proportion of managers were found to be dishonest, one of the
scenarios concerned a dishonest manager, The message was changed to
one better suited to the facts that the offender research had portrayed - it
became: 'you will be caught eventually', The finding of evidence that the
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culture of the business did not support dishonesty was taken account of by
introducing small 'vox pop' contributions by the real staff involved in the
incidents. Their disapproval was intended to establish this lack of support
for dishonest employees for the benefit of new starters. The video also
attempted to capitalise on the current willingness of employees to report
dishonesty, by advertising the confidential hotline answer phone facility
the business already had in place.
Within the business there was considerable support for the notion of the
new video training, and it was not difficult to get acceptance for the
measure, despite the difficulty of establishing a solid financial figure for
the benefit that the training would give. However, the original plan was
for the video to be targeted very clearly at new starters. This, the evidence
from the offender analysis seemed to suggest, was the most appropriate
group for this type of intervention. Itwas the best time for setting
standards and removing excuses, and may be the one time it would be
possible to 'tell' someone that the culture of the business did not support
dishonesty. However, the business managers were not prepared to fund a
video that would be used only in this way, and the script had to be
rewritten to make the video more appropriate for showing to all
employees.
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(6) EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES TO INTEGRITY
The results of the attitude survey of employees are presented in this
section, and its findings are related to the analysis of the offender records.
Aims of the survey and methodology
The survey had three aims. Firstly, it was intended to give a perspective
on the demographic profile of offenders that could be put against the
profile derived from the profile of offenders from the records of those that
have been caught. Secondly, it aimed to investigate the relationship
between dishonesty and wider issues of integrity, especially the link to
leadership issues. The third issue is to investigate the impact of the new
training video on staff attitudes to integrity. In addition to these main
aims, some questions were introduced to investigate the attitudes and
compliance with the policy on the searching of staff.
Profile of dishonesty
There are some benefits, but also some strong reservations about using
offender records as the basis for policy. Offender records are detailed and
specific, but are not likely to be a representative sample of dishonest
employees. Survey records are much less specific about offences and
offenders, but are likely to be much more representative of the workforce
as a whole.
The ideal is to combine the two types of data. The researchers Hollinger
and Clark (1983a, 103) were disappointed that:
... security records did not provide enough detail for us to assess how
employee thieves who had been apprehended differed from those who were
not.
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By undertaking a survey study and an analysis of offender records, this
can be achieved.
However, there is a problem in that it is an internal survey. The most
successful self-report studies (such as Hollinger and Clark 1983a) used
huge samples, and established unquestionable clear confidentiality
(usually through being run by outside educational organizations). A
survey across one organisation cannot achieve a very great size, and will
struggle to achieve the confidence in the confidentiality without resorting
to some subterfuge.
Itwas decided to establish that this was a company survey but establish
confidentiality by using an outside company to manage the responses and
data entry. Itwas still a concern that without huge numbers of
respondents questions directly asking about personal honesty may be too
challenging to achieve a reasonable return. It was decided that staff
would be more willing to talk about their perceptions of what 'staff in
general' do - as opposed to them.
This indirect measure - the 'honest' member of staff's perception of the
honesty of their colleagues - will still give demographic profile for
comparison if we ask staff to consider only employees in the same
situation as themselves. Research (e.g. Jones 1980) has also shown that
staff thieves report levels of theft in the workplace as higher than non-
thieves do - so the question may, in some cases, actually act as a direct
measure.
Higher levels of staff theft would be indicated by disagreement with the
following questions.
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People in my situation never take more time off (breaks, sick leave,
arriving late) than we are entitled to
People in my situation never give special discounts to friends or relations
People in my situation never make personal use of company property
People in my situation never take surplus free gifts home
People in my situation never take home products without authorization
People in my situation never borrow money from the company
'Production deviance' in the form of taking time off has been included
because of its reported association with 'property deviance' - and also
because it acts as a less threatening introduction to the section.
The relationship between attitudes to dishonesty and other integrity
issues
The analysis of offender records has identified that there is a possibility
that the standards set by managers on other integrity issues have a
negative impact on the personal honesty of staff. (The worry is that
employees could mentally decide 'If I'm told to bend the rules to make a
sale then it doesn't matter if I bend the rules for my own benefit.')
The offender records also suggest that some managers consider
themselves' above' the rules for other staff and will take stock home,
borrow cash or give excessive discounts. Obviously, this direct
'leadership' could affect the honesty of staff. So the first question that
needs to be asked is: is there a perception among staff that managers take
a cavalier attitude to integrity in dealings with customers? This would be
indicated by disagreement with the following statements:
My managers don't care what I say to customers so long as I make a sale
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My managers always insist I keep my promises to customers
My managers insist I never say anything untrue about goods I sell
The next question is whether there is there a perception among staff that
managers take a cavalier attitude to personal honesty? This would be
indicated by disagreement with the following survey statements:
My managers never take more time off (breaks, sick leave, arriving late,
leaving early) than they are entitled to
My managers never get special deals for their friends or relations
My managers never get special deals for themselves
My managers never make personal use of company property
My managers never take home products without authorization
My managers never borrow money from the company
My managers never take surplus free gifts home
The question of taking extra time off is included in this section (whilst not
strictly an example of' dishonesty'). It has been found in a number of
studies to correlate strongly with dishonesty, and yet is an example of
'rule breaking' that staff may feel less intimidated to report honestly on.
The staff perception of managers' degree of leadership in relation to
integrity is a worthwhile measure in itself. It gives feedback on many
initiatives. (The video has a separate section for managers that urges them
to show leadership on the issues of integrity. Repeating the survey in six
month's time could be used as a measure of how much this manager
section of film has influenced the way managers presented themselves to
staff.)
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However, the key question for the business is whether the integrity of
managers relates to dishonesty among staff. What is required is a 'self-
report' dishonesty measure to answer the question: do employees whose
managers have a poor attitude to integrity steal?
It is probable that the honesty or impartiality of answers to questions
about managers are going to be affected by attitudes to the quality of the
work experience and to the individual's opinion of the way they are
managed. Staff theft has also been found to be related to issues of 'job
satisfaction'. So, questions on this topic are needed to establish (or control
for) this relationship. In other words: Is it only those who don't like their
jobs who report failings in their managers? In addition, are those who do
not like their jobs stealing to compensate?
Those questions can be addressed by comparing agreement with
statements about manager integrity with agreement with the following
statements:
I enjoy my job
I'm well treated by the company
I'm well treated by my line manager
I get on well with other staff
I never feel pressured into working extra hours
I'm always rewarded fairly for the hours I put in
Attitudes to honesty may be related to integrity in personal dealings with
customers - irrespective of the standards set by managers.
This issue can be addressed by agreement with the following statements:
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I never say anything about the goods I sell which isn't true
It doesn't matter what I say to a customer so long as I make a sale
I always keep my promises to customers
The effect on attitudes caused by the training session
The offender records show that employees caught stealing are typically
young, male, recent joiners, and are caught by the simplest means taking
low-value stock. Such low rewards probably seem a worthwhile risk by
employees who believe they will not be caught, we will not take it
seriously and the police will not be involved. The video aims to reduce
staff theft by contradicting those views.
The main question is whether it increased the perceived risk of being
caught. If it has, then this would be shown by an increase in agreement
with the following statements:
If I were to take home stock without authorisation I would be caught
If I were to steal cash from the store I would be caught
If I were to give stock to someone without full payment I would be caught
It is also possible that it has increased the appreciation of the consequences
of dishonesty. This effect would be shown by an increase in agreement
with the following statements:
The thought of losing my job would influence me if I considered stealing
The thought of getting a criminal record would influence me if I considered
stealing
What my workmates thought would influence me if I considered stealing
The possible effect on my family would influence me if I considered
stealing
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The possible effect on friends would influence me if I considered stealing
To distinguish between respondents who had seen the video and those
who had not (even after the video should have been shown) it is also
necessary to ask about training. Rather than make the question directly
about the training video itself and risk colouring future questions, the
survey asked about the quality of training, and the most recent training
recalled:
I am very satisfied with the training I am currently receiving
I find Quality Training Time (QTT) training sessions effective
The last QTT I recall on I would score it:
selling or product knowledge
was: Out of 10 for effectiveness
(please give title or brief
details)
The last QTT I recall on I would score it:
security or Health & Safety
was: Out of 10 for effectiveness
(please give title or brief
details)
Mechanics
Itwas decided to only survey retail employees and not the distribution
and service arm. This was because differences in types of job, and
opportunities for dishonesty were so different between the different arms
of the organisation that a common form was going to become unwieldy. It
was also decided not to include site managers. This was because the
numbers were to small to ensure an adequate number for further analysis,
and because of the difficulty of establishing common questions for
managers and other employees. Assistant or trainee managers were
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included however, because their numbers were greater and there was no
need to tailor the questionnaires to them.
As it had been decided to be open about this being a survey conducted for
the company (rather than pretending it was only an academic exercise) the
survey forms were introduced by a letter from the most senior Human
Resources director. This letter stressed the confidentiality of the survey
and that the information would be used to influence policy making in the
future.
To give a private environment in which to deal with the forms, and to
emphasise confidentiality, the survey was sent directly to home addresses.
A pre-paid envelope was included in order that respondents return the
form directly to a survey company for coding.
Sample
In order to achieve a reasonable' cell size' for any analysis, it was decided
that a sample of at least 1,000 staff would be required. (This represents 6.5
per cent of the workforce.) Based on previous company surveys a
response rate of 1/3 was anticipated. However, it was thought that this
survey might be more challenging and derive a lower response rate. In
addition, it was noted that to get a reasonable useable response rate in
wave two of employees had to take account of who would have actually
seen the video. Given that only 60 per cent saw the last one, the effective
response rate would be 20 per cent to the second wave. As can be seen in
table 6.01 below, this gives a required sample of 4,800 forms (31 per cent of
the total population).
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Table 6.01
Numbers of survey questionnaires distributed and numbers
of returns expected
Wave 1 Wave2 Total
.••..
Chain Number of Sample Expected Sample Expected Sample Expected
employees response response response
(33.3%) (20%)
1 841 98 33 163 33 260 65
2 5734 666 222 1110 222 1776 444
3 4015 466 155 777 155 1243 311
4 1165 135 45 225 45 361 90
5 3745 435 145 725 145 1160 290
15500 1800 600 3000 600 4800 1200
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Table 6.02
Response rate by age group
Age group Returned Percentage of
those sent
Less than 18 96 35
18 - 20 231 21
21 - 25 202 17
26 - 30 130 17
31 - 35 115 23
36 - 40 77 23
41 - 45 57 24
46 - 50 37 23
51 - 55 35 24
55 - 60 16 20
Over60 9 15
Total 1005 21
Not filled in 106
Grand total 1111
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The full employee database for the company was available to construct the
sample, so a stratified systematic sampling method was used. The
stratification factors were chain, rank, and age. Eight of the intended
sample were accidentally excluded, leaving 4,792 survey forms
distributed.
Response rate
Of the 4,792 survey forms sent out, 1,111 were returned, or 23 per cent.
Checking personnel records later showed that 374 employees who were
sent survey forms left the company during the survey period. This
increases the effective response rate to 25 per cent.
There was a variation in the response rate by the five different trading
arms. The best response was from one of the high street chains (31 per
cent) and the worst was from one of the out of town superstore chains (19
per cent).
The response rate was best from the youngest employees, (35 per cent),
and worst among the 21-30 age group (17 per cent) and the few employees
surveyed who were over 60 (15 per cent), as is shown in table 6.02.
Clearly, this is a poor response rate, and less than was hoped for.
However, it is broadly comparable to other company surveys
administered in a similar way, and therefore does not suggest that the
survey was especially taxing, or boycotted in some way.
There was an allegation that some managers had urged their staff not to
complete the forms in order to avoid any adverse comment. If this had
been the case, the response rate in the second wave of the survey should
have been lower (as more managers found out about the survey and spoke
to their staff). However, the response rates to both were very similar (24.6
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per cent and 25.2 per cent), so it is unlikely that any comments by
managers had a significant effect.
Findings
Profile of dishonesty
To investigate the prevalence of dishonesty which employees believed
existed in the company, the survey asked to what extent the respondents
found a number of statements matched their own views. The statements
were all in the form 'People in my situation never ... ' (The phrase 'people
in my situation' was annotated in the section header to indicate it meant
people of similar 'age, rank and length of service'.) The options were
'agree strongly', 'agree', 'disagree', 'disagree strongly', and 'don't know'.
The statements and a summary of the responses are given below in table
6.03. The values show the percentage of respondents (among those who
expressed an opinion, l.e., excluding 'don't knows'). In most categories
the majority of respondents were able to 'strongly agree' with the
statements, indicating that they were confident that people in their
situation were never dishonest in any of these ways. A smaller number
disagreed that people in their situation behaved in these ways.
Disagreement suggests that they were equally confident that this did
happen.
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Table 6.03
Proportion reporting dishonesty among people 'in my
situation'
People in my situation Agree Agree, Disagree
never... strongly but not (disagree
strongly or disagree
strongly)
take more time off than we are 36% 45% 19%
entitled to
give special discounts to 49% 41% 10%
friends or relations
make personal use of 51% 43% 6%
company property
take home surplus free gifts 53% 40% 7%
take home products without 66% 33% 1%
authorisation
borrow money from the 72% 27% 1%
company
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The question is how to interpret the 'agree' category. Have they indicated
'agree' as a synonym for' strongly agree' - it never happens? If not, then
what does the difference really mean? My interpretation is that those who
have' agreed', but not ticked' strongly agree' have some reservations -
either in terms of the frequency of the actions or the number of people
involved. In other words they suspect that a small number their
colleagues may be doing this, or that people in their situation may do it,
but only very occasionally.
On this basis, I find the important' dividing line' in the figures between
'strongly agree' and the other categories. All others indicate some
suspicion that there is dishonesty among employees in their situation.
If the questionnaires have been completed candidly, for employees to be
confident enough to disagree with the statements (and therefore to be
relatively confident of either dishonest or counter-productive activity
taking place) is strikingly rare. If disagreement can be interpreted as
'knowing' the actions took place, then even the most common dishonest
action, taking unauthorised time off, was only known of by 19 per cent of
the respondents.
For more clearly criminal actions, the number who knew they took place
(and were prepared to report this in the survey) was very low indeed.
Only one per cent disagreed with the statements that employees in their
situation never took home cash or stock. Given that the figures from the
offender records show that around one per cent of staff are actually caught
and dismissed each year for dishonesty, these figures could not really be
any lower. It does not reflect the finding from comparing average
detected offender values with overall loss values from the company's
financial records - which gives a figure of around a third of all employees
being involved in stock theft (as derived in section four above, page 138).
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The low level of dishonesty reported suggests that possibly people who
knew of dishonesty were less likely to respond to the survey. (This is a
possibility with only a 25 per cent response.) If genuine, the low level of
staff knowing of dishonesty supports the finding from the offender record
analysis that dishonesty is not part of an accepted culture among
employees, but instead is a truly covert activity. In this case, the honest
employees answering the survey would only know of the relatively
uncommon cases of detected dishonesty.
In relation to the ranking of prevalence, the figures are similar to the
findings of Hollinger and Clark (1983a). Production deviance is far more
common than property deviance, and giving discounts is the most
common type of property deviance.
The numbers who agreed, but not strongly - those I interpret as
suspecting that something is going on occasionally, or in relation to only a
few individuals - are considerably higher than those who were prepared
to actually disagree. The disparity is particularly noticeable with regard to
the more clearly criminal actions. A third of employees are not completely
confident that others in their position take stock home, and nearly the
same number suspect cash is borrowed. If dishonesty was
institutionalised, or colluded in by supervisors, or simply more open, I
should have expected there to be less of a disparity. I interpret this as
meaning that dishonesty is concealed, by individuals, or within closely-
knit teams, and it is not an accepted practice in the workplace as, for
example, among Mars's dockworkers.
Those cases where employees disagreed to the non-involvement of their
colleagues in the three most dishonest types of action - taking stock
borrowing cash, and giving special discounts to friends and relations - are
worthy of particular focus. They represent the cases that can be
interpreted as employees knowing that their colleagues are sometimes
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dishonest. To facilitate this focus they can be combined into a single
measure. The combination measure includes all cases where the employee
has disagreed or disagreed strongly with any of the statements for these
actions never being undertaken by employees in the same situation as
themselves. This combined measure, which I will give the unwieldy title
of: Iemployees who knew people in their situation sometimes stole cash,
stock or via discounts', represents 113 cases, or ten per cent of all
respondents.
The distribution of those respondents by age is given in graphical form
below as figure 6.01 (and as table A.02 in Annexe A.) In figure 6.01 it is
put alongside the percentage of employees dismissed for dishonesty from
offender records in the same age groups. (These offender detection
percentages have been multiplied by a factor of ten to put them on a
comparable scale to the survey measures, so 25 per cent on the scale
represents 25 per cent of survey respondents reporting dishonesty but
only 2.5 per cent of employees in this age group being detected for
dishonesty. )
Broadly speaking, the survey results indicate more dishonesty in the
younger age groups. This supports the findings of the analysis of the
offender records.
It is worth noting that the poorest response rate to the survey was in the
21 to 30 age groups where there is evidence that there are higher levels of
undetected crime. If knowledge of or involvement in dishonesty caused
the poorer response rate in these age groups, then it would serve to
increase this effect.
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Figure 6.01
Distribution of dishonesty by age group: perceptions
compared to offenders caught
25% ,----- --
20% f---
15% - I-
10%
5% 1-
0% '- '- '- '-- .L- '- '- "-
Less than
18to 20 21 to 25 26 to 30 31 to 35 36 to 4018
f;;:tion (Surve~l 10% 17% 12% 9% 8% 12%
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0.06 0.02 0.03 0.12
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The perception of staff from the survey is of considerably lower levels of
dishonesty among those under 18. This may represent naivety among the
employees responding to the survey, who have not yet gained the
experience to make informed decisions about levels of dishonesty among
other young employees. However, it could equally well be interpreted as
representing a genuine disproportionate likelihood of young employees
(who have had less experience of techniques of dishonesty) being caught.
Young employees, it has already been noted are less likely to have taken
elaborate steps to conceal their dishonesty from the standard strategies for
detection. (They get caught in more simple ways.)
The perception of older employees in the survey, that employees similar to
them were dishonest, is greater than is reflected in the percentage of staff
in the older age groups who are dismissed for dishonesty. This would
accord with the pragmatic viewpoint that more experienced staff are likely
to be more difficult to catch and less likely to attract suspicion, and will
therefore figure less strongly in offender records.
A very similar perspective to that given by the age analysis is gained by
comparing the two data sources in terms of length of service, as is shown
in figure 6.02 below (and in table A.03 in Annexe A).
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Table 6.02
Distribution of dishonesty by length of service: perceptions
compared to offenders caught
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The records of offenders caught suggests that those with a shorter length
of service are the greatest risk, whilst the survey places those with over
five years' service as the highest risk group. Again, greater experience can
both on the one hand explain an increased perception of the amount of
dishonesty taking place - inflating the survey reports made by longer
serving and more worldly wise staff - and on the other hand explain a
reduced chance of getting caught for established staff - resulting in
offender records understating the number of offenders with longer
service.
Itmight have been expected from the analysis of the records of those
caught for dishonesty that there would be a geographical difference in the
proportion of staff who knew of dishonesty. Areas such as Central
London and Manchester not on!y had higher proportions of detected
dishonesty, but the detection rate correlated to the overall stock audit loss
rate for the same areas. However, when the combined measure of
dishonesty is cross-tabulated by geographical area (See table A.04 in
Annexe A) very little variation (in the numbers as a proportion of
respondents in each area) can be found.
One possible interpretation of this is that the geographical distribution of
dishonesty is more even than is suggested by the detection rates. It is
possible that the detection rate differences, despite correlating with the
stock audit result data, are not reflecting the underlying patterns of
dishonesty accurately. However, comparing the distribution presented in
the offender analysis (figure 4.07) with the geographic area options for the
survey gives an alternative interpretation. In order to simplify the options
for the survey (and not compromise its confidentiality) only six broad.
categories of geographical area were given: South East, South West,
Midlands, Northern England, and Scotland. Each of those areas contains a
mixture of high and low prevalence counties in terms of detected
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dishonesty. For example, the South East contains the higher rate areas
within London, but also the low rates in East Anglia and surrounding
areas. The South West although having low detection rate areas along the
South coast and Cornish peninsular includes the high-risk areas in South
Wales and Bristol. More specific and detailed areas are needed to
establish the geographic distribution of dishonesty through this type of
survey.
Attitude to deterrents
The survey asked respondents to what extent they agreed with a series of
statements about factors influencing their personal honesty. The
percentage of all respondents who strongly agreed with the statements
that they would be influenced by each factor is given in table 6.04 below.
This suggests that, overall, employees believe their own standards are the
most important factor, with 83 per cent strongly agreeing that these would
influence them if they considered stealing. The possibility of a criminal
record was the next strongest influence, with 79 per cent agreeing it would
influence them. The effect on the respondent's family was next most
agreed with as influential (76 per cent). The thought of losing their job
was the next highest-ranking factor (70 per cent). Given that the losing
their job is the most certain outcome of being caught being dishonest, it is
disappointing that it is ranked lower than other factors.
What friends and work-mates thought were the factors least of the
respondents strongly agreed would influence them (65 per cent and 60 per
cent respectively).
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Table 6.04
Factors that would influence employees if contemplating
dishonesty
Factor Percentage of respondents
strongly agreeing this factor
would influence them
Personal standards of honesty 83
The thought of getting a criminal record 79
The possible effect on my family 76
The thought of losing my job 70
What my friends thought 65
What my work-mates thought 60
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A question that suggests itself is whether these factors are influenced by
the respondent's familiarity with dishonesty. Do those in the combined
measure of I employees who knew people in their situation sometimes
stole cash, stock or via discounts' rate these factors differently?
As can be seen in table 6.05, the factors are ranked by those who knew of
dishonesty in the same order as by other employees, but the proportion
agreeing they would be strongly influenced by each factor was between
eight per cent and 31 per cent lower than for those who did not know of
dishonesty. The greatest difference was for the factors: 'what friends
thought' and 'what workmates thought'. This is not entirely surprisingly
if they knew people in their situation were acting dishonestly, then they
would be less likely to see them as a deterrent factor.
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Table 6.05
Factors that would influence employees if contemplating
dishonesty related to knowledge of dishonesty
Factor Percentage of respondents
strongly agreeing this factor
would influence them
Knew of Did not know
dishonesty of dishonesty
Personal standards of honesty 75% 85%
The thought of getting a criminal record 74% 80%
The possible effect on my family 68% 78%
The thought of losing my job 60% 73%
What my friends thought 52% 68%
What my work-mates thought 48% 63%
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When broken down into four age groups (figure 6.04), the most important
factor is effect on family for employees over 41 years old (with 83 per cent
of the group agreeing strongly that this factor would influence them). The
general trend is for younger staff to be less likely to be influenced by any
of the factors, but there are substantial differences between the factors.
The thought of getting a criminal record is a similarly strong influence on
all age groups of respondents with only three percentage points dividing
the top and bottom of the scale.
The effect dishonesty could have on their family is a much less strong
influence on younger staff, and a much stronger influence on the oldest
staff, a strong influence on the 21 to 27 and 28 to 41 age groups. This
seems to suggest that employees are more affected by the impact
dishonesty by them would have on their family when they think of their
children, rather than when they consider the effect on their parents. To a
certain extent, this is born out by comparing married and unmarried staff
with regard to this factor. Whereas 82 per cent of married staff strongly
agreed that they would be influenced by the effect on their family, the
same was true of only 74 per cent of unmarried staff. However, the
breakdown by age shows a more marked effect than this, and only for
younger staff. So, it is more likely that young staff are both uninfluenced
by the effect on their parents, and less likely to have a young family
themselves whom they want to portray a conventionally positive role
model for.
Though less strong an influence than the effect on family, the thought of
losing their job is reported as a similarly strong influence by all age groups
except young staff. Employees in the 16 to 20 year old age group clearly
do not believe they have as much invested in their careers as older staff.
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Figure 6.04
Relationship between age and deterrent factors: percentage
in each age group strongly agreeing this factor would
influence them
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This effect is not just a product of length of service however. (It is not just
that younger employees are likely to have a lower length of service.)
Recent joiners (six month's service or less) generally agreed strongly that
losing their job would influence them - 71 per cent in this length of service
group reporting strong agreement. (See table A.05 in Annexe A.)
What would be thought of them by friends and work-mates were factors
that operated in a similar way. The younger the age group, the fewer
strongly influenced by these factors. For the youngest age group, the
influence of friends is as influential as the risk of losing their job.
Before any of these deterrent factors can have any impact, the employee
needs to be caught. The risk of being caught is going to be a primary
deterrent. As can be seen from table 6.06 below, relatively few employees
believe they could get away with dishonesty (i.e. gave Idisagree' or
'disagree strongly' in response to statements that they would be caught if
they took each of the actions). Even for the least risky type of dishonesty
given, only 11 per cent of the respondents thought that they could get
away with it.
In terms of ranking, taking stock home was seen as the least risky,
followed by handing stock out without full payment, and then stealing
cash.
If these three questions are combined and the categories collapsed into just
those who disagreed and those who did not disagree, then this identifies
171 respondents, or 15 per cent who disagreed that they would be caught
for at least one of these types of dishonesty. Comparing this new measure
with broad categories of age (as shown in figure 6.06 below, and table A.07
in Annexe A) shows that the perception of the risk of getting caught varies
with age.
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Table 6.06
Percentage of employees reporting believing they would be
caught if undertaking particular types of dishonesty
I would be caught if I were to ... Disagree
Number %
take home stock without authorization 125 11
give stock to someone without full payment 81 7
steal cash from the store 63 6
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Figure 6.07
Relationship between age and perceived risk of being caught
for dishonesty: percentage in each age group disagreeing
they would be caught in anyone of the three categories of
dishonesty
•
299
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
A higher proportion of younger staff believed that they would not be
caught for dishonesty.
A different impression is given by the figures on length of service. Figure
6.08 below shows the percentages who disagreed they would be caught
broken down by length of service groups. The confidence in being able to
evade systems seems to be a product of age, not lack of experience of the
company.
From these variations it seems that new starters are least confident of
avoiding being caught (eight per cent disagreed they would be caught),
but as employees have been with the company longer, and learn more
about the way the company works they are more likely to think that they
would be able to get away with dishonesty. The peak percentage thinking
they could avoid being caught are those with one to five years' service (18
per cent). The percentage then reduces progressively for those with six to
ten years' service and the 11 to 15 years' service group. However, the
small number of staff with over 15 years' service (those who probably
have the best knowledge of company systems) are most confident they
could escape detection.
The group least likely to be deterred by the risk of getting caught, then, are
those who are relatively young and yet have not only just joined the
company. Among the group with one to five years' service, aged under
21, nearly a quarter (23.1 per cent) disagreed that they would get caught.
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Figure 6.08
Relationship between length of service and perceived risk of
being caught for dishonesty: percentage in each length of
service group disagreeing they would be caught in anyone of
the three categories of dishonesty
27'/0
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Resentment
The survey asked about the respondent's attitude to their job. Looking in
table 6.07 below, the percentage of respondents who disagreed with the
statements about job satisfaction (the 'disagree' category plus the 'strongly
disagree' category) it is clear that there are significant levels of resentment
among staff in relation to some aspects of their job.
Almost half the employees responding to the survey felt that they were
sometimes not fairly rewarded for the hours they put in, and nearly a
quarter could not agree that they were fairly treated by the company
generally. However, there was greater appreciation of local management
- only 16 per cent did not agree that their line manager treated them well.
General job satisfaction was high - with only eight per cent not enjoying
their job - and very few, one per cent, who could not agree that they got
on well with other staff.
This situation, where there is strong social cohesion between the staff, but
many have feelings of being poorly treated by the company, and
inequitably rewarded for the work they put in, would seem to be a very
poor environment to foster honesty.
Figure 6.09 below shows that the most common potential cause of
resentment - the feeling that work is not always fairly rewarded - is not
equally distributed by length of service.
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Table 6.07
Respondents reporting dissatisfaction
Factor Disagreed
Number Percentage of
all
respondents
I'm always rewarded fairly for the hours I put in 549 49
I'm well treated by the company 263 24
I'm well treated by my line manager 176 16
I enjoy my job 86 8
I get on well with other staff 14 1
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Figure 6.09
Relationship of sometimes feeling unfairly rewarded by
length of service
70% r--·····-···-----····..-··-·--·-·--·..----·---- ..---·-·---- ..-._-- ..-.- -- _- - - - - _ ..
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Figure 6.10
Relationship between sometimes not feeling fairly rewarded
and age
54% r····················································· . . .... \
I
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As was found by Hollinger and Clark, it takes time to become dissatisfied,
and the contracts made by new starters are generally seen as equitable by
them. The peak length of service for those who did not agree they were
always fairly rewarded for the work they put in was the six to ten year
length of service group.
A similar pattern is shown when relating this measure of dissatisfaction
with age of the respondent. Those in the youngest age group were less
likely to report disagreement with being fairly rewarded than those who
are in the 21 to 27 age group or the 28 to 41 age group. It was the oldest
category that had the least dissatisfied employees.
Having established these levels of resentment among staff and identified
how they differ between different groups, the next issue to address is
whether they affect the honesty. Other studies (Hollinger and Clark, 1982
and Greenberg, 1994b) have established in the laboratory and through
self-report studies that there is a relationship between dishonesty and
resentment. Are their findings supported by this work?
It has to be recognised that this survey cannot be as effective a test of the
relationship between dishonesty and job satisfaction as Greenberg's or
Hollinger and Clark's work. This is because the dependent variable used
here is not as clear-cut as laboratory observation, or self-reported
dishonesty. The variable used here is whether the respondents attributed
dishonesty to others in the same position as themselves. A low view of the
company and its management may lead to them to be suspicious of their
colleagues' motives for working within the company. Of course there is
no proof of any causal relationship that believing that their colleagues are
dishonest may be resulting inemployees being dissatisfied with the
company or their manager.
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With these 'health warnings' made, it can be noted that there are
significant but weak positive correlations between the job satisfaction
responses and the honesty of employee responses. (The full details are
given in table A.08 in Annexe A.) The strongest correlation in this group
is between 'getting on well with other staff', and 'not taking products
home without authorisation' (0.28). The most consistent correlations are
for the general 'I enjoy my job' variable (over 0.2 in every case). If the
cases are filtered by age group then the correlations are marginally
stronger for the 21 to 27 age group than they are for the 16 to 20 age group
(but still do not exceed 0.3).
A1anagerinteg7ity
The standards of integrity set by the managers could be expected to have a
significant effect on the standards of other staff. Itwould I think be hoped
by senior management within the company that employees would see
managers in the branches as having higher standards than the rest of the
staff. However, as can be seen from table 6.08 below this was not the case.
In terms of both property and production deviance, a significant
proportion of the respondents were either prepared to disagree with the
view that their managers never undertook dishonest actions (which I
would interpret as knowing of dishonesty), or could not agree strongly that
they would not take these actions (which I would interpret as suspecting
dishonesty). Using this interpretation of the 'agree' category (as opposed
to the' agree strongly' category), the percentages suspecting that their
managers did not have the highest standards of integrity ranged from
over two thirds of staff who at least suspected their managers of taking
more time off than they were entitled to, to just under a third who
suspected that they borrow money from the company.
The percentage of employees who disagreed with the manager statements
are greater than the number who disagreed with the statements about
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employees in the same situation as the respondent. Table 6.09 below
compares the two measures, and represents the difference between them
as a percentage.
308
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Table 6.08
Respondents' report of manager integrity
My managers never ... Percentage Percentage
disagree agree, but not
strongly
take more time off than entitled to 23 44
give special discounts to their friends 11 46
or relations
make personal use of company 9 44
property
take surplus free gifts home 9 38
give special discounts to themselves 6 41
take home products without 3 39
authorisation
borrow money from the company 1 31
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Table 6.09
Comparison of reported integrity of 'people in my situation'
and reported integrity of managers
Action Percentage Percentage Difference
disagree disagree (Percentage
managers people like difference
between
never do them never
percentage
this do this attributing this
action to
managers and
to people like
them)
take home products without 3.3 1.2 165
authorisation
make personal use of company 9.4 6.4 48
property
take surplus free gifts home 8.7 7.0 24
take more time off than entitled to 22.9 18.8 22
give special discounts to their 11.4 9.7 18
friends or relations
borrow money from the company 1.0 1.2 -20
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It is difficult to interpret these results as straightforwardly reflecting a
greater likelihood that managers steal from the company.
The discrepancy may represent a measure of theoretical' opportunity' in
that the highest disparity is on measures where the managers have more
opportunity than staff to undertake them. Managers are able to take
products or free gifts with less chance of being challenged, and have far
more access to company property that they could make personal use of
than staff. The challenge to this view is why respondents were more likely
to see their colleagues borrowing money from the company than the
managers. It is perhaps that they interpreted this as simply stealing cash
from the tills, something that managers, because they are less often taking
cash, have less opportunity to do.
The effect may represent ill feeling towards managers. If they feel ill
treated by managers, staff may be more inclined to attribute dishonesty to
them. There is some evidence to support this view from the significant,
though weak, correlations (between 0.31 and 0.38) between the attitude to
job variable 'I am well treated by my line manager' and the measures of
manager honesty. (See table A.09 in Annexe A.) However, there are much
stronger correlations (from 0.48 to 0.80) between the measures themselves
- and that suggests to me that this is more a case of picking up evidence
that employees think their managers are dishonest, than of finding a
measure of satisfaction with managers in general.
The values for the most dishonest actions, taking stock home or borrowing
money, are still relatively low, however, given the proportion of managers
who are dismissed for dishonesty. This suggests that employees who
knew of dishonesty among their colleagues were less likely to return the
survey. The discrepancy could then be accounted for by employees who
knew of manager dishonesty being more likely to return the form than
employees who knew of dishonesty among other employees.
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The next issue to address is whether there is a relationship between
opinions of manager honesty and opinions of employee honesty. There
are significant and quite strong correlations between the two sets of
variables. (They range between 0.26 and 0.49 - see table A.OB in Annexe A
for details.) It is interesting to note that these correlations are stronger
than correlations between job satisfaction and honesty.
Attitude to customers
If there is a relationship between' conscientiousness' and all other aspects
of integrity, then the integrity of relationships with customers is worth
investigating. Perhaps there is a 'barrow boy' culture encouraged among
sales staff, and this lower 'moral tone' in the store then has a detrimental
effect on personal honesty. As can be seen in the table below, there is no
evidence for this. The employees profess thoroughly conscientious
attitudes to the integrity of their contacts with customers. The percentage
who disagreed they met service standards was lower than those who
disagreed their colleagues met some of the honesty standards. Twice as
great a proportion of respondents disagreed that people in their situation
misused discounts, than could bring themselves to disagree with the
statement that they never said anything untrue about the goods they sell.
In part, this can, of course, be explained by the more challenging form of
the question. It asks what the employees themselves do, not what the more
distant 'people in my situation' would do. As with the issue of personal
honesty the mirroring questions about managers elicited a more negative
response than the questions about staff.
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Table 6.10
Comparison of reported integrity of 'people in my situation'
and reported integrity of managers
Percentage of
respondents
Measure Disagree Agree, but
not
strongly
I never say anything about the goods I sell which 5 39
isn't true
It matters what I say to a customer more than 3 31
whether I make a sale*
I always keep my promises to customers 2 54
* The actual question and responses were in a negative format. The actual question was: 'It does not matter
what [ say to a customer as long as [ make a sale'. The titles for the headings should be of 'Agree', 'Disagree
but not strongly', and 'Total not disagreeing strongly'. The questions and answers have been made positive
in order to make percentages consistent with the other categories and the table therefore easier to read.
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Table 6.11
Comparison of reported integrity of 'people in my situation'
and reported integrity of managers
Percentage of
respondents
Measure Disagree Agree, but
not
strongly
My managers care what I say to customers more 14 40
than whether I make a sale*
My managers always insist I keep my promises to 8 54
customers
My managers insist I never say anything untrue 9 47
about goods
• The actual question and responses were in a negative format. The actual question was: 'My managers do
not care what I say to a customer so long as [ make as sale'. The titles for the headings should be of'Agree',
'Disagree but not strongly', and 'Total not disagreeing strongly'. The valances of the questions and answers
have been reversed to make percentages consistent with the other categories.
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It is the ranking as well as the strength of the responses that has changed.
The respondents most commonly showed their failings as saying things
that weren't true about the goods, then putting sales before honesty, and
the fewest of them disagreed they broke their word to customers. They
rank the managers' failings as most commonly putting sales before
honesty, and then breaking promises to customers, then misrepresenting
the goods. This seems to display some employees seeing management
integrity to customers in a cynical light: the most important thing is not to
break trading standards, then not to lose customers goodwill, but beyond
that making sales comes first.
As can be seen from tables A.11 and A.12 in Annexe A, there are
significant (but weak) correlations between the measures of integrity in
customer relations and the honesty respondents perceived in their
colleagues. Though they are similar, it is the correlations between
manager integrity in relation to customers and the honesty of staff that are
strongest. The most consistently high being associated with managers
who insist staff never say anything untrue about the goods they sell.
So there is support for the view that managers who create a climate of
integrity in relationships with customers also have fewer dishonest staff.
Effect of training
A key objective of the survey was to investigate the effect of the training.
Unfortunately the key variable - whether the respondents actually saw the
video - was a victim of poor survey design, and was not responded to very
well. The survey was in two waves, one before, and one after the video
was distributed. However, previous studies have shown that only around
60 per cent of employees get to see a video distributed in this way. We can
be sure that all those in wave one did not see the video, but we can expect
that around 40 per cent of those in wave two missed it as well. Only 70 of
the 690 respondents in wave two could be identified from their answer as
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having definitely seen the video. This does not mean that only ten per
cent of staff saw the video. It is just that this was one of only two non-
tickbox questions, and few employees filled it in at all. So we have three
categories of respondent: those who definitely did not see the video, those
who may have seen it, and those who definitely did see it.
An essential aim of the video was to increase the perception of the risk of
being caught amongst employees. So, it would be hoped that after seeing
the video employees would be more likely to agree that if they were
dishonest they would be caught.
As can be seen in table 6.12 below this was generally true. (The full cross
tabulation forms table A.13 in Annexe A.)
The proportion of respondents who thought they could get away with
dishonesty reduced with the certainty that they had seen the video. A
thirty seven per cent lower proportion of those who saw the video felt
they could get away with dishonesty. Clearly if this effect were to be
representative and the risk of getting caught the only factor affecting
honesty, and thus the video caused a 37 per cent reduction in dishonesty it
would represent a considerable return on investment.
316
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Table 6.12
Respondents who believed they would not be caught if they
were dishonest grouped by whether they had watched the
prevention video
Percentage of respondents
Did not May have Did see
see the seen the the
video video video
Disagreed they would be caught
for at least one type of 16.2 15.5 10.0
dishonesty
317
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Summary and review of survey findings
Very few employees disagreed with positive statements about the honesty
of employees in the same situation as themselves. This I interpret as
meaning that very few employees 'knew' that people in their situation
were dishonest. However, I have interpreted not being prepared to 'agree
strongly' with positive statements about honesty as 'suspecting'
dishonesty (though I accept that this interpretation could be disputed.)
Interpreting not selecting the 'strong agreement' cagegory in this way,
then depending on the severity of the dishonesty, between 28 per cent and
63 per cent of employees suspected it.
The findings supported the view from the offender analysis that younger
employees with less time in the company are more dishonest. The effect
was not as marked as is suggested by the detection records. However, the
figures indicate more dishonesty among older staff than are represented in
the profile of staff we catch being dishonest. Similarly employees with
relatively long lengths of service suspected that more staff like themselves
steal than are accounted for by staff caught.
There was very little geographical variation in the proportions of staff
suspecting their colleagues were dishonest - the north of England was
marginally higher.
Personal standards of honesty, the thought of getting a criminal record
and the effect on family were the factors that most people agreed would
influence them if they considered dishonesty, but there were variations by
age group. Although getting a criminal record influences staff of all ages
the effect on family influences the youngest staff less than it does other age
groups. Similarly, the possibility of losing their job has less influence on
the youngest staff than it has on other staff. The reaction of friends and
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workmates is least influential and becomes progressively stronger with
age group across all groups.
Relatively few employees thought they could get away with dishonesty.
The range was from 11 per cent who thought they could get away with
taking stock, through to six per cent who thought they could steal cash.
Generally, younger employees with longer service were more likely to
think they could get away with it. (Almost a quarter, 23 per cent, of those
in the group with one to five years' service and aged under 21.)
There are significant levels of dissatisfaction among staff. (Nearly half
disagreed that they were always fairly rewarded for the hours they put
in.) Job satisfaction is correlated with honesty.
More employees disagree that managers are honest, than disagree that
people in their situation are honest, and manager honesty is correlated
with honesty.
Employees see managers as showing less integrity in relation to customer
relations than they do, and manager integrity in customer relationships is
correlated with honesty.
There is evidence that the video was a successful crime prevention
measure. A thirty-seven per cent lower proportion of staff thought that
they could get away with dishonesty after seeing the video.
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(7) CASE STUDY: THE EFFECT OF INTERVENTION
This section investigates the extent to which the effect of the interventions
which were instigated following the offender analysis can be identified and
measured.
Problems of measurement
Whilst the company was anxious to adopt an information-led programme
of action to prevent employee dishonesty it proved impossible to get a
commitment to establishing' experimental conditions' to measure the
effect of interventions. If there seemed potential for a saving through the
introduction of a measure, there was little enthusiasm for limiting the
saving by not introducing it into a 'control' area so that the effect of the
intervention could be measured. This problem was exacerbated by the
length of time required before results could have been known. A store
would have to be stock audited to identify losses accurately, and the
normal cycle for that is nine months. As a result, if recommendations for
prevention arising from the research were adopted then they were
implemented immediately and across the board.
This lack of a 'control' group meant that it was only comparison of
measures 'before and after' the intervention that could be used for
measurement of success. However this approach was made difficult
because a number of measures were introduced at different times
independently. This made it impossible to identify accurately the effect of
particular interventions. Itwould be difficult to be sure that an effect is
the immediate impact of one measure and not the delayed effect of
another.
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As had been mentioned earlier, the main impact of staff dishonesty is on
stock losses (identified through stock audits). It had been hoped that the
project would at least show a measurable gross impact in the rate of loss of
stock. This is always difficult to be sure about, of course, because the stock
loss also includes other unidentified stock losses - those resulting from
customer theft, administrative problems, and delivery problems - as well
as those resulting from undetected employee theft. However, in this case
it became very much more greatly problematical because a new computer
system introduced to the distribution system created accounting errors in
stock records between the warehouse and the store. As the movements of
stock were all internal, the overall impact on company accounting was
negligible, but at a detailed level it meant that losses were not necessarily
shown at the point in the system where they had actually occurred. This
in turn meant it was impossible to be confident about individual audit
results representing the impact of initiatives targeted at the retail units.
Figure 7.01 below shows the trend in audit losses as a ratio to sales over
the study period. (In order to obscure the actual losses, which are
commercially sensitive, whilst allowing the trend to be plotted, the scale
represents an index proportionate to the actual figures but not revealing
them.) Expressing the losses as a percentage of sales is the accepted
measure within retailing. It gives a better indication than is provided by
mapping the actual values because it counteracts the effect of the growth
in the business - increased numbers of shops and more employees
represent a greater opportunity for losses. Within the business studied,
the percentage of sales measure also counteracts the effects of the audit
schedule. Stores are audited at only approximately similar intervals on a
rolling program. Actual values of loss each month are affected by whether
large or small turnover stores are included in that month's schedule of
audits. Expressing all the losses as an aggregated ratio to turnover
counteracts these effects.
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Figure 7.01
Trend in stock audit losses over the project period
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There were no changes to the auditing procedures or accounting rules or
systems that would alter the audit results in the time period, and the
downward trend in the ratio of losses to sales is therefore a significant
improvement to the business. It would be very attractive to attribute this
substantial reduction in losses to the impact of the project. However, it is
clear that there are problems with the figures.
The company trades through a number of different chains - each with a
slightly different offering within the electrical goods market. Some entire
chains go below zero losses and into negative figures - that means they are
showing a surplus. Given that retail sites do not manufacture stock this
identifies that there are accounting discrepancies here, and indeed much
of the reduction in losses established over this period was balanced by an
increase in losses recorded at the warehouse end.
Against this background it is difficult to establish how much of the
reduction in losses was attributable directly to a reduction in employee
dishonesty, which is galling because it is very probable that the success of
the interventions is represented there. All that can be established from
these figures is that it is very unlikely that staff dishonesty increased
during the period studied.
Investigating effect on detection records
Another method of investigating the effect of the project was to look at the
impact it had on the numbers and types of employees being detected after
the project started, compared with the situation at the start of the project.
There are two problems with this approach.
The first is that because of the relationship between prevention and
detection of employee dishonesty any change in the number of offenders
may be interpreted both positively and negatively. (It could be said that
the retail security manager is in a fortunate position of being able to put a
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positive 'spin' on any change.) For example an increase in the number of
offenders in a particular grouping detected may be interpreted as a
success because targeting has improved the number of offenders being
caught. Alternatively if the number of offenders detected in any grouping
goes down, then this can be interpreted as reflecting a reduction in the
prevalence of this type of offending, and therefore a success for
prevention.
The second issue is that when the sample represented by detected
employees is so small there is a terrific opportunity for a prejudice on the
part of those detecting dishonesty to have a significant impact on
detection rates without there actually being any change in the underlying
characteristics of dishonesty.
Evaluation within the study period
The difficulties of interpretation may be illustrated by focusing on the
detection rate figures as they appeared within the study period.
Stock was taken of the current position in August 1998. The Data from
January 1998 to then was compared with the equivalent period in the
previous financial year. In this period there had been 135 employees
detected as dishonest, and in the same period the year before there had
been 115. This represented a growth from 0.6 per cent of all employees to
0.7 per cent.
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Figure 7.02
Changes in proportion of offenders detected by
personnel group
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One significant change noticed at this time was the increase in the
proportion of casual payroll employees who were detected for dishonesty.
In the study period overall, the proportion of casual staff detected for
dishonesty was slightly lower than the main payroll retail employee
group. Figure 7.02 below demonstrates that underlying this figure there
was a changing situation. 0.5 per cent of casual retail staff had left the
company following dishonesty in the previous year, but that had
increased to 1.2 per cent at this point.
The detection records showed that 71 per cent of the casual payroll
employees who had been caught this year had been caught stealing stock
(half of them in simple 'walk out' cases). It seemed clear that the new
initiatives to counter stock theft, particularly the search wands, were
having the effect of increasing the proportion of this group of employees
who were caught.
It had never seemed realistic that the casual employees, who could be
presumed to have a lower commitment to the good of the company were
less likely to be dishonest. It seemed more probable that they simply had
a better chance of avoiding detection because they tended to leave at times
that meant that they were less likely to be subject to the controls that
regular staff were subject to. The introduction of tighter controls seemed
to have improved this situation, and that meant that a greater proportion
of them was caught.
In one sense then, this year-on-year change can be seen as a success.
However, the real aim of the interventions was to deter employees, not to
catch them. A clear message from the detection records was that the
previous search regime was not a deterrent. It was hoped that the search
wands would lead to increased searching which would deter employees
from risking walking out with stock.
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Figure 7.03 shows that the relationship of gender with the detection
records had remained fairly constant. (The increase in the proportion of
both male and female dishonesty between the two years' data results from
the overall increase in the proportion of employees caught.) Male
employees still have a considerably higher proportion of their number
detected as dishonest. None of the interventions were targeted at
changing this relationship. However, itwas hoped that by changing the
profile of employees who were recruited into the business the number of
higher-risk employees could be reduced, and therefore the number of
cases of dishonesty reduced. With the higher risk among male employees
still showing itself to be a factor, and yet the proportion of employees
overall arrested higher than the previous year, there is evidence that the
policy was not successful.
A similar story is told by figures 7.04 and 7.05. Young employees, and
new starters are considerably more likely to be detected as dishonest as
they had been the year before. However, underlying these figures we find
that the proportion of female retail employees had not changed since the
year before and the number of employees under the age of 21 had actually
increased from 22 per cent of the workforce to 25 per cent of the
workforce. The crime prevention aim in recruitment policy had been
overwhelmed by other factors associated with recruitment, and had
simply not worked.
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Figure 7.03
Changes in proportion of offenders detected by
gender
0.90%
Male
DThis Year
.LastYear
Female
0.16%
0.00% 0.20% 0.40% 0.60% 0.80% 1.00%
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Figure 7.04
Changes in proportion of offenders detected by
age
51 - 55 0.00% DThis Year
0.00% • Last Year46 - 50
41 -45 0.36%
36 -40 0.35%
31 - 35
26 - 30 0.97%
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Figure 7.05
Changes in proportion of offenders detected by length of
service
20 years or more
16 - 20 years
01 - 05 years •••••• 0.60%0.60%
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There was no reduction in the proportion of 'high-risk' employees, so we
should not be surprised that there was no reduction in the actual numbers
detected. The fact that the proportion of young new starters detected has
increased seems to relate to the impact the interventions instigated have
had on the types of dishonesty detected.
This is illustrated in figure 7.06, which shows the changes in types of
dishonesty detected as a proportion of all dishonesty detected.
The big changes have been in the stock theft offences against which
interventions were targeted. Detected walk out theft has increased from
22 per cent of detected dishonesty last year (25 offenders) to 36 per cent (48
offenders). Rubbish-drop theft has increased from four per cent (5
offenders) to nine per cent (12 offenders).
Though the interventions may have had a deterrent effect they have
clearly increased the number of detections. The supposition formed from
looking at the increased figures for detections (in absolute terms and as a
percentage of all detections) is confirmed by the individual detection
records. For example, the three extracts given below show how the clear
rubbish bags and new 24-hour door alarms resulted in detections.
Extract from record 32386
... [5] was putting rubbish out. [M], manager walked past him in the warehouse
and informed him that the rubbish should be put out in clear bags and not black
ones as he was using ... [W], warehouse manager became suspicious and after
[5] was back in the warehouse he checked the rubbish. Inside the black bag was
the car stereo ...
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Extract from record 106364
[M], manager went out to the rubbish bins to look for a fax that had been thrown
away. Whilst she was doing this she noticed a Sainsbury's bag inside one of the
clear plastic bags. [M] checked inside and found the empty box for the hands
free kit. ..
Extract from record 12946
At 1340hrs on 21/02/97 the fire exit door at the top left hand side of the store was
opened which set off an alarm. [W], security and [M], manager, ran down
towards the area and found [S], on work experience, in the area. [8] denied
opening the fire exit door and said he'd fallen against it. [M] then found a
[product] placed outside the fire exit door which [8] admitted to placing there ...
The employees most commonly detected perpetrating rubbish drop and
walk out thefts are young and relatively recent starters. By increasing
detections in these types of offence, the interventions have had the result
of increasing the proportion of employees detected in these categories.
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Figure 7.06
Changes in proportion of offenders detected by
type of dishonesty (percentage of offenders represented by
top seven categories)
DThis Year
• Last Year
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It is possible that enhancements to recruitment policy did actually have an
impact on the actual levels of dishonesty by new starters. However, the
increased detections resulting from the search wand, door alarm and clear
rubbish bag initiatives swamped their effect in terms of detection rates
among new starters. This inter-relatedness among effects in terms of
detection rates is, of course, another reason why it is not very good as a
method of evaluating initiatives.
It is possible, on the other hand, that the detection rates do display the
effect of a prevention initiative. A number of measures (a training
initiative, briefings to area managers and personnel officers, and
workshops to help administration staff reduce the opportunities for fraud)
had targeted the issue of the high proportion of general managers who
had been the subject of dishonesty cases. It can be seen from figure 7.06,
which shows the proportions of employees detected in rank groupings,
that the proportion of general managers detected had fallen considerably
against the previous year from one per cent of managers being found
dishonest to 0.3 per cent. (A drop from nine offenders down to three.) As
the measures were all aimed at prevention and not increased detection,
the reduction seems to represent a successful outcome. (Though it has to
be acknowledged that the numbers are too small to be sure of the
significance of the finding.)
In response to the level of collusion in credit application fraud, improved
procedures were written into the operations manual and a mailing was
sent to all staff. (This was also followed up by improved exception
reporting of anomalies in credit agreements raised.) These measures
seemed to have had the desired deterrent effect. There was a 66 per cent
reduction in the number of staff caught.
The 28 per cent reduction in the number of detected refund frauds also
seemed to represent a prevention success. The administrator workshops
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had specifically targeted improving the controls countering this type of
crime.
Keeping check on the detection figures did, therefore, give some pointers
to the effect of the interventions put in place. However, as has been seen it
is difficult to attribute outcomes accurately.
A summary of the assessment at this point in the project is given in table
7.06 below.
335
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Figure 7.06
Changes in proportion of offenders detected by
rank
WAREHOUSE
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Table 7.01
Summary of outcomes
Problem Intervention Result Notes
Walk out 100%search with Improved detection 92% increase in staff caught
theft wands in all stores
Refund Administrator's No recent progress 28% reduction in staff
fraud workshops caught. (New indicators not
developed.)
Collusion in Exception reporting. Deterrent effect 66% reduction in staff
credit fraud Improved operating continues - fewer caught
manual instructions caught
Rubbish Clear rubbish bags, Improved detection 140% increase in staff
drop theft enhanced door - caught more caught. (Alarms and clear
alarms and labelling
bags are catching them)
Crime by Increased focus Effect masked by 96% increase in staff with
young & during recruitment increased detection less than 7 month's service
and 124% increase in staff
recent
less than 21 years old
joiners
Crime by Revised training. Improved deterrent - 66% reduction in general
managers Increased awareness caught less managers caught
among personnel
and area managers
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Review after the study period
Although it is difficult to be confident about the effect of interventions on
the detection rates at a particular point towards the end of the intial
project period, it is now possible to look at the trend over a longer period.
Figure 7.07 below shows the overall trend in detections as a percentage of
employees in the company from January 1997 (a year after the start of the
main study period) through to April of 2000. To avoid the significant
seasonal changes in staffing, the moving annual total figures are given -
that is the aggregate for the year to the month shown in the scale. (The
first figure, then, represents the total for the first year of the study period.)
The main initiatives introduced as a result of the project are overlaid on to
the chart at the time they occurred (or had been fully implemented). As
can be seen the detection rate for retail employees remains fairly constant
over the whole period. From this chart it does not seem that four years of
focus on the problem of employee dishonesty has had much impact.
Nonetheless, the rate of detection of Christmas temporary staff increases
considerably in the first year. This may represent a positive impact of the
project. The detection rate increases to a similar level to that for the main
retail employees. Given that the rate of offending is very unlikely to be
lower among the less committed temporary employees taken on for
Christmas, the increase is likely to represent an increase in the detection
rate rather than an increase in the underlying level of dishonesty. On the
other hand, the increase happens before roll out of interventions such as
search wands and door labelling had reached all stores. Although some
sites had all these measures at this time, they were not in all stores for
another nine months. In part the increased emphasis on preventing
employee dishonesty may have resulted in the increase in detection.
However, the key initiative at that time was the introduction of more
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rigorous security components of the induction training - which should
have had a deterrent effect. It is true of course, that the instructions to all
managers telling them to ensure all the Christmas temps went through the
training may have increased their awareness of the potential problem and
their vigilance. In addition to this the number of temps used as the basis
for the calculation is only an approximation. So the effect may merely
represent more Christmas temps than normal being taken on. In short, it
is difficult to interpret this in terms of interventions taken.
Another change in the trend that is more likely to represent a success of
the interventions taken is the reduction in the number of non-payroll
employees detected. These workers are predominantly cleaning and
maintenance staff. Again the numbers are estimates, but the change in
detection rates did start after the introduction of search wands, door
alarms, and clear rubbish bags were complete. Before these measures
were in place it was considerably more difficult for managers to manage
the risk represented by these ancillary workers. However, as the measures
came in the detection rate for these staff grew substantially and then fell
back again. It is reasonable to interpret this as increased detection giving
way to an improved deterrent effect after the measures had become
established. However, the detection rate falls back only to the level it was
at before the start of the project. It is possible that this means that the
measures have not had an overall deterrent effect, and that the underlying
level of dishonesty is as it was. As the search wands and other measures
make the risk of being caught so much higher it could be argued that the
current rate represents a greater proportion being caught from a lower
population of dishonest workers. Without any direct measure of the
underlying rate of dishonesty it is impossible to tell.
The trend in detections for the total of the main retail payroll groups
(labelled 'total retail' in figure 7.07) seems to show no discernible impact
from the initiative at all. (The level of detection as a percentage of the
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workforce remains fairly constant throughout the study period and into
the longer evaluation period afterwards.) Looking at specific sub-sets of
the detection figures tells a different story, and does show that the
initiatives did have an impact.
Figure 7.08 picks out the trend for just those offenders detected for
collusion in credit fraud. (It plots moving annual total (MAT) values, i.e.
the sum for a complete year to the end of each financial period shown.) It
declines consistently from the time the intervention was put in place to a
very low level. This seems clear evidence that the intervention had a
significant effect. It has not been possible to identify any other changes
that would affect this type of dishonesty over this period. The effect of the
pamphlet to all employees will now have dissipated almost entirely
(employee turnover means that only a small proportion of those
employees who received the pamphlet are still with the company). This
means that it is the changes to the instructions in the operations manual
that are having the current deterrent effect. Consequently the continued
marked reduction in credit fraud collusion suggests that the lack of clear
instructions on the issue acted as considerable facilitator for this type of
dishonesty.
A similar story is told by figure 7.09, which picks out those detected for
'rubbish drop' theft. The increase in detections, which was identified in
the year-an-year figures from the intermediary analysis discussed
previously, shows itself to be a temporary effect. The rate of detection for
this type of offence, though it shows a 'spike' as the measures were
introduced, has reduced consistently afterwards. The initial increase in
detections resulting from the measures seem to have been followed by a
deterrent effect (to which, perhaps, the increase in detections contributed).
Detections are now at their lowest level for several years.
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Figure 7.07
Moving annual total trend in detections as a proportion of all
employees
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Figure 7.08
MAT trend in detections for collusion in credit fraud as a
proportion of all employees
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Figure 7.09
Moving annual total trend in detections for rubbish drop
theft as a proportion of all employees
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The survey of employee attitudes gave some evidence of the effectiveness
of the new video as a deterrent. Further evidence is to be found from
looking at the rate of detection of dishonesty among its principal target
audience, new starters.
Figure 7.10 picks out the trend in detections among new starters as a
proportion of all new starters. (New starters are defined as those who had
joined a year or less before the date of their offence.) The appropriate base
data is the moving annual total of the monthly number who joined the
company - but because most employees are taken on before Christmas,
this does not provide a smooth base, so the figures are instead the average
of these figures for the year. They show the average of the MAT number
of new starters for the year centred on the financial period shown.
The trend against this smoothed curve for the number of new starters
shows an increase in the proportion of dishonesty detected among new
starters before the video was available. After the introduction of the new
training video it falls again. This decline in the rate of detection of new
starters is very likely to represent a deterrent effect resulting from
showing the video to all new starters from the time that the video became
available. It will have a relationship to the deterrent effect from the
rubbish drop measures too, however. Rubbish drop theft showed itself to
be a favourite method of theft among new starters, so a decline in rubbish
drop theft being detected will also contribute to a reduction in the
proportion of new starters who are caught. And the corollary is, of course,
also true: the deterrent effect of the new video on new starters will result
in fewer detections for rubbish drop theft.
The interventions also had an impact on the way that employees were
caught. Figure 7.11 shows the proportion of all employees who were
detected for dishonesty through being caught 'red-handed'. When
interventions targeting stock theft (the new alarms, the clear rubbish bags
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and the new search wands) were newly in place there was an increase in
the relative numbers of employees caught 'red-handed'. This has declined
since then, and there are now very many fewer employees caught in this
way.
This feature has a number of implications. Firstly it reinforces the
deterrent effect of the measures. When the measures were introduced
they' caught out' more people and this type of detection went up. The fact
that this is not happening any more suggests that the measures are
understood and are deterring staff from these simple methods of theft.
However, another consequence is that dishonest employees are more
difficult to detect. However, the continued similar level of detection
overall suggests that this has not interfered with the ability of the
investigative staff to detect and process dishonesty. It suggests that the
'amateurs' have been deterred from offending and that the investigation
and detection resources are being targeted at more serious offenders - one
of the aims of the way deterrents were targeted.
Looking at the MAT value of losses associated with the offenders detected
can show a similar effect. Figure 7.12 shows the estimated annual value of
loss prevented by detecting offenders. The value is an estimate that takes
into account the value associated with the incident or incidents that were
detected, if known, the frequency of incidents, and the opportunity the
perpetrator had to commit similar dishonesty. Though these factors make
the assessment in many ways subjective, there is a substantial increase
over time in the value of most types of loss. Potential chargebacks - the
value of credit fraud - is the only value that is not substantially higher by
the end of the period than it was at the beginning. This suggests that the
deterrent effect of the interventions has enabled investigators to improve
the' quality' of the offenders detected at least as far as that can be
measured by the value involved.
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Figure 7.10
MAT trend in detections among new starters as a proportion
of the average number of new starters for the year
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Figure 7.11
MAT trend in employees caught 'red handed' as a proportion
of all employees
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Figure 7.12
MAT trend in the estimated value of loss prevented by
detection of dishonest employees
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(8) Summary
This section summarises the findings from the research.
The study centred on the application of a 'problem solving' approach to
the issue of employee dishonesty in a particular retail organisation. The
purpose of the research was to contribute to the company's policy making
by studying its records of detected offenders, surveying the attitudes to
the honesty of its employees, and by investigating the impact of
prevention interventions based on these sources of information.
Theoretical viewpoint
When studying the records to select those appropriate for inclusion in the
offender analysis, it was clear that there was a wide variation in how
dishonesty could be defined. One aspect was the degree of criminality,
and within the records of investigations undertaken by the company there
was a scale of criminality that touched on organised crime at one end and
merely breaking company rules at the other end. Another aspect was the
complexity of beneficiary and victim. For example, the primary victim of
cases of credit card fraud is the credit provider (not the retailer), and the
beneficiary in some cases of false accounting is the company itself. A third
aspect was the attitude of the company to the offence. Not all criminal
offences committed at work were considered as seriously by company
management.
After investigating the cases involved, the definition of dishonesty used as
the basis of this work was that written by Greenberg and Scott (1996): 'a
non-violent form of property deviance focused on one's company
committed by an employee of that company for personal gain.' However,
it was taken with some pragmatic additional distinctions that arose from
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considering individual cases. The term 'property' is (as Greenberg and
Scott intended) only taken to denote the distinction from 'production'
deviance, and includes cash thefts and frauds, overcharging expenses and
not charging friends for goods or services. The concept of 'personal gain'
was interpreted broadly to include any benefit, even 'esteem', so as to
include cases in which the primary beneficiary of the dishonesty was not
the perpetrator. To establish a standard for seriousness, records were
included only if they were consistent with a criminal offence (even if not
actually prosecuted) and resulted in the employee having to leave the
company (even if they were allowed to resign rather than being
dismissed).
One starting point for the study was a concern that the wide range of
potential influences on dishonesty identified by previous writers was not
taken account of by the company's prevention strategies. Offender
records showed support for a number of theoretical positions.
Deterministic interpretations are supported by the finding that there were
variations in geographical distribution of offenders which correlate with
the areas that have the worst (Le. highest loss as a percentage of sales)
audit results (suggesting a link to particular home environments). This
finding was not replicated by the attitude survey, but possibly because the
geographical categories in the survey were not detailed enough. Further
support for deterministic interpretations comes from the high level of
offending by new starters to the company (1.1 per cent of those with less
than seven months service being detected for dishonesty).
Some evidence for offending representing a rational choice is provided, in
terms of economic motivation, by the higher level of previous debt as
represented by court orders against wages among dishonest staff (three
per cent of whom had court orders) as opposed to all other employees (of
whom only one per cent had court orders). More compelling evidence is
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provided by the effect of some of the crime-specific prevention measures
introduced. Interventions which increased the risks of detection for a
particular type of crime, such as the door alarms and clear rubbish bags
intended to reduce rubbish drop theft, resulted in a considerable drop in
the number of employees detected for that type of offence. The clear
implication is that because the risks have been increased the potentially
dishonest employees have made a rational decision that the rewards no
longer justify the risks. The low average value of offences detected
(almost two thirds being valued at £150 or less) may be interpreted as
evidence to the contrary, as the consequences of detection do not seem a
rational risk to set against such small rewards. However, it was noted that
in terms of economic models of offending (such as proposed by Becker
1968, or Farrell et al., 2000) the' opportunity cost' of time spent in theft
while at work is insignificant, increasing the overall 'economic' benefit to
the perpetrator.
There was also considerable support for interpretations that view
dishonesty as behaviour that is interpreted or reclassified by the offenders
as normal in the workplace. Employees taking goods that could be
classified as not having any value, such as free gifts or 'scrap', provided
evidence to support the role of 'neutralisation' in workplace dishonesty.
The role of retaliation in producing dishonest behaviour was supported
both by individual accounts in the offender records, and also by the
correlation between dissatisfaction and dishonesty in the attitude survey.
On the other hand evidence of the considerable influence on honesty that
can be exerted by supervisory management is provided by individual
accounts among the offender records, and by a correlation between the
degree of integrity shown by management and the honesty of lower
ranked employees.
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Profile of offences
The offender records were grouped into categories according to the
similarity of the offences. This categorisation was better suited to
identifying opportunities for prevention than grouping them by legal
classifications. The first distinctions made were that thefts of stock were
categorised separately from thefts of cash or frauds, and collusion with
outsiders separated from purely internal thefts. Stock thefts undertaken
by employees were most common, representing just over half (54 per cent)
of the cases. Fraud and cash thefts accounted for 29 per cent of the cases,
and collusion the remaining 17 per cent.
Among the detailed classifications, 'walk out' thefts were the most
common form of dishonesty detected, representing over a third of all
cases. Employees took the items out (commonly at break time or the end
of the day) in their clothing or bags. Although a number of cases involved
items being found in places such as inside the lining of jackets or inside a
lunch box, it was more typical that the items were not well hidden. There
were also cases of goods taken or sent out openly but with a plausible
excuse such as a special delivery.
The three next most common forms of dishonesty each accounted for ten
per cent of the cases. The first of these was the group of stock theft cases
classified as 'rubbish drops', that involved the stock being taken out of the
store (most commonly with the store's rubbish) and hidden outside for
collection later. The second was refund frauds, in which employees
overcome the controls in the refund system to pay themselves cash (or
sometimes a credit to their credit card account) from the till as if it
represented a refund to a customer for returned goods. The third was
collusion with an outsider in credit fraud - both by using stolen and
counterfeit credit cards, and by making fraudulent credit account
applications.
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Also detected were cases of theft of scrap (by delivery drivers), collusive
thefts of stock in which the goods were handed over to a member of the
public without payment or without full payment, and straightforward
thefts of cash from the till. Less commonly detected were cases of
employees abusing their staff purchase scheme rights, stealing the money
taken from the tills for banking, or taking the money from customers
instead of putting it into the till.
There were also cases of employees perpetrating credit frauds on their
own, stealing from the petty cash, falsifying returns to fiddle incentives,
copying and then selling software, and committing other frauds. There
was one case of an employee who stole from a shop having returned and
unlocked it after everyone else had gone home, and one of an employee
deliberately leaving a rear door open so that his friends could get in and
take goods.
How commonly particular offences were detected cannot necessarily be
taken as representative of frequency with which they actually take place in
the workplace. The risks of detection are by no means the same for each
type of offence. The attitude survey gives a picture of the most common
forms of dishonesty that is more likely to be representative. Of the five
categories of dishonesty presented in the survey, 'giving special discounts
to friends or relations' was the most common, with 18 per cent of
respondents indicating that it was done by people in their situation (and
72 per cent indicating that it was not or they did not know). Taking
surplus free gifts home was next most common, (seven per cent), then
making personal use of company property, (six per cent), and then
borrowing money or taking home products without authorisation (both
one per cent).
353
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Another contribution to the comparison of detection rates and actual
levels of dishonesty was made by comparing the value associated with the
detected offenders with the values of loss in the company's financial
records (shown as table 4.02).
The disparity between which offences are most commonly detected (Le.
are most common in the offender records), and which offences the survey
reports are most common, is generally consistent with the varying rates of
detection that can be derived by the financial records.
For types of offence where the detection rate derived from these financial
figures is low, the survey indicates a higher prevalence of the offence than
is represented in the numbers of offenders detected. For types of offence
where the detection rate derived from the financial figures is higher, the
survey indicates a lower prevalence of the offence than is represented in
the numbers of offenders detected. From the financial records, the
estimate for the amount of margin loss detected is very low. (The
percentage of this type of dishonesty detected was estimated as 0.1 per
cent at worst and only two per cent at best). In line with this,
unauthorised discounts (the offence most likely to lead to margin loss) is
the most commonly reported in the survey and yet do not feature
commonly in the detection records. In contrast, stock thefts, which the
survey reported as rare, but were the most commonly detected offence in
the offender records showed a higher estimated detection rate using the
financial data. (It was estimated to be between 1.9 per cent and five per
cent of offences being detected.)
Grouping the offences from the detection records in the way described
above identified several common factors that could be useful factors for
targeting prevention. Some identified opportunities for new controls. It
was clear, for example, that the hand-over stock thefts relied on the sales
receipts never being checked by anyone else, and so a regime of occasional
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receipt checks would act as a deterrent. In other cases old controls were
shown not to be effective. The number of walk out thefts detected by
searches showed, for example that the end of day search regime was not
robust enough to act as a deterrent. Identifying opportunities for loss
prevention from the offender records was enhanced by using Clarke and
HomeI's 'opportunity-reducing technique grid' (Clarke 1997, 18).
Profile of offenders
Four hundred and sixty-seven records of dishonest employees were
identified from amongst all of the employees associated with incidents in
the company security database, according to the definition set out above,
during the study period of February 1996 to August 1998. Only 21 per
cent of the records were classified as being of 'dishonest' employees.
(Another 21 per cent was of less serious rule-breaking, classified as
breaches of discipline, but over half represented accounts of negligence
such as failing to secure stock properly.) In broad terms (using
estimations for the numbers of Christmas temporary employees,
contractors, and students on work experience) these dishonest employees
represented just less than one per cent of the workforce.
The comparison of company financial loss values to the values involved in
detected offences was used to give an indication of the proportion of all
dishonest employees who are represented by those who were detected.
This investigation suggests that the detected offenders represented only
between 1.2 per cent and 4.5 per cent all of dishonest employees, from
which it can be inferred that around a third of all employees may act
dishonestly at some time.
Despite this, only one per cent of respondents to the attitude survey
indicated that employees in the same situation as themselves took cash or
products from the company. However, another perspective is provided
by the number who only 'agreed' as opposed to 'agreed strongly' with the
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statements that employees in their situation never took cash or products.
If these responses can be taken as indicating a suspicion that these
practices go on, as opposed to knowing that they do, then the figures - 33
per cent for products, and 27 per cent for cash - are much closer to the
prevalence figure derived from the financial measures and offender
records.
According to the offender records, the employee with the greatest risk of
being detected for dishonesty was found to be young, male, and with
relatively short length of service, though not necessarily in a low-grade
role. Fourteen in a thousand employees under 21 were detected, as
opposed to less than five in a thousand of those over 35. There were only
two in every thousand female employees detected for dishonesty, as
opposed to 12 in every thousand male employees. The number of those
with five years' service or less detected ranged between nine and 12 in a
thousand, but this figure fell to just five in a thousand for those with six to
ten years' service.
The attitude survey supported these findings. Seventeen per cent of 18 to
20 year old respondents thought that people in their situation took cash,
stock or gave unauthorised discounts, but this dropped to between five
per cent and six per cent for the age groups between 41 and 55 years old.
Those with between six months and five years' service thought between
ten per cent and 11 per cent of people in their situation were dishonest,
whilst those with 11 years' service or over thought that only between three
per cent and seven per cent of people in their situation were dishonest.
However, despite this broad match, the attitude survey portrayed
dishonesty as more common among older and longer serving employees
than the offender analysis did. The disparity can best be explained either
by the younger and less established survey respondents being more narve
about what their collegues were up to, or by the offender records being
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biased towards younger more inexperienced employees because they are
easier to catch.
The first alert to the typical detected offender's dishonesty (according to
the offender records) came from the people he or she worked with, but the
case against him or her was' proved' by the company security manager
and the value involved in the dishonesty was very modest. The first alert
to dishonesty for 22 per cent of the offenders was that their manager
became suspicious, 11 per cent were caught by searches carried out by
managers or guards, and for 11 per cent of offenders the first indication
they were dishonest was information given by a colleague. Forty-six per
cent of offenders were proved to have been responsible for the offence by
the intervention of the company security manager. Two thirds of the
offenders were involved in cases valued at £150 or less.
There was little evidence of a culture supportive of dishonesty. The
offender records showed only six per cent of offences were found to have
involved more than one employee working together. Also many records
(11 per cent) recorded employees openly reporting the dishonesty of
colleagues.
The profile of offending was found to change with the age and the length
of service of the offenders. The average age and length of service of
offenders perpetrating different types of dishonest behaviour increases
broadly in line with the sophistication of the offence. Simple thefts of
stock (putting stock outside with the rubbish, or walking out with the
goods hidden on them) are perpetrated by the young with little time with
the company. Offences requiring finding ways around controls in
company systems, such as refund frauds and' fiddles', are perpetrated by
those with longer service and higher average age. Allied to this is the
finding that older employees with longer service are caught by specialist
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people or confidential phone reports, and involved the company security
manager in the investigation that proved the case against them.
Older longer serving employees in general are involved in higher value
dishonesty than young new starters. However, the difference is not very
great, and there are many longer serving older employees prepared to risk
detection for trivial amounts. The highest values were associated with the
longer serving young employees.
Dissatisfaction with treatment or rewards was identified by the attitude
survey as a potential cause of dishonesty. There were significant levels of
some unsatisfactory perceptions. Forty-nine per cent of respondents
disagreed that they were always fairly rewarded for the hours they put in,
25 per cent disagreed that they were well treated by the company, and 16
per cent disagreed they were well treated by their line manager. There
were weak but significant correlations between measures of satisfaction
and reporting dishonesty by employees in their situation. Greatest
perception of not being fairly rewarded was associated with established
and relatively old employees - over 60 per cent of those with six to 15
years' service, and over 50 per cent of those aged 21 to 41.
The attitude survey provided evidence that the attitude to deterrents
varied with the age of the employees. Although the risk of a criminal
conviction was agreed to be a deterrent for all age groups, 16 to 20 year
olds were less influenced than the other age groups. Similarly they
reported being less influenced by the impact their dishonesty may have on
their family, whilst the over 41s agreed more strongly than the others that
it would influence them. The thought of losing their job again affected the
16 to 20 year olds less than the other groups. Whilst the impact of their
dishonesty on what their friends or workmates thought of them increased
across all age groups as age increased.
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Despite the low risk of detection suggested by the offender record
analysis, few of the survey respondents disagreed that they would get
caught if they were dishonest. Only 11 per cent thought they could get
away with taking stock without authorisation, seven per cent giving out
stock without full payment, and six per cent stealing cash. This perceived
risk decreased with the age and length of service.
Although all the employees classified in this study as dishonest lost their
jobs, their chances of getting a criminal conviction were relatively low.
Almost half (48 per cent) of all the offenders were known not to have been
reported to the police or to have not been acted against by the police.
Aside from the 11 per cent who were known to have been sentenced or
cautioned, many of the others of whom the records only state they were
arrested, or in some cases were charged, may have escaped a criminal
record too.
The research identified a number of issues regarding the integrity of
managers.
The offender records showed that they had a surprisingly high rate of
detection for dishonesty. Twelve in every thousand general managers
were found to be dishonest, a rate almost the same as the general sales
staff (15 in a thousand), and higher than that for Saturday staff (11 in a
thousand). Further investigation of the cases of manager dishonesty
showed that the vast majority (13 of the 21 cases studied) represented
managers (who were often relatively young and inexperienced) taking a
cavalier attitude to standards of integrity. The offender record research
included records of managers having a detrimental effect on the integrity
of the store staff as a whole. (In two cases colluding with the employees to
turn a blind eye to credit fraud, in another to misuse money found' over'
in the till, and in another by setting up unofficial reward systems.)
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Respondents to the attitude survey attributed lower levels of integrity to
their managers than they did to employees in their situation. Three per
cent thought their managers took home products without authorisation,
though they thought only one per cent of people in their situation did so.
Nine per cent thought that managers made personal use of company
property, as opposed to six per cent thinking this of people in their
situation. Perceptions of manager integrity correlated with perceptions of
employee honesty significantly and more strongly than measures of
satisfaction did.
There is a similar relationship between integrity in relationships with
customers. Survey respondents believe their managers are more likely to
support lying to customers about the goods, putting sales above honesty,
and break promises to customers than employees. There are correlations
between these measures and the combined honesty measure, providing
support for the view that managers who create a climate of integrity in
relationships with customers have fewer dishonest staff.
Effect of intervention
One of the aims of the study was to investigate the effect of targeted
interventions derived from the offender and offence profiles.
The principal interventions were determined to be: fraud prevention,
training to tackle collusion in customer frauds, clear rubbish bags and
improved door alarms and labelling to tackle rubbish drop thefts,
searching with a 'search wand' metal detector every time employees left
the branch to tackle walk out theft, and the creation of a new dishonesty
prevention video to be shown to staff to tackle dishonesty generally.
Establishing financial measures of success proved unsuccessful,
principally owing to a failure to establish Iexperimental conditions' under
which to identify the impact the interventions had. (It was not possible to
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establish a control group and 'before and after' comparisons were
compromised by interventions overlapping each other.) At a company
level the principal performance measure dishonest prevention would
contribute to, the audited stock loss as a percentage of sales, declined
significantly during the study period. However this cannot be claimed
absolutely as representing the success of the interventions, as accounting
problems in the distribution network, taking place at the same time, meant
that part of this decline was a misrepresentation.
The effect of the interventions on detection rates was monitored during
the interventions, but in the short term it was difficult to be sure whether
to interpret the results as positive or negative. Was a reduction in the
number of a particular type of offenders detected a positive improvement
in the deterrent effect of a measure or a negative failure of the detection
resources? In the short term, measures such as clear rubbish bags and
search wands, which had been intended as deterrents, increased the
number of employees detected for 'rubbish drop' or 'walk out' theft.
However, in the long term each of the measures has been shown to be
effective. The targeted crimes of collusion in credit fraud, and rubbish
drop theft have declined consistently as a percentage of offenders detected
since the measures were introduced. The number of detections among
new starters has declined since the company started showing the new
video to them, and there was some evidence from the attitude survey that
the training video increased the perceived risk of detection among those
who watched it. Sixteen per cent of those who had not seen the video
disagreed they would be caught for at least one type of dishonesty, whilst
only ten per cent of those who had definitely seen it thought the same.
(However there were flaws in the methodology that call this finding into
doubt.)
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The deterrent effect of the stock theft prevention measures has been shown
by a decline in the trend of employees caught 'red handed'. Though
another interpretation would be that the increased risks have been met by
greater effort on the part of the dishonest employees - and that employees
are now more difficult to catch.
Despite this the overall rate of detection has not been affected by the
success of the interventions. This could be seen as evidence of
displacement, but it could also be that a reduction in the number of
offenders would not have any great impact in the number of detections.
Given the evidence that the detected offenders represent such a small
proportion of all the dishonest employees in the company, the detection
and investigation resources of the company may have continued to detect
the same numbers of employees even though the 'pool' they are fishing
has got smaller. The trend in the values associated with offenders
detected seems to support this view. The value has increased substantially
since the interventions were adopted. This could mean that the employees
who were previously tempted into trivial dishonesty have been deterred,
and the detection resources are focusing on more serious offenders.
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(9) Conclusions
This section uses the evidence presented in the preceding sections to
discuss theoretical perspectives of employee dishonesty, to draw
conclusions for the management of dishonesty by retail businesses, and
to suggest avenues down which further research and investigation could
profitably progress.
Theoretical perspectives
Itwas clear from this study that the simplistic views of dishonesty as a
response to greed, or as representing the polluting effect of 'dishonest'
people getting into the business are both flawed.
Previously published literature puts forward a variety of theoretical
perspectives. In figure 2.02 on page 56 I represented these as a number of
potential influences acting on the employee. Rather than identifying one
particular influence as best explaining employee dishonesty, this study
finds evidence that all the influences included in that figure are
appropriate, at least in some cases. A model of employee dishonesty
which portrays the employee as encouraged or deterred from dishonesty
by a number of forces may indeed therefore be an appropriate one.
In addition, the study identified some evidence that the influences become
more or less influential in relation to different groups of employees. The
evidence for this is complicated by the fact that the two grouping
characteristics are age and length of service and they are very substantially
inter-related.
In figure 2.02 I grouped factors that the literature identified as influencing
the general willingness to offend separately from those factors that the
literature identified as influencing the decision to commit a particular
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dishonest act. Both of these groups I then broke down further into
'external' and 'internal' influences. I'll consider each of these theoretical
perspectives in the light of the results of this study. I'll take each in turn,
starting with external influences on the willingness to offend.
A number of the factors influencing the willingness to offend were
connected with the quality of management. The high rate at which general
managers were detected for displaying a cavalier attitude to standards of
integrity within the offender records identified that there was a potential
issue with management standards in the company being studied. The
employee attitude survey showed that there was a correlation between
employees' perception of the integrity of their managers, and their
perception of the honesty of employees. This confirmed that managers
were influencing the honesty of the employees. However, the effect
observed was different from the 'supervisory collusion' recorded in the
previous literature. Dalton (1959), Bensman and Gerver (1963), and Ditton
(1977), for example, recorded supervisors encouraging employees to be
dishonest to achieve company goals. Instead, this study has found an
influence resulting from managers setting a poor example.
In addition, within this grouping of external influences on the general
willingness to offend, were issues related to the fairness of legitimate
rewards and the way employees were treated by the company. The
attitude survey confirmed a relationship between these issues and the
perceived integrity of employees. Job satisfaction correlated with honesty,
broadly confirming the positions of Adams (1996), Greenberg and Scott
(1996) and Greenberg (1990). (The correlation of 'satisfaction' with
honesty may support Zeitlin's (1971) notion that honesty provides a more
stimulating environment for the employee, but this question was not
specifically addressed.)
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However, Tucker's (1989) assertion that employee dishonesty is the
reaction of the 'low status, temporary, socially isolated employee' to their
social status seems over simplistic in the light of the detailed evidence. He
assumed age equated with 'low status' and noted that the greatest levels
of theft were associated with the lowest age employees. The detection
records show a slightly more complex picture. Young employees with the
higher status derived from longer service were more commonly detected
(as a percentage of employees in this category) than young new starters
and in terms of the value taken represented a higher risk to the business.
This is probably related to the finding from the employee attitude survey
that dissatisfaction was greater in employees with longer service than in
the new starters.
It seems clear from the literature that workplace norms could act as a
strong influence on dishonesty. There was little evidence from the study
to indicate that a culture of dishonesty existed as a shared workplace
'norm'. This does not challenge the influence of workplace norms on
employee honesty, however. It just seemed more likely that dishonest
employees worked independently in the particular company studied, in
the way Mars (1984) described as a 'donkey' culture. As might be
imagined, it was in the larger stores that employees were more likely to
found to have worked together, and the employees being dishonest
together were all young.
The type of dishonesty that came closest to representing dishonesty
accepted by the workplace culture was the collusion of employees in credit
application fraud. As discussed on page 116 it was sometimes difficult to
distinguish cases of active collusion with a fraudulent application for a
tangible reward, from cases of 'turning a blind eye' to the possibility of
fraud in order to boost business performance. This suggested that the
acceptance of the latter was fuelling the former. The impact of the
'education' initiative described in the study shows that such a culture is
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susceptible to influence as a result of a 'removal of excuses' message from
the managment, at least within the business studied.
Another group of influences on the willingness to be dishonest identified
on the figure 2.02 model I had labelled the 'internal' influences on the
individual. In part these influences could be seen as an inherent
propensity of the individual towards dishonest acts that have resulted
from social factors earlier in the employee's life, or even, as proposed by
Cortes (1972), their biology. The detection records give some support for
this view. Although the greatest percentage of dishonesty was detected
among employees with one to five years' service, those with less than
seven months' service were almost as high, and far higher than those with
six to ten years' service. It seems reasonable that people who started
stealing as soon as they joined were considerably influenced in their
willingness to offend by factors they brought with them when they joined.
To put it another way, it is unlikely that the culture they discovered after
they had joined could have' turned around' more honest attitudes so
quickly. The attitude survey shows that employees perceive the greatest
influence on their offending in this way. Table 6.04 on page 292 shows
that 83 per cent strongly agreed they would be influenced by 'personal
standards of honesty' if they contemplated dishonesty. However, any
contribution to this made by their family background was not
acknowledged to the same extent. Only 76 per cent strongly agreed they
would be influenced by their family if they contemplated dishonesty and
this dropped to 69 per cent for the 16 to 20 age group.
There was also evidence that employees internally re-categorised what
they were doing to 'neutralise' conventional moral classifications in a way
Matza (1964) described in terms of delinquency. Many employees took
goods that were of low value, or were substandard, or were normally
'consumed' as part of their work (such as floppy disks used by technical
staff). Some of the comments made by offenders recorded in the detection
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records made a strong link between taking these items and Matza's Idenial
of harm' category of neutralisation. However, given that Matza's
explanation is vulnerable to the argument that neutralisations may just be
rationalisations after the event, the evidence cannot be taken as
contributing in any conclusive way to the debate about the nature of
neutralisation. Itmerely provides an attractive and plausible
interpretation of information that is otherwise difficult to explain. (There
are few alternative explanations for the way employees risk the
consequences of detection for items that are of very low value.) In
addition, investigation of the circumstances whereby managers were
detected for dishonesty showed that some had personal problems that
seemed to have influenced them. These seem to represent the sort of
'unshareable problems' that Cressey (1959) described as capable of 'over-
riding' conventional moral attachments.
Turning to the influences for a particular dishonest act, which were
identified separately, again, a number were labelled 'external' factors.
These comprised the attracting influences of rewards and opportunities,
balanced against deterring forces of difficulty of the dishonest act and the
risk and consequences of detection.
The principal contribution to criminology that this study makes is in
support of the importance of the 'situational' approach to crime
prevention that manipulates these factors. The results of the interventions
show that offenders are deterred from particular offences by interventions
that increase the risks and the difficulty of the dishonest act. For example,
the introduction of clear rubbish bags and back door alarms seem to have
eradicated the offence of stealing by putting stock out with the rubbish.
This is difficult to interpret in terms other than a rational choice being
made by the offenders that the rewards no longer justified the risks and
the effort required.
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Having said that, there was evidence of the other factors having an
influence. The attitude survey showed that those with one to five years'
service disagreed more than most other groups that they would be caught
if they were dishonest and they also had the highest detection rate. So
lower perception of risk was associated with higher offending. However,
even more of those in the group with over five years' service disagreed
that they would be caught if they were dishonest, and they were the group
with the lowest detected offending. So the lowest perception of risk was
associated with the lowest rate of offending. This contrast could be
interpreted in terms of the relatively lower value of the available rewards
to employees in more senior positions. (The individual perception of a
reward I have classed as an 'internal' factor and will touch on below.)
However, the contrast may reflect other influences taking effect. (For
example older employees were more influenced by the effect offending
would have on their family than younger employees.)
Study of the offender records suggests that the real risk of detection is
relatively slight, and the consequences limited to losing employment.
However if dishonesty is not a 'shared' activity then it is probable that
employees do not realise this, and it has little influence. Mars (1974) and
Altheide (1978) described dishonesty as controlled at a particular level by
work group norms in situations in which the workplace culture supported
dishonesty. The work group would limit theft to a level that would not
attract undue attention. The fact that some employees stole to such an
extent that their dishonesty became quickly to light is good evidence that
such a culture is not working in the company studied.
I turn, finally, to the internal aspects of the influences on committing a
particular dishonest act. In part, these are inextricably related to the
'external' risks and rewards, in that it is the value put on them by the
employee, a very subjective measure, which will determine how effective
a deterrent will be. As has been mentioned by Adams (1965), or Hollinger
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and Clark (1984), the risk of losing their job may be viewed very
differently by different age groups. This is borne out by the attitude
survey in which only 59 per cent of employees in the sixteen to twenty age
group strongly agreed that they would be influenced by the thought of
losing their job if they contemplated dishonesty, in contrast to over 75 per
cent strongly agreeing among those aged 27 or over.
Another factor influencing all but the first dishonest act will be the
experience gained from previous dishonesty. The low detection rate and
the low risk of prosecution will mean that any previous experience the
offenders had was probably very positive, and a strong influence towards
further dishonest acts. However, employees very rarely admitted to any
previous offences, and the study was not able to assess the impact of this
factor.
Clinnard and Quinney (1967) identified the special characteristic of
occupational crime being the 'way in which the offender conceives
himself'. They assert that the offender' generally regards himself as a
respectable citizen'. Consequently one of the greatest deterrents to
dishonesty may be the risk to the employee's' self image'. This view is
supported by the attitude survey's findings on the deterrent effect of the
possibility of getting a criminal record. Eighty per cent of respondents to
the attitude survey strongly agreed that they would be influenced by the
thought of getting a criminal record. (Only 'personal standards of
honesty' had a higher percentage agreement.) Also, unlike other factors,
the risk of a criminal record was strongly agreed to be an influence by all
age groups.
Targeting prevention
This study establishes that there are benefits to targeting prevention
initiatives at particular groups of offenders and offences.
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In part this is established by the way that the targeted interventions
undertaken during the study period had a discernible impact on particular
types of offending. In addition it established the contradictory or
unproductive nature of some of the messages typically disseminated by
employee honesty programmes. For example, many programmes focus
on the effect that dishonesty has on colleagues, friends and family.
However, the attitude survey has shown that this message is not likely to
have much impact on young newly started employees. On the other hand,
older employees are sceptical about the ability of the company to detect
dishonesty, and emphasising the certainty of detection is not likely to
influence them in the way that it would new starters.
The study shows that there is a need for better measures of employee
dishonesty within retail businesses. There is a management saying that
asserts that 'what gets measured gets done'. If this is accurate, then the
management of employee dishonesty is currently at a severe
disadvantage.
It has proved very difficult to establish how much employee dishonesty is
costing the business. In addition the study has shown that it is very
difficult to establish financial measures for the performance of any
initiatives that are taken. Detection rates can give feedback on the effect
initiatives are having, but are always subject to the double-edged nature of
the figures, potentially measuring effectiveness of detection rather than
deterrent impact. A greater concern with measurement could lead to the
establishment of measurement regimes that include a control group.
However, the study itself suggests an alternative to financial measures. It
may be better to measure the effectiveness of prevention initiatives by
direct measurement of the attitudes of the employees via a survey.
Regularly conducting surveys of attitudes to honesty among the
workforce, of the type used in this study, would allow year on year
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comparisons to be made. Changes in the perception of the prevalence of
dishonesty, the perceived risk of detection, could be used as measures of
how well the deterrent message has been received.
The way that the detection of offenders is generally viewed is called into
question by the study. The analysis of the offender records shows that the
savings that can be gained by removing particular employees from the
business is inconsequential compared to the potential saving from
deterring employees from offending. However, as the risk of a criminal
conviction is the most effective deterrent for all groups of employees, a
credible detection regime is essential. The implication is that the detection
effort needs to be aiming for quality, and not quantity of offenders. This
means, for example, seeking out higher-ranking dishonest employees who
are having a greater impact on the culture of the business, and those
involved in greater value offences that are having greater commercial
effect. An emphasis on quality would also mean reducing the number of
investigations that are ambiguous in terms of their message to other
potentially dishonest employees in the business because the offenders
were allowed to resign or could not be prosecuted.
Management strategy
In the introduction I asserted that the approach employers take to
preventing dishonesty seldom reflects the complexity of the problem.
Looking at the broad picture of the problem that has emerged from the
study it is possible that a flexible management strategy could be matched
to the problem.
There are essentially two types of approach that can be taken by the
company. The first type is a 'control' approach that relies on the
company's power over the staff and the second type is a support approach
that emphasises the company's concern for its employees.
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The 'control' message stresses that offenders will be caught. It is
concerned with ensuring that employees conform to standards and
instructions put in place to ensure that they do not have an opportunity to
steal. It tends to emphasise the company's surveillance measures. It
stresses the particularly unpleasant consequences for employees who steal
or transgress the rules. The' support' message plays on more personal
values - focusing on how by stealing the staff member will be 'letting
themselves down' and 'letting down' the rest of 'the team'. The dire
consequence of being caught stealing is also stressed, but not as something
the company will gleefully impose on you, rather something the offender
will bring on themselves by stealing and which the company wants to
protect them from. The supportive message also stresses the benevolence
of the company, both as a way of showing that the employee doesn't really
need to steal, and also to emphasise the status, reputation and benefits the
employee will be throwing away.
These two approaches also have resonance with a similar divergence of
approaches observed within the study of personnel management. These
two sets of propositions and assumptions about the general management
of employees are enunciated by Douglas McGregor. His theory X (that
man is by nature indolent, irresponsible and needs to be led) has affinities
with the' control' message, whilst the Y theory (that people have the
capacity to assume responsibility and can be encouraged to share
organisational g?als) has affinities with the 'support' messages. There are
also similarities with Blake and Mouton's (1964) concept of management
styles fitting into a grid formed from two scales of concern: one of concern
for production, and the other of concern for people.
I feel that in a comparable way to that in which Paul Hersey's situational
management concept (1984) develops Blake and Mouton's management
grid and targets different management approaches to employees at
different stages in their career, it is probable that the management of staff
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dishonesty should differ for employees at the different stages in their
career. There is considerable similarity between the measures in
situational management theory of 'directive' and 'supportive' management
behaviour and the 'control' and 'supportive' approaches to employee
dishonesty.
The degree of 'support' and 'control' approach could be varied according
to the age and length of service of employees. It is difficult to be precise
about how to divide up the groups because age and length of service are
so strongly related, but there appear to be four groups. Firstly there are
the young new starters, around twenty years old or younger, with less
than a year's service. Then there are young but established employees in
their twenties who have been with the company for two or three years.
The third group represents the experienced employees with more than
three years' service. There are then a group of senior employees, who by
age, rank or length of service could be said to be in a further group.
The evidence from this study is that young new starters are at great risk of
being tempted towards dishonesty, and that they are less likely to be
deterred from dishonesty than other employees by the thinking of the
effect their dishonesty may have on their family, friends or colleagues, or
by the threat of losing their jobs. On the other hand more of them think
that they would be caught than do the older employees. Many of the
particularly young recent starters also do not seem as aware as older
employees that dishonesty does take place in the company. The detection
records suggest that they are more likely to commit the simplest types of
offence, and to account for the lowest individual values.
For this group of employees a response based strongly on 'control' seems
most appropriate, restricting access to high-risk operations and checking
regularly that they are complying with systems. There seems less
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opportunity with these employees to persuade them that dishonesty is not
in their best interests - it seems more effective to deny them opportunities.
Established employees, who are still relatively young but have gained
experience of systems, present the greatest risk. Both offender records and
survey reports put them at high risk of offending. Young experienced
employees commit the highest value offences. However, compared to the
young new starters they are more influenced by the potential
consequences of detection, the risk of losing their jobs, and to some extent
the effect on their family, friends and workmates.
This suggests that both control and support strategies are appropriate to
this group. A regime that reduces opportunities can be backed up
effectively with a persuasive portrayal of the risks, and efforts to remove
the potential for neutralisation.
Offending among the experienced employees is less common, but is more
sophisticated, and less easy to detect when it does take place. However,
these employees are more influenced by the effect of any dishonesty on
their family, friends and colleagues than are younger employees. It is this
group, however, who are most likely to feel unrewarded or dissatisfied
with their treatment, and therefore at greatest risk of retaliatory
criminality .
Controls that remove opportunities are less likely to be effective with this
group of employees. Their greater experience means that they are more
likely to be able to bypass them. They are more likely to be influenced by
having the risks of offending portrayed clearly. In addition, providing the
support to them that removes the potential for grievances is likely to
reduce the potential for retaliatory theft.
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The small group of older employees with the longest service seems to
represent the lowest risk, and there is a case for expending the least
resources on them. The number feeling un-rewarded is lower, and they
are the most influenced by deterrent factors, particularly the effect
dishonesty would have on their family. However, the study of managers
showed that crime as a response to a severe personal problem affected
those of higher than average age. This makes clear a need for keeping
good communication with this group, even if it is appropriate to reduce
the intensity of the' support' approach to prevention.
Itwould not be appropriate to consider all managers as fitting into this
fourth category, however. The situational management approach to
general management advocates a return to the first approach whenever
employees move into a new role, and this seems appropriate in terms of
this model too. Dishonesty among newly appointed young managers
would probably be controlled best by an emphasis on controls, among
established managers by an approach that removes excuses and highlights
risks as well as maintaining controls, and among experienced managers by
focusing on removal of grievances and maintaining good communication.
The outline of this approach is shown in figure 9.01 below.
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Figure 9.01
A situational approach to managing employee honesty
Focus
on
support
High
Low
Experienced Established
employees Employees
Remove excuses Highlight consequences
Highlight consequences Remove excuses
Counteract dissatisfaction Remove opportunities
Riqorous controls
Long-serving Young new
employees starters
Communicate Remove opportunities
Rigorous controls
Low High
Focus on control
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Implications for the future of electrical retailing
The current trend in electrical retailing is to move to larger units with
many more employees in a style of operation much more like a
supermarket than the traditional high street electrical store. The results of
this study suggest the change to this type of trading will have a number of
implications for the management of employee honesty.
Within the larger new stores there is less of a role for the expert sales
adviser, and a greater role for lower grade 'shelf fillers'. This will result in
a greater number of less skilled and therefore probably younger
employees. The reduced number of more skilled jobs will probably result
in greater employee turnover, and more new starters. This will mean
greater numbers of new employees in the highest risk groups for
offending.
In addition, though the study found no evidence that there was a shared
culture of dishonesty in the business, it was in the larger shops that
employees were most likely to work together. The new shops, with larger
numbers of lower grade employees will have a greater chance of such a
culture developing. Avoiding this happening will be a considerable
challenge for the management in an environment in which increased
customer theft risks from additional open display merchandise will also
provide a ready excuse to explain stock shortages. However, it has been
shown that the standards set by management can have an impact, and the
shift in emphasis that greater self service will bring from managing for
service rather than sales is likely to make it easier to set standards that
encourage integrity.
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Future research
Within the business the next stage to the process started by this study will
be to develop the situational management strategy suggested by the
study. It seems appropriate to develop this material into a training
workshop for store managers. Itmay be possible to implement these
workshops in particular areas on an experimental basis and investigate the
impact it makes.
Allied to this there is a need to develop measures of dishonesty in the
workplace, possibly, as suggested above, by repeating the honesty survey
and investigating the comparisons with previous results.
There are two issues that the study touches on that would benefit from
further study beyond the confines of an individual company.
The first is the issue of deterrents. The survey indicated differences
between different age groups in the way that they respond to different
potential deterrent influences. These results were not always what was
expected. (For example, it was expected that younger employees would be
more put off by the effect their dishonesty would have on their family,
meaning their parents, but it was older employees who were most
influenced by this, presumably interpreting this as the effect on their
children.) It is possible that prevention initiatives could be improved by
further research into this, establishing the significance of the effect in a
wider study. Itwould also be of benefit to establish whether the reported
responses to these factors by all employees are shared by offenders. In
conjunction with the empirical gathering of data on deterrents it could he
very informative to pursue the economic modelling described by Farrell et
al. (2000) to include the special case of employees (for whom the
opportunity cost of participation in crime is so low, yet the potential risk
of loss of earnings potential that would result from discovery is so high).
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Such modelling has the potential to inform the way targeted deterrents are
constructed.
The other issue is the relationship between the culture of an organisation
and the management of honesty. The correlations between the attitude to
management or job satisfaction and the compromised measure of honesty
used in this study (honesty among employees in the same situation)
would benefit from further study by outsiders who could conduct a more
direct self-report study. Such an investigation would give the opportunity
to introduce the company culture as a variable by selecting respondents
from a number of different companies.
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Annexe A: Tables
Table A.Ol
Correlations between geographic rates for audit loss,
detection rates, and employee measures
Correlations between geographic (county) rates
Detection
AuditLoss Rate YoungMgrs YoungStaff NewStarters
AuditLoss Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.224" -.055 -.153" -.146·
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .445 .032 .040
N 198 198 198 198 198
Detection Rate Pearson Correlation -.224" 1.000 .156" .003 -.057
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .028 .971 .428
N 198 198 198 198 198
YoungMgrs Pearson Correlation -.055 .156" 1.000 .543" .257"
Sig. (2-tailed) .445 .028 .000 .000
N 198 198 198 198 198
YoungStaff Pearson Correlation -.153" .003 .543" 1.000 •. 697*
Sig. (2-tailed) .032 .971 .000 .000
N 198 198 198 198 198
NewStarters Pearson Correlation -.146" -.057 .257*' .697* 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .428 .000 .000
N 198 198 198 198 198
"". Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
". Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table A.02
Believe people in their situation steal cross tabulated with
age group
[I'hought people in their situation
stole cash, stock or via discounts
Age group of lNotknown No ~es fIotal
espondent o at least one
Iquestion
lNotKnown ~ount 19 ~5 ~ rt06
Yo within Age group of 18.5% ~9.6% ~.9% ~OO.O%
espondent
I....ess than IS ~ount ~1 ~5 ~O ~
Yo within Age group of 11.5% r;S.I% ~0.4% ~OO.O%
espondent
~8 to 20 ~ount 24 ~69 ~8 ~1
Yo within Age group of ~0.4% r;3.2% ~6.5% ~OO.O%
espondent
121to 25 ~ount ~1 ~56 125 ~02
Yo within Age group of ~0.4% ~.2% ~2.4% ~OO.O%
espondent
126to 30 ~ount ~ ~12 ~2 ~30
Yo within Age group of ~.6% ~6.2% ~.2% ~OO.O%
espondent
~1 to 35 ~ount ~O ~6 9 ~15
Yo within Age group of ~.'7% ~3.5% 7.8% ~OO.O%
espondent
~6to 40 ~ount ~O ~8 9 ~
Yo within Age group of ~3.0% ~5.3% 1.7% ~OO.O%
espondent
~1 to 46 ~ount ~ ~ 3 ~'7
Yo within Age group of ~4.0% ~0.'7% 5.3% ~OO.O%
espondent
~6to 50 lCount 14 ~1 12 ~'7
Vowithin Age group of 0.8% ~3.8% ~.4% ~OO.O%
espondent
~1 to 55 ~ount ~2 12 ~.
Vowithin Age group of 12.9% ~.4% 15.'7% ~OO.O%
espondent
f56to 60 ~ount ~ ~4 II ~6
Vowithin Age group of 16·3% ~'7.5% 16·3% ~OO.O%
espondent
~ver 60 ~ount ~ ~ ~
Vowithin Age group of ~1.1% ~8.9% ~OO.O%
espondent
rrotal ~ount ~06 1892 ~13 ~111
Yo within Age group of ~.5% 180.3% ~0.2% ~OO.O%
Irespondent
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Table A.03
Thought people in their situation stole cross tabulated with
length of service
Thought people in their situation stole Tota
cash, stock or via discounts
Length of service Not known to No Oishones
at least one dishones
question
6 months or less eoun 17 8~ 4 106
% within Length of service 16.0% 80.2% 3.8% 100.0%
More than 6 eoun 34 223 27 284
months, but less
than a yea
% within Length of service 12.0% 78.5% 9.5% 100.0%
1 to 5 years Coun 46 405 58 509
% within Length of service 9.0% 79.6% 11.4% 100.0%
6 to 10 years eoun 5 84 16 105
% within Length of service 4.8% 80.0% 15.2% 100.0%
11 to 15 years eoun 1 58 2 61
% within Length of service 1.6% 95.1°1c 3.3Ofc ioo.os
Over 15 years eoun 3 36 3 42
% within Length of service 7.1% 85.7% 7.1°1c 100.0%
Ok/ns Coun 1 3 4
% within Length of service 25.0% 75.0% 100.0%
Total coun 106 892 113 1111
% within Length of service 9.5% 80.3Ofc 10.2°1c 100.0Ofc
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Table A.04
Thought people in their situation stole cross tabulated with
location
Thought people in their situation
stole cash, stock or via discounts
Location Not known Ne Yes Total
South Eas Coun 35 2804 32 351
% within Location 10.0% 80.9% 9.1% 100.0%
South Wes Coun 25 131 18 18C
% within Location 13.9% 76.1% 10.0% 100.0%
Midlands Coun 1E 14€ 20 181
% within Location 8.3% 80.7% 11.0% 100.0%
North eoun 2C 2104 32 26€
England
% within Location 7.5% 80.5o/c 12.0% 100.0%
Scotland eoun 3 6~ E 81
% within Location 3.7% 85.2% 11.1% 100.0%
Dklns eoun 8 4~ 2 52
% within Location 15.4% 80.8o/c 3.8% 100.0%
Total eoun 10€ 894 11~ 1111
% within Location 9.5% 80.3o/c 10.2% 100.0%
394
A Targeted Approach to Managing Retail Employee Dishonesty
Martin Speed
Table A.OS
Marital Status cross tabulated with' effect on my family
would influence me if I considered stealing'
What influences my personal honesty:- The possible effect on
my family would influence me if I considered stealing
Marital Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Dklns Tota
Status strong I) strongl)
Married Coun 29E 49 ~ 2 12 360
% within 81.9% 13.6% .6% .6% 3.3% 100.0%
Marita
Status
Single eoun 537 147 1E 11 14 72f
% within 74.1% 20.3% 2.2% 1.5% 1.9% 100.0%
Marital
Status
Dklns Coun 1~ 9 1 2 2€
%within 53.8% 34.6% 3.8% 7.7% 100.0'*
Marital
Status
Total eoun 84€ 201: H 13 28 1111
%within 76.1% 18.5% 1.7% 1.2% 2.5% 100.0'*
Marital
Status
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Table A.06
Length of service cross tabulated with 'losing my job would
influence me if I considered stealing'
What influences my personal honesty:- The thought 0 Total
losing my job would influence me if I considered stealing
Length 0 Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Dk/ns
service strongl~ strongl)
6 months 0 eoun 75 2C E 6 10E
less
% within Length 0 70.8°1c 18.9% 4.7% 5.7% 100.0%
service
More than 6 eoun 191 68 10 4 5 284
months, bu
less than a
year
% within Length 0 69.4% 23.9% 3.5% 1.4% 1.8% 100.0%
service
1 to 5 years eoun 344 119 20 13 13 509
% within Length 0 67.6% 23.4% 3.9% 2.6% 2.6% 100.0%
service
6 to 10 eoun 80 21 1 3 105
years
% within Length 0 76.2% 20.0% 1.0% 2.9% 100.0%
service
11 to 15 eoun 47 9 2 ~ 61
years
% within Length 0 77.0% 14.8% 3.3% 4.9% 100.0%
service
Over 15 eoun 35 4 3 42
years
% within Length 0 83.3% 9.5% 7.1% 100.0%
service
Dk/ns eoun 2 2 4
% within Length 0 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
service
Total eoun 780 243 40 18 30 1111
% within Length 0 70.2% 21.9% 3.6% 1.6% 2.7% 100.0o/c
service
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Table A.07
'Thought that they would get caught' cross tabulation with
age group
Thought that the) Age Group Total
would get caught fo
at least one type 0
dishonest)
Not known 16 to 2C 21 to 21 28 to 41 Over 41
Yes coun 8~ 26~ 21E 237 130 940
% within 84.0% 82.3% 83.0% 85.9% 90.9% 84.6%
Age
grou~
Ne coun 11 58 4~ 39 13 171
% within 16.0% 17.7% 17.0o/c 14.1% 9.1O/C 15.4%
Age
grou~
Total Coun 10E 321 25~ 27€ 14~ 1111
% withir 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0o/c 100.0%
Age
grou~
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Table A.13
Thought that they would get caught for at least one type of
dishonesty * Saw the video Crosstabulation
Saw the video Total
Did not see May have Saw it
it seen it
Thought that the) Yes Coun 353 524 63 940
would get caught for
at least one type 0
dishonesty
% within 83.8% 84.5% 90.0% 84.6%
Saw the
videc
No Coun 68 ge 7 171
% within 16.2% 15.5% 10.0% 15.4%
Saw the
video
Total eoun 421 620 7e 1111
% within 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Saw the
videc
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Annexe B: Basis for calculation of annual losses from
offender records
Offenders generally said it was the first time they had stolen. However, in
many cases there was clear evidence that this was not the case. To
establish annual values for each offender involved arbitrary decisions, but
gave a valid perspective nonetheless. If not, some crimes, such as refund
fraud, where it is easier to get a list of potential crimes to investigate,
would be seen as much more costly.
If there was a specific time scale then it was assumed that they would have
continued to steal at that rate for the rest of the year. So if the value
recorded on the incident report represented the loss was established over
the last two months, then it was assumed that they would steal six times
that amount in a year.
If nothing was known about the rate of offending then it was assumed that
the loss established represented a monthly value.
If there was good evidence that it was a more common occurrence-
usually an investigation revealing evidence on the day of the interview as
well as the original incident, then it was assumed that they were weekly.
Some thefts required special circumstances, then an arbitrary decision
based on my experience was used to estimate how often it would have
been likely that this type of incident could have taken place.
Values represent loss to the business - so values are cost price of replacing
stock, not retail sales values.
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Many incidents did not have exact values, and estimates were included.
Many of these could be accurate - the incident report would just say Ia
game' and an average value for the cost price of a game could be included.
However, some, especially frauds, were very vague, and so conservative
estimates for the less serious of this type of incident were included. Itwas
assumed that if the value had been considerable, greater efforts to include
an estimate would have been made.
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